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ABSTRACT 
 
Incorporated into the Eurocentric world order, Koreans have represented their national 
self and the world within the framework of Eurocentric discourses throughout the 
processes of modernization in changing global and national circumstances. What I call 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a historically constructed knowledge system based upon 
the relations constructed around the concepts of sŏnjin’guk (advanced country) and 
hujin’guk (backward country). It has provided South Koreans with dominant 
interpretive frameworks of national identities and worldviews in their national 
developmental processes. One of its most notable characteristics is a hierarchical 
distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, in which the former has the latter as its 
alienated other. As an ideal image, sŏnjin’guk has played important roles in guiding the 
transformation of the Korean society, e.g., as an urgent national goal and central 
reference points. As previous research is rare, this dissertation aims to answer basic 
questions about the concept of sŏnjin’guk and a system of knowledge constructed 
around it. 
The primary foci of this dissertation lie on the basic assumptions, characteristics, 
formation and transformation, and historical backgrounds of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. 
In particular, this study examines its central concepts, classificatory frameworks, 
contexts of use, and identity constructions; historical conditions of its formation and 
transformation; contestations over and challenges to it; and its comparison with 
neighboring East Asian countries’ dominant discourses. Grounded upon the theories of 
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discourse, hegemony, developmentalism, and Eurocentrism in the global historical 
context, this study assumes that developmentalism is a global discursive construction 
reflecting Eurocentric worldviews in specific historical circumstances. 
Methodologically, this study employs the discourse analysis of newspaper texts as the 
main research method with semi-structured interview skills as supplementary one.  
As a contribution mainly to global studies, cultural studies, development studies 
as well as Korean studies, this dissertation shows the following major findings and 
arguments. First, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is premised upon a distinction between 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, into which South Koreans have projected their positive and 
negative developmental values into them respectively. Second, the discourse has its 
historical root in the early modern discourses of kaehwa (enlightenment) and 
munmyŏng (civilization) in terms of Korea’s discursive responses to the Eurocentric 
world order. Third, the discourse has transformed its connotations and political 
implications in changing historical circumstances since its rise as a hegemonic 
discursive system supporting South Korean developmental regime in the 1960s. Fourth, 
the basic assumptions and ideas of the discourse are challenged and contested in a 
variety of ways by counter-developmentalist socio-economic groups. And last, the 
discourse shows South Koreans’ distinctive national identities and worldviews 
compared with Chinese and Japanese mainstream discourses on national identity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“What is the political party that will lead our fatherland to sŏnjinhwa and sŏnjin’guk, 
following the wishes of President Park Chung-Hee? Isn’t it the Grand National Party? 
In order for the Grand National Party to lead our country to sŏnjin’guk, President Lee 
Myung-Bak should make a success. [. . .] I think that it is the calling of our times that 
the Grand National Party put South Korea up to the level of sŏnjin’guk by re-taking 
power for the next term, and also think that there is no other political party than the 
Grand National Party in South Korea to be able to do it. [. . .] I think that if such a 
power as the Roh Moo-Hyun government is established again, or if the Democratic 
Party, leftist party, takes power, our country would eventually fail in entering into 
sŏnjin’guk. It is my idea that President Lee Myung-Bak should make the basic 
framework for our country to enter into sŏnjin’guk and, then, it should be done by the 
next president from our Grand National Party to complete the achievement of 
sŏnjin’guk. In this way, if we make [GDP per capita] above $30,000, then it is unlikely 
to drop below $30,000. However, in our times of $20,000, we are unable to enter into 
full sŏnjin’guk because we are up and down around $15,000 and $20,000. [. . .] Isn’t it 
that our Grand National Party should re-take power for the next term if it is to upgrade 
our country to the level of sŏnjin’guk, following the competent Lee Myung-Bak 
administration? Isn’t it that it should be able to achieve the era of $30,000 in GDP per 
capita? For this, we should re-take power for the next term.” (Grand National Party 
2010)1  
 
The controversial statement above recently made by a top-ranked official of the ruling 
Grand National Party (Hannaradang) well demonstrates the status of the term 
sŏnjin’guk (advanced country) in contemporary South Korea. In this speech for party 
members, he emphasized a national need for achieving sŏnjin’guk in relation to his 
party’s political interests, using the term sŏnjin’guk as many as eight times. The concept 
of sŏnjin’guk is widely used in South Korea as a national goal to achieve in the near 
future, as is shown in the statement above, and as other references. Given its popularity 
and connotative significance, the concept of sŏnjin’guk has been playing very important 
social and political roles in South Korea. Then, what is sŏnjin’guk? What is its 
                                                 
1 All citations from Korean sources in this study are my own translations unless noted otherwise.  
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historicity? And what social roles has it been playing? Employing a global historical 
perspective, this dissertation aims to answer basic questions about the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk and a system of knowledge constructed around it.  
 
Discourse and Power 
Discourse is used in a variety of ways from person to person in different contexts (Mills 
1997). I identify three main ways of conceptualizing it: utterance, knowledge, and 
totality of social relations. When used as utterance, discourse implies various forms of 
communication through which meanings are exchanged and constructed. Many linguists 
and social theorists lean to this use of discourse. Dant (1991:7), for instance, defines it 
as “the material content of utterances exchanged in social contexts that are imbued with 
meaning by the intention of utterers and treated as meaningful by other participants.” As 
such, discourse in this use is considered as forms of utterance and communication, or 
material contents delivered through them. Thus, discourse is not necessarily a systemic 
idea, and is distinguished from knowledge.  
For some, it is not just forms or contents of utterance, but knowledge itself. 
Foucault (1976), for instance, does not distinguish discourse from knowledge in the 
sense that both are a formation of regularities among various dispersed elements 
constitutive of them. For Foucault (1976:49), discourses should be treated not just as 
“groups of signs” but as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak.” In this respect, he considers discourse as something more than utterance, noting 
that discourses are “irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech” (Foucault 
3 
 
1976:49). For Foucault, various disciplines of knowledge system such as political 
economy, biology, psychopathology, etc., are rather identified with the processes of 
“discursive formation” (Foucault 1976:ch. 2).  
For Foucault, dispersed elements become discursive elements through a 
regularity they obtained. It is the rules of formation that render regularity to those 
elements. As for the rules of formation, Foucault (1976:38) states that “[t]he conditions 
to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic 
choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation” (emphasis in the original). 
Without these rules there is no discourse but dispersed elements. In this respect, the 
rules are the very conditions for the existence of the elements of discourse. In this 
regard, he adds that “[t]he rules of formation are conditions of existence [. . .] in a given 
discursive division” (ibid.). Thus, there occurs a discursive formation when dispersed 
elements take on regularity by being arranged and organized according to certain rules 
of formation. As a system of rules of formation is not universally applicable, but 
specific to a certain discourse, it is a constitutive factor of a totality of discursive system.  
In this way, Foucault’s concept of discourse focuses on a practice of formation 
that renders a unity to dispersed elements by setting a system of relations among them 
according to certain rules of formation. Discourse becomes an interpretive totality that 
forms discursive objects and determines the positions of subjects whose subjectivities 
are dispersed too. There are no inherent attributes in discursive objects and subjects, but 
they are determined by certain relations among them that are set by a certain system of 
formation. As the system of formation is “a complex group of relations that function as 
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a rule,” Foucault (1976:74) states that “[t]o define a system of formation in its specific 
individuality is therefore to characterize a discourse [. . .].” 
For other theorists, discourse is understood as virtually equivalent to a system of 
social relations as no social activity is possible without being grounded upon it. Laclau 
and Mouffe (1987:82), for instance, consider discourse as “totality which includes 
within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistics [. . .].” Hence, for them, discourse is 
not “a combination of speech and writing,” but rather “speech and writing are 
themselves but internal components of discursive totalities.” Somewhat similar to 
Foucault, they conceptualize a discourse as an interpretive totality, or “systematic set of 
relations,” which makes both linguistic and non-linguistic social activities possible. 
However, their focus of discourse is not just on knowledge, but on general social 
relations. For them, no social relation or activity is possible without discourse. 
Therefore, every social activity is discursive and “every subject [and object] position is 
a discursive position” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:115). 
I consider all of the three definitions of discourse are not only respectively valid 
in different contexts, but also closely interrelated to one another. For this study, I pay 
attention to the aspect of discourse that carries more systemic meanings than are 
delivered in simple utterance. Hence, I employ Foucault’s (1976) notion of discourse as 
a system of relations among dispersed elements, constituting knowledge. I understand 
discourse mainly as a system of knowledge conveyed through various forms of 
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utterances, e.g., newspapers’ written texts.2 On this ground, this study focuses on the 
systematic and somewhat constant meanings forming a system of knowledge 
constructed around the concept of sŏnjin’guk, which I call the discourse of sŏnjin’guk.   
In regard to its social roles, discourse is a socially constructed system of 
meanings and relations, which provides social members with ways of identifying and 
interpreting the world. In this way, it creates the identities of subject as well as object. 
For individuals, discourse is an interpretive window through which one can see the 
world, engage in social activities, and construct her/his identities. In a similar vein, a 
mainstream discourse in society plays a role as an interpretive framework enabling the 
society to understand the world, engage in activities with others, and construct its 
identities. 
An aspect of discourse is related to the location of meaning. All of the three 
aforementioned perspectives on discourse would agree that it is a system of relations, 
whether a system of language, of dispersed elements, or of social relations. Thus, they 
see that meanings are produced within the system rather than externally given. For 
discourse theorists, the claim to truth is valid only within the system of relations, and 
any claim on universal truth is incompatible with the concept of discourse. Therefore, 
discourse theorists search for meanings from contexts and relations within the system of 
discourse. This way of understanding of meaning production process is closely related 
                                                 
2 In relation to this way of understanding discourse, it is also appropriate to argue that discourse is a 
totality of social relations. In this regard, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) do not distinguish between discursive 
and non-discursive practices on the grounds that every social relation is basically discursive. This notion 
of discourse supposes a far broader range of relations, than the other definitions do. However, this study 
does not rely much on this notion of discourse as its main focus is on the structure of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk as a system of knowledge reflected in newspaper texts.   
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to a central thesis of the sociology of knowledge, that is, knowledge is socially 
determined (Dant 1991). In this respect, discourse theories and the sociology of 
knowledge are in tension with epistemological or scientific traditions of philosophy or 
social studies, which assume that knowledge and meanings are objectively existent 
outside the contexts of society.  
This meta-theoretical assumption of discourse and knowledge raises some 
questions about methodology in social studies. As meanings are assumed inherent in the 
system of relations, positivist scientific methodology is no longer accepted as the 
appropriate way of searching for universal truth. Researchers in the fields of discourse 
studies and the sociology of knowledge consider that interpretive, qualitative 
methodologies are, rather, proper ways of studying discourse, knowledge, or social 
relations. In this regard, Dant (1991:54) notes that “[t]he methods with which the 
relation between knowledge and social groups shall be studied are necessarily 
interpretative because there are no objective, epistemological criteria which can 
arbitrate transhistorically on the nature of truth” (emphasis in the original). In relation to 
this, some theorists see society in terms of people’s “everyday life,” which is so 
complex and wide-ranging like “landscape,” that any knowledge of it inevitably 
involves selective processes reflecting social values and power relations (de Certeau 
1988; Hay 1996). In this sense, research activity itself is not free from social contexts, 
but is socially situated. It is a practice not of searching for universal truth, but of 
meaning production. In this regard, Denzin and Lincoln (2005:x) go further to argue 
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that “all inquiry is moral and political,” and the practices of qualitative research should 
help “change the world in positive ways.”  
 As Foucault (1977, 1980, 2000) notes, knowledge is deeply associated with 
power, that is, knowledge reflects and exerts power. He states that “[t]he exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power” (Foucault 1980:52). As for the relationship between knowledge and 
power relation, he notes that “there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault 1977:27). In this respect, 
discourse as a knowledge system reflects and constitutes certain power relations. As 
intertwined with power relations, discourse also becomes a site of social, political, 
economic, and cultural struggles, where various ways of interpreting and envisioning 
the world are confronting with one another. In relation to this, Howarth (2000:9) 
maintains that “[t]he construction of discourses thus involves the exercise of power and 
a consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents.” 
 This understanding of discourse disputes a positivistic way of considering 
knowledge as a pure reflection of reality. Discourse theorists are, rather, interested in 
how reality is constructed by discourse. Despite the existence of an object in the 
empirical world, the construction of its meaning is dependent upon discourse, and, thus, 
the epistemological process of it is inherently discursive. However, discourse is not 
internally homogeneous and coherent. It is, rather, composed of a broad range of 
dispersed concepts, statements, ideas, and practices that may not necessarily be grouped 
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together in a logical sense (Foucault 1976). Therefore, discursive formations are 
conditioned by external factors.  
In this respect, discourse is a historical construction, that is, its formation and 
transformation take place in certain historical circumstances. Hence, rather than being a 
self-contained static system of meanings and relations, a discourse undergoes change 
reflecting the difference of historical circumstances. This is also a process of responding 
to challenges from different sets of meanings and relations. Challenges to a discursive 
system come not only from different discourses but also from within. The field of 
discourse is subject to contestations among various social and political groups. 
Reflecting power relations, discourses do not have the same discursive power. The 
interpretive systems of some discourses can be shared by a broader range of social 
groups than those of others. Furthermore, as critical discourse analysts note, power of 
certain discourses serves for the political purpose of domination at the expense of the 
marginalization of other discourses (Wodak 1989; Fairclough 2003).  
 
Hegemony 
A discourse can be in a hegemonic status when its assumptions are consented by a 
broad range of social groups and social relations. In this case, hegemonic discourse 
reflects the hegemony of certain social groups. In Gramscian notions, hegemony refers 
to dominant groups’ intellectual and moral leadership over subordinate groups, which is 
based upon a broad range of consent from the latter. Gramscian social ideas show a 
certain degree of departure from the mechanical historical materialism, which tends to 
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ignore the complex dynamics of the social, cultural, and political realms (superstructure) 
vis-à-vis the economic one (base). In this regard, Gramsci differentiates two major 
levels of the superstructure: civil society and political society, each of which is relevant 
to hegemony and domination respectively in terms of the relations of social forces. As 
Gramsci acknowledges, “These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function 
of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other 
hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the state and 
‘juridical’ government” (Forgacs 1988:306). For Gramsci (1971:57), “domination” and 
“leadership” are two main ways in which the supremacy of a social group manifests 
itself, and the two forms of power relation mainly operate in different realms of the 
superstructure. In contrast to political society, in which domination is dependent upon 
coercive measures, civil society, “the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
‘private’,” is a realm in which moral and intellectual leadership operates in power 
relations based upon the consent of the subordinate (Gramsci 1971:12).  
For Gramsci, hegemony is distinguished from “direct domination” in the sense 
that it is preconditioned by the consent of subordinate groups. As Gramsci notes, social 
hegemony is based upon “[t]he ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group [. . .]” (Forgacs 1988:306-7). While acknowledging that consent and coercion are 
closely interrelated with each other, Gramsci emphasizes the voluntary aspect of the 
former that is manifested, in principle, in the cultural, moral, and ideological leadership. 
In this respect, the leadership legitimated by the consent from a wide range of social 
10 
 
groups is an important precondition for the dominant group’s construction of “historical 
bloc,” which refers to the association at a certain historical point between the “complex, 
contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures” and “the ensemble of the 
social relations of production” (Forgacs 1988:192). In relation to this, Gramsci 
(1971:57-8) notes that “[a] social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 
‘leadership’ before winning governmental power [. . .]; it subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must 
continue to ‘lead’ as well.” 
Insofar as hegemony needs a broad range of consent, it should take on a certain 
degree of universal bearings. This aspect of hegemony is closely related to Gramsci’s 
emphasis on the need for a system of alliances among social groups as a precondition 
for it. In Gramscian terms, a social group cannot achieve hegemony if it remains 
sticking to its own economic-corporate interests. For a social group to be dominant, it 
needs to transcend its own economic interests to build political alliances with other 
groups. At the stage of the political alliance formation, as Gramsci notes, “one becomes 
aware that one’s own corporate interests [. . .] can and must become the interests of 
other subordinate groups” (Forgacs 1988:205). As such, Gramsci suggests a need for 
constructing an awareness of homogeneity in political terms among diverse social 
groups that have different economic interests, for the purpose of constructing hegemony.  
This insight of Gramsci’s is particularly worthwhile to note in the sense that 
hegemony implies a political phase in which both dominant and subordinate groups 
develop shared interests. As such, the rule of the dominant group is regarded by 
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subordinate groups not necessarily as oppressive but, rather, as beneficial to their own 
interests. In the hegemonic phase, the rule of a certain group is politically allied with the 
subordination of other groups, and thus is defended by both of the dominant and 
subordinate groups. In cultural terms, this becomes a phase where the cultural activities 
of the dominant group take on universal bearings, which appear to transcend the 
particularism of any social group. At the national level, a hegemonic group tends to be 
regarded as representing rather broader “national interests” than those of any particular 
group or class. In the concept of Gramsci’s “national-popular,” it is implied that the 
intellectual activities of the dominant group are widely shared by the majority of the 
national population. In this way, hegemonic cultural and political activities are well 
associated with national energies. As for this, Simon (1991:44) argues that “[a] 
hegemonic class is one which succeeds in combining these patriotic struggles and ideas 
with its own class interests so as to achieve national leadership.” Thus, an important 
way of securing hegemony for a social group at the national level is to successfully 
relate its own political economic interests to “national interests,” leading to create 
“national-popular” collective energies.  
 Gramscian notion of hegemony has influenced many cultural theorists in a 
variety of ways. Discourse theorists, in particular, have tried to employ the concept of 
hegemony without prioritizing “fundamental” groups. A main criticism of the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony is its assumption of centralized power based upon class 
identities. Supposing the constructive, decentralized nature of identities, Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001:137-8) criticize Gramsci’s thought in two ways: “(a) his insistence that 
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hegemonic subjects are necessarily constituted on the plane of the fundamental classes; 
(b) his postulate that [. . .] every social formation structures itself around a single 
hegemonic centre.” Laclau and Mouffe argue that hegemony can appear in diverse sites 
of social relation. For them, hegemony emerges from “a field where the ‘elements’ have 
not crystallized into ‘moments’” (ibid.:134).3 As for a condition for the emergence of 
hegemony, they also argue that “hegemony should emerge in a field criss-crossed by 
antagonisms [. . .]” (ibid.:135). Thus, hegemonic relations appear from the denial of 
certain stable discursive relations that are regarded as the “structured totality resulting 
from articulatory practice” (ibid.:105). In this way, there is a distinction between 
“discursive formation” and “hegemonic formation”: that is, the former is relevant to the 
process of creating a system of regularities among “moments” while the latter refers to 
practices among antagonistic “elements.” Supposing that hegemony emerges from 
antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe (2001:153) argue that “our task is to identify the 
conditions in which a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression, and 
thereby constitutes itself into the site of an antagonism.” Thus, for them, hegemonic 
struggles involve recognizing antagonisms by denaturalizing the preexistent taken-for-
granted positivities in various sites of social relation.   
 A main critic of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory in regard to the concept 
of hegemony is Stuart Hall. Hall claims to dissociate himself from “the discourse 
theoretical approach to the analysis of whole social formations” and criticizes their 
                                                 
3 As for a distinction between “element” and “moment,” Laclau and Mouffe (2001:105) note that: “[t]he 
differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By 
contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated.”  
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position for the “dissolution of everything into discourse” (cited in Wood 1998:404). 
While recognizing the plurality of the social, Hall still emphasizes the central role of the 
state, by arguing that many parts of civil society should be articulated with the state for 
the creation of hegemonic power. In this respect, for Hall, hegemonic struggles taking 
place in multiple sites of the social are not enough to be politically significant, but need 
to enable the passage of power into the state. For this, he emphasizes the practice of 
articulation, which links the “dispersed conditions of practice of different social groups” 
with “those forms of politics and ideology which allow them to become historically 
effective as collective social agents” (cited in Wood 1998:408).   
 I consider that those theoretical positions are not contradictory with one another, 
but have different emphases in explaining complex social phenomena. Thus, on the 
basis of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, I take the point from Laclau and Mouffe that no 
identities are essential and that there can be far more diverse sites of hegemonic 
struggles. However, their decentralized theory has a weakness in its disregard of real 
politics, in which power is more concentrated in certain sites, rather than is equally 
distributed. Thus, power struggles in some sites can be more important than others. In 
this respect, I recognize the importance of the state as the currently most powerful 
political institution and, thus, as an important target for struggle. Based upon Gramsci’s 
notion, I also believe that some hegemonic blocs are more committed to the values of 
equity, diversity, and justice of society, than others. 
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Discourse, Orientalism, and Developmentalism 
A number of studies have employed the Foucauldian notion of discourse as a 
historically specific knowledge system for their analyses. Among others, Said (1979) 
has used it for his analysis of the discourse of Orientalism. As noted above, Foucault 
maintains that discourse is a structural formation within which objects and subjects of 
knowledge are constructed in a certain way. In this sense, the elements of knowledge 
are meaningful only within the system of knowledge itself. Employing this concept of 
discourse to his analysis of Orientalism, Said argues that any knowledge of the Orient is 
not free from the systematic web of meanings and relations of Orientalism. As he notes, 
“the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself 
is not just there either” (Said 1979:4; emphasis in the original). In this respect, the 
Orient is the very construction of Orientalism. As discourse requires a system of 
relations, the construction of the Orient is not possible without elements it is related to. 
In this regard, an important conceptual element is the Occident that is constructed in 
relation to the Orient within the systematic knowledge of Orientalism, reflecting the 
power relation between the two. In this way, both the Orient and the Occident are the 
historical constructions of Orientalism, which have affected the construction of reality 
for the interests of the latter. In this regard, Said (1979:5) mentions that “as much as the 
West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, 
and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West.” 
In development studies, post-development theorists provide insights into the 
understanding of the discourse of developmentalism, based upon the notion of discourse 
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in Foucauldian terms. For them, developmentalism is no more than a discursive system 
reflecting the Western ways of looking at the world, entailing an epistemic hierarchy 
between the West and the non-West. Escobar (1995:6), for instance, argues that 
“development” is “a historically produced discourse” or “a regime of representation.” In 
this sense, the central concepts of developmentalism such as the “developed,” the 
“underdeveloped, or “poverty” are in no ways the faithful representations of reality out 
there, but are the very constructions of the discursive system and thus meaningful only 
within the system. An important aspect of developmentalism is the construction of a 
hierarchy between the “developed” and the “underdeveloped,” which serves for the 
former’s management and domination of the latter. In this respect, the hierarchical 
structure of developmentalism is somewhat similar to that of Orientalism. Thus, 
Escobar (1995:6) acknowledges that “[t]he study of development as discourse is akin to 
Said’s study of the discourses on the Orient.”  
 
Developmentalism and Global Power Relations 
In a global historical perspective, I pay attention to the global discursive circumstances 
that fostered the formation and transformation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. In this 
regard, developmentalism is a noticeable discourse that has determined power relations 
around the globe in the postwar era. “Development” is not a unitary concept, but is 
defined in plural ways. Nederveen Pieterse (2001:3), for instance, defines it as “the 
organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement.” By 
adding that “[w]hat constitutes improvement and what is appropriate intervention 
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obviously vary according to class, culture, historical context and relations of power,” he 
opens a room for the plurality of the concept of development. When it comes to 
“developmentalism,” however, the concept of development strongly takes on singularity, 
by prioritizing the value of economic development or economic growth over various 
important values of society, such as harmony, equity, solidarity, etc. The degree of 
development in developmentalism tends to be measured in simple quantitative indices 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.  
Given the cultural and institutional power of developmental alliances around the 
world, developmentalism has enjoyed a hegemonic status at the global level. Under its 
hegemony, the opportunities for thinking about development in diverse ways have been 
far reduced. The significance of developmentalism lies in its power to construct social 
reality. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001:110) notes, discourse is “a real force which 
contributes to the moulding and constitution of social relations.” In this regard, 
Fairclough (2003:130) mentions that it is through “systems of classification” or 
“preconstructed and taken for granted ‘di-visions’” that “people continuously generate 
‘visions’ of the world.” As for the discursive power of developmentalism, Escobar 
(1995:41) argues that it sets “the rules of the game: who can speak, from what points of 
view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of experience.” In this way, it 
creates representations, institutionalizes social practices, designates identities, and 
transforms social reality according to its interpretations, imaginations, and 
classifications of the world.  
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 Given the historicity of discourse, developmentalism in the global context can 
be understood mainly as a postwar construction, which reflects the transitions of global 
power relations and global political economic, cultural circumstances. With regard to 
this, four circumstantial changes are notable. First, in cultural aspects, the discourse of 
civilization, which supported a hierarchical relationship between the “civilized” and the 
“uncivilized” in the colonial era, lost its discursive hegemony in the wake of the 
imperial wars committed by the so-called “civilized” countries. This situation entailed 
that the power relations among different societies could no longer be defined by the 
hierarchical framework of the “civilized” and the “uncivilized.” Second, there was a 
hegemonic transition from Europe to the U.S. in terms of world political economy and a 
need for new discursive frameworks reflecting this change arose. Third, former 
colonized societies and countries retrieved independence and achieved sovereignty 
whose national statuses were legitimately equal to those of former colonial countries. 
And last, the onset of the Cold War strengthened the usefulness of developmentalism as 
an ideological tool for mobilization at national and international levels.  
The popularity of developmentalism reflects a hegemonic discursive change 
from the discourse of civilization centered on European power to that of development 
under American hegemony. With regard to this, Patterson (1997:49) states that “[a]fter 
1945, the United States, using arguments that echoed those of social Darwinists half a 
century earlier, began to project itself as the center and driving force of Western 
civilization.” With this as a momentum, he adds, “progress was measured in terms of 
economic growth [. . .]” (ibid.:50). The discursive change was a sea change of 
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perceptual frameworks, which accompanied the appearance of new concepts, identities, 
and relations. In this respect, the transition was a point when former “savage” or 
“primitive” worlds began to be termed and identified as the “underdeveloped,” and the 
“civilized” world as the “developed.” An important concept characterizing the 
“underdeveloped” area is poverty. In this context, Escobar (1995:22) points out that 
“[p]overty on a global scale was a discovery of the post-World War II period.”  
In terms of global power relations, the hegemonic discursive transition enabled 
former colonial countries to maintain their cultural hegemony as they were represented 
as “developed” countries over the “developing” or “underdeveloped.” The discourse of 
development can be regarded as a more advanced form of hegemonic discourse as it 
supposes a cooperative relationship between the subjects in the hierarchical discursive 
framework. That is to say, compared with colonial subjectivities, which are basically 
grounded upon an antagonism between the colonizer and the colonized, the identities 
provided by the discourse of development do not necessarily assume the domination-
subordination relationship. Rather, the relationship between the “developed” and the 
“developing” in the discourse of development is usually conceived of as a reciprocal 
one.  
 An important epistemic ground of developmentalism is its Eurocentric idea of 
progress. In the colonial era, European colonialists perceived as “savage” or “primitive” 
other societies that supposedly had different societal forms from their own ones. 
Assuming a universal timeline for human progress, they supposed those different 
societies as the past of Europe, somewhat equivalent to the medieval forms of European 
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societies. By turning the “spatial difference” into the “temporal hierarchy,” they 
justified their colonial projects as “civilizing mission.” Combined with evolutionary 
ideas, the modern idea of progress took on strong metaphoric bearings by illusively 
comparing social changes to the development of living things (Nisbet 1969). The 
discourse of development is also grounded upon this epistemology in assuming a 
universal linear path of progress from the “underdeveloped,” “developing,” to the 
“developed.” As certain countries are termed as a temporarily advanced form, they are 
presented as the future societal form of the others, incurring a cultural hierarchy 
between them. In this framework, it is naturally assumed that “developing” societies 
should “catch-up” with the “developed” through their internal transformation of socio-
cultural systems (Rostow 1960; Parsons 1971; Inkeles and Smith 1974). Here, 
“developed” societies are presented as a universal model of development. 
Nederveen Pieterse (2001/2009) provides important insights into the interaction 
between global power relations and development.4 Employing a discursive approach to 
developmentalism, he pays attention to the transition of global hegemonic discourses 
from evolutionism, modernization theory, to development theory, reflecting the change 
of global power relations. On the basis of the interconnectivity between knowledge and 
power, he argues that “[e]volutionism was an imperial vision, modernization theory 
bears witness to the American century, and development theory translates into 
contemporary relations of power” (Nederveen Pieterse 2001:18). As such, each 
                                                 
4 See Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 2009 [2001]. Development Theory, 2nd ed. London: Sage. In particular, 
chapter 2 succinctly addresses the problem of Eurocentrism deeply ingrained in developmentalism in 
various global historical contexts.  
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developmental idea prevalent in a certain period corresponds to certain power relations 
characteristic of that period. Far from objective knowledge, developmentalism contains 
the willingness of the West to change the world according to its imaginations. This 
incurs certain power relations surrounding the knowledge of development. As for this, 
Nederveen Pieterse (2001:18) states that “[t]hose who declare themselves furthest 
advanced along its course claim privileged knowledge of the direction of change.” In 
this respect, developmentalism is the claim to truth by the centre of power.  
 
Developmentalism and Eurocentrism 
A central idea deeply underlying various developmental thoughts of the West is 
evolutionism, by which it posits itself at the top of the evolutionary hierarchy. As the 
West sets itself as the most evolved or developed, the remaining part of the world is 
identified as non-developed. In evolutionism, the complexity of the world tends to be 
simplified into certain categories posited in different stages, such as: “primitivism, 
savagery, barbarism, civilization” (Nederveen Pieterse 2001:19). This kind of stage 
theory transforms spatial differences into a temporal hierarchy. When the world is 
classified into some evolutionary stages, Nederveen Pieterse (2001:19) notes, “global 
space appeared transformed into a time sequence, with Europeans as the only 
contemporaries, the sole inhabitants of modernity” (emphasis in the original). 
 In observing the historical transition of development ideas, Nederveen Pieterse 
pays attention to a rupture between the pre- and post- world war periods. As the wars 
seriously undermined the faith in progress, the pre-existing ideas of evolutionism and 
21 
 
progress supporting European hegemony fell into crisis. In this context, a different type 
of evolutionism, i.e., modernization theory, appeared reflecting the change of global 
power relations in the postwar era with the rise of American hegemony. Modernization 
theory brought about U.S.-centered notion of modernity, in which the U.S. was the 
“epitome of modernity” with the majority of the world in the status of “tradition” or 
“unmodern.”   
 However, with the decline of American hegemony and, more generally, Western 
hegemony, many modern thoughts including modernization theory lost their appeal. In 
this context, Nederveen Pieterse argues that the keyword in general discourses became 
“development,” instead of “modernization.”5 In this transition of keyword, yet, linear, 
teleological evolutionism still remained. As he notes, “The categories used in the UN 
system of highly developed, developed, less developed and least developed countries 
structurally resemble the stages of evolutionism [. . .]” (ibid.:24). 
 For Nederveen Pieterse, developmentalism is now in crisis, which is 
accompanied by the crisis of Eurocentric political economic, cultural orders. Not only 
the promises of developmentalism failed in the global South, but also various societies 
in the global North exposed their own limitations in various ways. Western societies 
have exposed a lot of problems, such as growing economic inequality, environmental 
unsustainability, individualization, etc. Meanwhile, some non-Western developmental 
models are often supposed as more sustainable, whose modernization processes did not 
follow the predicted path of modernization theory. As Eurocentric developmentalism 
                                                 
5 In this study, I do not distinguish the transition from “modernization” to “development,” but regard the 
former as part of the latter.  
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did not bring about rosy futures in the global South, there have been a lot of resistances 
to it. According to Nederveen Pieterse (2001), the crisis of developmentalism reflects 
the crisis of deeper perceptual frameworks, such as Western ethnocentrism and 
epistemology. 
In those respects, developmentalism is closely associated with Eurocentrism 
(Hettne 1995; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Leys 1996; Rist 1997; Mehmet 1999). 
Eurocentrism is understood as an attitude to regard European experiences of history as 
the archetype of global history. Wallerstein (2004a:93) defines it as “any assumption 
that the patterns discerned by analyzing pan-European history and social structure are 
universal patterns, and therefore implicitly a model for persons in other parts of the 
world.” It can be analytically divided into two interrelated epistemic attitudes: European 
exceptionalism and Orientalism, of which the former is relevant to the construction of 
the superior self while the latter is to that of the inferior other (Kang 2004).  
A notable characteristic of Eurocentrism is an imagined hierarchy between the 
West and the non-West. In Eurocentric discourses, virtually heterogeneous “others” 
tend to be constructed as a homogeneous entity with which negative attributes are 
associated, such as “irrational,” “depraved,” “childlike,” and “abnormal,” whereas 
similarly heterogeneous entities are homogenized into the “self” to which positive traits 
such as “rational,” “virtuous,” “mature,” and “normal” are attributed (Said 1979). As for 
the misleadingly simplistic distinction between the two worlds, Hobsbawm (1987:16) 
points out that “the (much larger) second world was united by nothing except its 
relations with [. . .] the first.” In this regard, he appropriately questions, “What else, 
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except a common membership of the human race, had the Chinese Empire in common 
with Senegal, Brazil with the New Hebrides, Morocco with Nicaragua?” (Hobsbawm 
1987:16) Nevertheless, this kind of episteme has historically provided a solid ground 
for colonialism and imperialism. As Hobsbawm (1975:267) questions, “what was easier 
than to assume that those who represented the style of childhood or adolescence in the 
development of civilization [. . .] had to be treated like children by their mature 
‘parents’?” As such, societies of the West and the non-West in Eurocentric discourses 
are hierarchically ordered, reflecting global power relations. In this regard, Hall 
(1996:186) points out that the “West,” as a set of images, provides the “criteria of 
evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive 
and negative feelings cluster.” This makes a fertile ground for global governmentality 
led by the West (Larner and Walters 2004).6 
 While the Eurocentric hierarchy between the West and the non-West was 
explicit in the discourse of civilization in the past, e.g., between the civilizer and the 
civilized, it is implicit in basic concepts of developmental discourses in the 
contemporary era. As certain societal forms supposedly prevalent in the West are 
                                                 
6 Global governmentality is a concept mainly developed by theorists who try to apply Foucauldian notion 
of governmentality to the global order. Foucault (2000:345) says that “power relations are rooted in the 
whole network of the social.” Thus, power is somewhat invisible and dispersed, and hidden in signs and 
meanings. For governmentality, Foucault pays attention to the production and exchange of meanings, 
rather than to the direct exercise of power by political institutions. His interest lies in the situation in 
which individuals voluntarily discipline themselves according to certain ideas and knowledge. In this way, 
governmentality is embedded in the social. Applied to the global order, governmentality refers to power 
dispersed in the relations among countries, exercised mainly through signs and meanings. In this regard, 
Larner and Walters (2004:7) note that “the inter-state system is itself an art of governmentality.” Global 
governmentality is concerned with disciplining countries and societies through the production and 
exchange of signs and meanings at the global level. In the trend of globalization, neoliberalism was a 
useful tool for global governmentality as it provided a set of standards to which individuals and nation-
states should discipline themselves to be included in the global network.  
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designated as the “developed,” they tend to be regarded as the desirable future of the 
“developing,” regardless of the historical and cultural variations of those societies. 
Therefore, to unilaterally designate certain societies as “developing” deprives them of 
their own identities (Sachs 1992; Brohman 1995; Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 
1997; Nederveen Pieterse 2001). In this representational framework, various forms of 
life and knowledge, which are not considered as belonging to the “developed,” are 
marginalized (Apffel-Marglin and Marglin 1990, 1996).7 This is a good ground for 
justifying the domination-subordination relationship between the “developed” and 
“developing.” In this regard, Tucker (1999:1) points out that developmental discourse is 
“an essential part of the process whereby the ‘developed’ countries manage, control and 
even create the Third World [. . .].” In this understanding of developmental discourse, 
development virtually becomes “the process whereby other peoples are dominated and 
their destinies are shaped according to an essentially Western way of conceiving and 
perceiving the world” (ibid.). Despite the relative decline of Western power, 
Eurocentric discourses are still consciously or unconsciously accepted around the globe 
(Alatas 2006). In this respect, Eurocentrism is distinguished from other provincial 
ethnocentrisms and marginalized belief systems such as racism, which are criticized by 
mainstream discourses (Amin 1989; Blaut 1993; Shohat and Stam 1994). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 These conditions facilitate the need for critical researches that are “localized, grounded in the specific 
meanings, traditions, customs, and community relations” (Denzin 2005:935-6).   
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Modernities 
During the colonial era, numerous non-Western societies unexpectedly encountered 
with the threatening expansion of the West. A paradox entailed by this situation was 
that they had to embark on modernization projects mirroring the image of the West in 
order to resist it. Motivated by “a sudden external threat” (Therborn 1995), they 
launched various modernization projects to transform themselves into “modern” 
societies that could effectively confront the West. In these processes, their political, 
economic, social, and cultural values came to resemble those of the West to a certain 
extent, inducing a dilemma for them between modernization and Westernization (Zheng 
1999). Many non-Western societies accepted the West as the most significant other in 
their modernization processes that were deeply associated with their modern identity 
formations. This was a process of their incorporation into the representational schemes 
set by the West, which then functioned as a yardstick of their processes of 
modernization.  
This does not mean, yet, that those non-Western societies involved in 
modernization processes have converged into modern images envisioned by the West. 
Rather, the processes of modernization are as diverse as are the variation of the societies’ 
historical and cultural backgrounds. Despite the fact that the West has been the most 
significant other, the non-Western societies have, in reality, transformed themselves 
into modern societies reflecting their own historical conditions, which are 
26 
 
distinguishable from those of the West.8 The Japanese modernization process, for 
instance, has brought about a societal form that has been interpreted as non-modern or 
postmodern by many theorists (McCormack and Sugimoto 1988; Miyoshi and 
Harootunian 1989; Clammer 1995, 2001). The modern world has been not only far 
more diverse and heterogeneous but also more connected and interactive across time 
and space than is assumed by the Eurocentric notion of modernity (Nederveen Pieterse 
1995).  
The Eurocentric notion of modernity basically exists in a singular form on the 
grounds of two basic assumptions. First, it is originated from “modern Europe,” which 
is often imagined as a historical and spatial exception disconnected from the rest of 
human histories and societies. And second, it is also assumed as the advanced type of 
societal characteristics that other societies are to eventually emulate. On these 
assumptions, the goal and path to modernity are assumed singular, of which European 
societies are the reference. In this way, the European particularistic view assumes an air 
of universalism (Wallerstein 2006), and this kind of perception of modernity prevailed 
in major thoughts on social change, such as American modernization theory (Rostow 
1960; Parsons 1971; Inkeles and Smith 1974).  
Close observation of reality, however, disproves this notion of modernity. Not 
only are the paths of modernization within the West different, but are those among non-
Western societies diverse. Quite contrary to the belief in the convergence to the 
European imagination of modernity, the processes of modernization and the forms of 
                                                 
8 The West itself, indeed, is not a homogeneous entity.  
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modernity exist in the plural in the empirical world. Furthermore, the plural forms of 
modernity are not present by themselves confined within geographical boundaries. They 
are, rather, understood as the results of historical interactions and hybridization 
occurring across geographical boundaries (Nederveen Pieterse 1995). In those respects, 
it is appropriate to employ the notion of “modernities,” giving a room of plurality to 
“modernity.” In the concept of “modernities,” various temporal and spatial phenomena 
are conceived of as entangled with one another, and certain phenomena regarded as 
“modern” appear differently from society to society as well as from period to period. 
For instance, the appearance and development of the modernity of modern European 
cities should not be understood as the result of the processes enclosed within them, but 
as connected to the past as well as other regions, such as the medieval forms of cities in 
various regions (Alsayyad and Roy 2006). The notion of modernities does not disregard 
an important point that various types of modernities are not only different from one 
another in general characteristics, but also are the results of historical interactions with 
one another (Göle 2000; Kamali 2005; Bonnet 2006).  
 
Eurocentrism in Korea and the Discourse of Sŏnjin’guk 
Those global historical circumstances are closely related to the formations and 
transformations of Koreans’ Eurocentric worldviews. Incorporated into the Eurocentric 
world order, Koreans have generally represented their national self and the world within 
the framework of Eurocentric discourses throughout modernization processes in 
changing global and national circumstances. In their early interaction with the West, 
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they employed the discourses of kaehwa (enlightenment) and munmyŏng (civilization), 
reflecting the European colonialist discourse of civilization in the colonial era. Then, 
since the mid-twentieth century, they have constructed the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
(advanced country) echoing the global discourse of development in the post-colonial 
period. From a historical perspective, the period when the discourse of sŏnjin’guk arose 
dominant witnessed the ascent of U.S. hegemony (Wallerstein 2000, 2004b) and South 
Korea’s launch of aggressive modernization projects under the strong developmental 
state (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Yoon 2005). In this respect, while modernization 
theory “bears witness to American century” (Nederveen Pieterse 2001:18), the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk observes the era of South Korean developmental regime.   
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk is deeply related to how South Koreans represent 
the world, identify their country, transform their society, and imagine their future in the 
contemporary context. It is a historically constructed knowledge system based upon the 
relations constructed around the concepts of sŏnjin’guk (advanced country) and 
hujin’guk (backward country). Promulgated mainly by developmentalist ruling groups, 
it has provided legitimacy to South Korean developmental regime. The discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk is so prevailing today that a main national vision of the contemporary Lee 
Myung-Bak administration is to achieve ‘sŏnjin-illyu-kukka’ (advanced first-class 
country), a terminological variant of sŏnjin’guk. In relation to this, the term “sŏnjinhwa” 
(achieving advancement) is widely used by governmental organizations and various 
opinion leaders.  
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One of its most notable characteristics is a hierarchical distinction between 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, in which the former has the latter as its alienated other. For 
South Koreans, in general, sŏnjin’guk is positively represented as a country that they 
should learn from and eventually catch up with, while hujin’guk is considered as a 
country lagging behind. As for the distinction, Lim (1994:227-8) states that: 
 
South Koreans’ third framework of perceiving foreign countries is that of distinguishing 
sŏnjin’guk from hujin’guk. In this epistemic structure, which can be said as a structure 
of perceiving foreign countries based on a kind of evolutionary developmentalism (or 
linear modernization theory), South Koreans categorize various countries in the world 
into sŏnjin’guk or hujin’guk, and tend to dichotomize between the “countries to learn” 
for South Korea as a hujin’guk in the past to develop itself, and the countries that are 
not [. . .].  
 
As an idealized concept into which South Koreans’ various positive values are 
projected, the concept of sŏnjin’guk plays diverse roles in the contemporary Korean 
society in varied contexts. In terms of national identity, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
frequently identifies Korea as “near sŏnjin’guk” or “sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk” (on the 
threshold of sŏnjin’guk). It interprets South Korea’s economic development as an 
escape from the status of hujin’guk, and assumes hujin’guk as the past of the country 
and sŏnjin’guk as its future. It tends to argue that South Korea has gone through the 
mobility from hujin’guk to the contemporary status of “near sŏnjin’guk” by virtue of the 
past generations’ hard efforts, and put a responsibility on the contemporary generations 
to achieve a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk status in the near future. In this way, the discourse 
has been playing an important role in directing the change of Korean society.   
30 
 
The formation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk reflected the rise of developmental 
regime in Korea, which also echoed the global transition of hegemonic discourse and 
power relations. Seizing power through a military coup in 1961, the Park Chung-Hee 
regime institutionalized various ideas and practices in its aggressive pursuit of 
economic development. Lacking procedural legitimacy in taking power, the Park 
regime sought for it from two main discursive sources: anti-communism and 
developmentalism (Kim and Cho 2003; Cho 2003).9 Under the slogan of “choguk 
kŭndaehwa” (the modernization of fatherland), the regime justified its pursuit of rapid 
economic growth, and this was generally consented by civil society which internalized 
the logic of development. In this regard, Cho (2003) points out that the 1960s was the 
period when the general public consented the prioritization of economic growth over 
democracy, as was reflected in such phrases as “minjujuŭi-ga pammŏgyŏjunya” (does 
democracy feed us?).  
The transition of global hegemonic discourse and the rise of the South Korean 
developmental regime incurred a discursive transformation from the discourse of 
munmyŏng (civilization) to that of sŏnjin’guk in terms of South Korea’s dominant 
national self and worldviews (Table 1). Amidst the crisis of the global discourse of 
civilization, the West came to lose its authority within the framework of the discourse 
of munmyŏng through the two imperial wars. Unlike at the turn of the century when a 
clear hierarchy was found between the West and the non-West including Korea in the 
                                                 
9 As Cho (2003) notes, the 1960s was a period when developmentalism first appeared as a notable 
dominant discourse to be combined with the preexisting primary dominant discourse of anti-communism. 
In regard to material conditions, Seo (1991) argues that the 1960s was the period of the full-scale 
appearance of South Korean capitalist classes, based upon the export-oriented industrialization strategy.  
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munmyŏng discourse, the period after World War I showed no apparent epistemic 
hierarchy between Korea and the West as the former was also regarded as a kind of 
munmyŏng-guk (civilized country) of chŏngsin munmyŏng (spiritual civilization). The 
West was rather represented as having advanced material civilization but weak at 
spiritual aspects. In this respect, both Korea and the West were conceived of as the 
possessors of civilizations of different kind and, thus, their statuses were not necessarily 
in a hierarchical order.  
 
Table 1. A Conceptual Overview of the Transformations of Korean and Global 
Eurocentric Discourses 
 Colonial Era (the 1880s – 1940s) 
Post-Colonial Era 
(the 1950s to the 
present)
Global 
(Hegemonic) 
Discourse 
Main Concept Civilization Development 
Differentiation Civilized / Uncivilized 
Developed / 
Underdeveloped 
(Developing) 
Hegemony Europe The U.S. 
Korean Discourse 
Main Concept Kaehwa, Munmyŏng Sŏnjin’guk 
Differentiation 
Kaehwa-guk /  
Mi-kaehwa-guk; 
Munmyŏng-guk / 
Yaman-guk 
 
Sŏnjin’guk / 
Hujin’guk 
Hegemony Reformists (Early modernists) Developmentalists 
Representation of 
the 
West 
Kaehwa-guk, 
Munmyŏng-guk Sŏnjin’guk 
Representation of 
National Self 
Munmyŏng-guk 
→ Pan-kaehwa-
guk → 
Munmyŏng-guk 
Hujin’guk → 
Chungjin’guk → 
NICS → 
Sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk 
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This changed with the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, and the hierarchy reappeared in a 
quite similar form to that of the discourse of munmyŏng of the early modern period, yet, 
with different contents. It is interesting to note that Korea’s identity dramatically 
degraded from munmyŏng-guk in the discourse of munmyŏng to hujin’guk in the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk. With the identity of hujin’guk, Korea felt a sense of humiliation 
vis-à-vis sŏnjin’guk or the West, and, in this context, the Korean developmental 
regime’s aggressive pursuit of modernization was justified. The modernization project 
was understood in the context of urgency to transform the nation from the status of 
hujin’guk to that of sŏnjin’guk. Having gone through the identities of hujin’guk and 
chungjin’guk (developing country), South Korea now aims for a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk. 
As such, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk has provided a primary interpretive framework for 
those historical changes of national identity, goal, and vision. In those respects, various 
sociological ideas interplay in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in the Korean context, such as 
developmentalism, Eurocentrism, and nationalism.    
As noted above, developmentalism is one of the most influential hegemonic 
discourses presenting national identities and visions around the globe in the postwar 
period. Thus, many countries in the South defined themselves as “underdeveloped” or 
“developing” country in the developmental discursive framework, and launched various 
national projects to achieve a “developed” status. In developmentalism, those countries’ 
pursuits of economic growth and industrialization were justified as a historical necessity. 
Turkey and Egypt in the 1950s, for instance, “embarked upon grand developmentalist 
projects” of different kinds: that is, the former was based upon “popular capitalism” and 
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the latter upon “popular socialism” (Keyder and Oncű 1994:1). As such, both ideologies 
of capitalism and socialism were, in many ways, under the same regime of 
developmentalism in the Cold War context. In this regard, Turkish elites promoted the 
creation of “a new country, a new society, a new state . . . respected at home and abroad” 
(Eralp 1994:206).  
 In no other countries were the aspirations for national development clearer and 
more successful than in Asian developmental states in the 1970s. In the so-called Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs), such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, economic development was set as an urgent national goal. For this, each 
state effectively orchestrated national resources for the achievement of the goal in 
cooperative international circumstances. Those Asian countries recognized their “less 
developed” status and made hard efforts to achieve a “developed” status. In this way, 
their national identities and visions were constructed in terms of economic development.  
National developmentalists solidified their hegemony through the endeavors to 
achieve the national goal of economic development. In this way, economic development 
as national goal was not just about economic concerns but also related to political 
situations. The national goal of economic development provided developmentalists with 
their political legitimacy. In this regard, Castells (1992:56) notes that “[a] state is 
developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote 
and sustain development [. . .].” Thus, economic development is not just a goal but a 
means for the developmental state (Castells 1992:57). This relationship between 
economic development and political legitimacy is well shown in the South Korean 
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developmental state under the Park Chung-Hee regime in the 1960s and 70s. Taking 
power through a military coup, the Park regime sought for its political legitimacy 
mainly from economic development. In this regard, Koo and Kim (1992:133) note that 
the Park regime’s industrialization drive was “clearly a politically motivated plan to 
diffuse popular discontent and to mobilize people’s energy for a new economic goal.” 
They add that “[t]his was justified in the name of building a prosperous nation that 
would be able to join the club of advanced industrial countries [sŏnjin’guk]” (ibid.). 
The aspirations for economic development are still strong in various countries 
today in different historical circumstances. For instance, Malaysia has set the Vision 
2020 in 1991, in which it aims to become “a fully developed country by the year 2020” 
(Mahathir 2010). In this regard, current Prime Minister Najib Razak insists that 
“Malaysia needs to grow 8 percent annually over the next decade to achieve its goal of 
becoming a developed nation by 2020” (Pakiam and Adam 2009). Taiwan also aims for 
a “developed” status. For this, it has set a goal of achieving average 5-6 percent of 
annual GDP growth until 2012 (Taiwanese Department of Investment Services 2010). 
In this regard, a Taiwanese governmental vision mentions that the country should be 
“compatible with developed countries in terms of its economic development, social 
justice and environmental protection” (ibid.). In those respects, the aspiration for 
economic development and for “developed” national status is not specific to South 
Korea.  
However, the context in which each country pursues its “developed” status 
varies from country to country. That is to say, the “developed” status does not mean the 
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same thing to countries, but reflects each one’s own identities and visions. In this sense, 
the concept of “developed” status is a construction of each country’s own historical 
experiences. For instance, the Malaysian aspiration for “developed” country, reflected 
in Vision 2020, is far different from South Korean one shown in the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk. A notable difference is that the former shows a certain degree of resistance 
to the Eurocentric notions of development whereas the latter is rarely critical of them. In 
this regard, Malaysians set a different path of development from those of Western 
countries. In the Vision 2020, former Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir insists that: 
 
What, you might rightly ask, is “a fully developed country”? Do we want to be like any 
particular country of the present 19 countries that are generally regarded as “developed 
countries”? Do we want to be like the United Kingdom, like Canada, like Holland, like 
Sweden, like Finland, like Japan? To be sure, each of the 19, out of a world community 
of more than 160 states, has its strengths. But each also has its fair share of weaknesses. 
Without being a duplicate of any of them we can still be developed. We should be a 
developed country in our own mould. (Mahathir 2010) 
 
As such, Malaysian concept of “developed” country shows an apparent departure from 
a Eurocentric attitude that tends to consider Western countries as actual models of 
“developed” country. Furthermore, Malaysian pursuit of “developed” status is far more 
comprehensive than is assumed by economic growth-centered developmentalism. In 
this regard, the Vision’s nine strategic challenges indicate that the competitive, dynamic, 
and robust economy is just one strategic condition for the national vision.   
The Taiwanese strategy for economic development is also distinguished from 
South Korean one in terms of prominent national identity. Despite its importance in 
national strategy, economic development is not dominant enough to define national 
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identity for the Taiwanese. In this regard, the most important factor affecting dominant 
national identity varies from country to county as well as from period to period. Some 
countries, for instance, focus on economic factor in their construction of national 
identities, while others emphasize political or cultural aspects. Currently, the Taiwanese 
seem to be more concerned with the political factor for their national identity, e.g., their 
relationship with mainland China (Corcuff 2002; Bedford and Hwang 2006). Having 
successfully achieved industrialization and democratization, the Taiwanese are now 
struggling with the crisis of national identity in terms of international politics. As Liao 
(2002:286) notes, “Although Taiwan has [. . .] succeeded in surmounting the first two 
challenges, poverty and political charge, the third and the greatest challenge – that of 
stabilizing relations with mainland China – is an obstacle yet to be overcome.” In this 
sense, for the Taiwanese, the prominent issue of national identity is more of an 
international political problem rather than of an economic one. This is distinguished 
from South Koreans’ situation, in which the economic issue is still the most dominant 
factor in defining their national identity after having achieved industrialization and 
democratization.  
In those respects, the case of South Korea is unique in their national identity 
construction with the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Despite the common pursuit of 
“developed” status among various countries in the global developmental era, South 
Korean aspiration for “sŏnjin’guk” takes on strong Eurocentric bearings and plays a 
dominant role in the construction of national identity. In this respect, the South Korean 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk shows one of the best examples of nationally popular discourse, 
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which contains main elements of Eurocentrism, developmentalism, and nationalism. 
Besides, South Korea makes an interesting case in the sense that it is a former colonized 
country, which now demonstrates, probably, the strongest aspiration for being included 
at the center of the Eurocentric global stage.  
 
Research Goal and Question 
Despite its significance, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk has not been a primary focus of 
research so far. Previous studies on Korean dominant discourses tended to focus on 
governmental slogans and policies. In this regard, some suggest a historical 
transformation of dominant discourses in South Korea according to the change of 
governmental discursive foci: from anti-communism (the 1950s); modernization, 
industrialization, and development (the 1960s - 80s); to segyehwa (the 1990s) (Cho 
2003; Kim and Cho 2003). Cho’s (2003) study offers a succinct overview on the 
historical transformations of South Korean dominant discourses in relation to different 
political and social circumstances. He categorizes modern South Korean history into 
three main periods in terms of the change of dominant discourses: the 1950s; the 
authoritarian period of 1961-1987; and the period of democratization after 1987. He 
argues that a discourse that characterized the 1950s was that of “pangong” (anti-
communism). Based upon this, he conceptualizes the society in this period as “pangong 
kyuuyul sahoe” (anticommunist regimented society). In this period, South Korea’s 
economy relied much on aids from outside and its willingness for economic 
development was somewhat weak. This situation underwent a sea change when a 
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military group seized power through a coup d’état in 1961. In this period, the Park 
Chung-Hee regime made a priority of economic development, and promoted such 
slogans as “chal sal-a pose” (let’s live rich). In this situation, the discourse of 
“kŭndaehwa” (modernization) took a dominant discursive position, which continued 
until the late 1980s. During the Park regime, the goal of economic development was set 
as a national mission under such a patriotic phrase as “choguk kŭndaehwa” (the 
modernization of fatherland). In the 1990s, the discourse of “segyehwa” (globalization) 
took a dominant position, reflecting the global trend of neoliberal globalization, and 
domestic political economic circumstantial changes.10 The authoritarian developmental 
regime of the past was transformed into a neo-developmental regime, which employed 
                                                 
10 Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy, which has exerted a strong influence around the globe since 
the early 1980s until recent years. Its main idea lies in the prioritization of market freedom over state 
intervention. As for the role of the state, Milton Friedman argues that “[t]he scope of government must be 
limited . . . to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets . . . ” 
(cited in Hettne 1995:113). Promoted by Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s U.S., neoliberalism began to 
earn global significance in the 1980s. Neoliberal principles were employed by international economic 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for their structural adjustment 
programs, and were used as a discursive force, along with the discourse of globalization, driving the 
transformation of various countries. Its policies were well summarized in the Washington Consensus, 
which was made by the representatives of the G-7 countries and international institutions in 1989. A set 
of neoliberal policies recommended by it include: financial and trade liberalization; privatization of 
public enterprise; deregulation of measures restricting competition; strengthening of property rights; and 
so forth (Peet 1999). Because of its pro-market, pro-capital stance and neglect of human needs, a variety 
of criticisms have been made for it, and its discursive power seems to be far waned these days. Among 
others, Chang (2008) succinctly argues that neoliberalism has failed in all fronts of economic values: 
growth, equality, and stability.  
In the case of South Korea, neoliberalism has been adopted as a leading economic philosophy by 
the ruling elites since the mid-1990s. On the assumption of limitless international competition promoted 
by neoliberal globalization, the ruling elites suggested neoliberal reformation as the only way to 
overcome the global challenge, as was reflected in such a slogan as segyehwa (globalization). Amidst the 
economic crisis in the late 1990s, in particular, South Korea as a debtor country had to undergo drastic 
neoliberal socio-economic transformations under the guidance of international institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund. Neoliberal ideas, which are represented by liberalization and privatization, 
are still influential in Korea today as a main strategy for winning global competition and eventually 
achieving sŏnjin’guk. In regard to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, contemporary South Korean ruling elites 
widely promote the need for meeting the “global standard” to reach the goal of sŏnjin’guk. In this sense, 
South Korea seems to be one of the hardest working countries to follow the techniques of global 
governmentality.  
39 
 
neoliberalism as a main developmental strategy (Cho 2003). In this respect, Cho 
considers the discourse of segyehwa as that of neo-modernization or neo-
developmentalism. Cho’s work provides an important contribution to the study of 
dominant discourses in modern Korean history. However, his focus remains on notable 
slogans and policies promoted by the government, and is not put on common epistemic 
discursive frameworks upon which those dominant developmental discourses are 
grounded. In this regard, I consider that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk has provided an 
important interpretive background for those dominant discourses especially after the 
appearance of the developmental regime.  
In terms of Koreans’ construction of national identities vis-à-vis the West, there 
have been researches focusing on the discourses of kaehwa (enlightenment) and 
munmyŏng (civilization), which were prevalent in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Previous studies have examined the dichotomous classification of 
munmyŏng and yaman (barbarism) in the Korean context (Y. Chung 2004; S. Chung 
2004; J. Kim 2005). They have critically investigated Eurocentric assumptions 
embedded in those concepts and classifications, which were associated with Koreans’ 
Orientalistic constructions of the self and the world. However, researchers rarely 
examined Koreans’ national identity construction in relation to the West in the post-
colonial context. From the mid-1990s, researchers have critically examined 
Eurocentrism from various perspectives in the Korean context, but rarely paid attention 
to the Eurocentricity of the ideas constructed around the binary distinction between 
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sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk (Wu 1997; Lee 2002; Chung 2003; Kang 2004; Park 2004; 
Seong 2006).  
This study aims to examine the basic assumptions and characteristics of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk, as well as the historical contexts of its formation and 
transformation. In particular, it analyzes various aspects of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, 
such as: its central concepts, classificatory frameworks, contexts of use, and identity 
constructions; historical conditions of its formation and transformation; contestations 
over and challenges to it; and its comparison with other East Asian countries’ national 
identity discourses. Main research questions are:  
 
 What are main concepts, assumptions, representations, and relations that 
constitute the discourse? 
 What are historical conditions on which the discourse appeared and 
developed? 
 What are the variations of the main concepts, assumptions, and 
characteristics of the discourse across time, and how do they reflect 
historical circumstances? 
 What are continuities and discontinuities in the historical transitions of 
discourses from kaehwa, munmyŏng to sŏnjin’guk? 
 How does the discourse construct South Koreans’ national identities in 
relation to their perceptions of the West? 
 How is the discourse challenged and contested by various social groups? 
 How are the basic assumptions and characteristics of the discourse 
different from or similar to other East Asian countries’ dominant 
discourses in terms of their national self and worldview?  
 
For this study, I try to employ various useful theoretical frameworks broadly 
from the areas of global, cultural, and development studies, rather than following a 
single theoretical tradition. This is mainly based upon my belief that no single theory is 
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perfect in explaining the complexity and diversity of human society. Rather, I observe 
many social phenomena, which can be better explained by the combination of various 
theories. Furthermore, I am wary of a possibility that sticking to a single theoretical 
framework is susceptible to doctrinism, as is shown, for instance, by orthodox Marxists 
or neoliberal fundamentalists. In practical terms, I advocate broad cooperation, rather 
than division, among various theoretical strands, which are critical of unjust social, 
cultural, and political economic systems and processes. 
 Upon these grounds, I use various ideas that are critical of Eurocentric 
conceptions of modernity and development. As noted above, I consider that the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a historically constructed system of knowledge reflecting the 
changes of power relations in Korea as well as the world. For this, I rely on Foucault’s 
critical understandings of modern systems of knowledge and discourse as reflections of 
power relations, which have no internal logical inevitability within themselves. In 
relation to this, I also borrow from post-developmentalists’ insights into their 
application of Foucault’s ideas to the understanding of developmentalism as a global 
discourse reflecting Eurocentric global power relations.  
A weakness of Foucault’s idea on knowledge and power is that he does not pay 
much attention to the fact that certain knowledge systems serve for certain people’s 
political economic interests and their dominations over others. In this respect, I observe 
that power is not only dispersed, as is argued by Foucault, but also unequally distributed 
skewed toward some dominant people and groups. To understand this aspect, I employ 
Gramscian notions, e.g., hegemony. In regard to this, this study is primarily concerned 
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with the hegemonic status of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, that is, the conditions in which 
the discourse sŏnjin’guk secured consent from a wide range of the Korean population, 
and served for the hegemony of developmental regime at the national level. In regard to 
this, I pay attention to the following aspects of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk: its reflection 
of dominant developmentalists’ political economic interests; its successful association 
of the concept of sŏnjin’guk with national-popular goal; and its attainment of consent 
from the general public. Thus, a research focus is on the historical circumstances of the 
emergence of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk as a notable hegemonic discourse, having 
determined South Koreans’ national identities and worldviews in the post-colonial era. 
Another important theoretical idea that I employ in this study is postmodernists’ 
suspicion of modern mentality searching for universal progress, certainty, and 
centrality.11 In this regard, I consider that my dissertation is a critique of Koreans’ 
                                                 
11 As Bauman (1992:viii) points out, “postmodernity means many different things to many different 
people.” In a similar vein, Nederveen Pieterse (1992:26) notes that “[p]ostmodern sensibilities are plural, 
protean, not reducible to a single view [. . .].” In fact, many theorists focus on different aspects of the 
postmodern vis-à-vis the modern according to their different theoretical backgrounds. Lyotard (1984), for 
instance, finds the postmodern mainly from the “incredulity towards metanarratives.” Bauman (1991) 
considers the “control of contingency” as the central point of modernity, and sees the postmodern as 
based upon the critical recognition of it. Theorists in the Marxist tradition tend to see the various aspects 
of the postmodern as reflecting the change of political economic conditions, such as those of “flexible 
accumulation” or “late capitalism” (Harvey 1989; Jameson 1991). In institutional terms, the postmodern 
is based upon critical attitudes towards the institutions constituting modernity, such as industrialism, 
surveillance, capitalism, the nation state, military power, etc. (Giddens 1990). On the basis of those 
perspectives, I consider that an important ground of the postmodern is the critical attitude towards 
modernity that has a tendency of emphasizing certainty, centrality, and universality. In this respect, the 
postmodern is concerned with “a heightened sensibility to instability, indeterminacy and transience” 
(Nederveen Pieterse 1992:26). In terms of development studies, the postmodern sentiment is based upon 
a wide range of attempt to go “beyond” the epistemic and institutional limitations of modernity, with the 
suspicion of a linear path of “human progress.” In this regard, Lemert (1997:xii) notes that 
“[p]ostmodernism, if it is about anything, is about the prospect that the promises of the modern age are no 
longer believable [. . .].” As for the historical background of the rise of postmodernism, he adds that 
“there is evidence that for the vast majority of people worldwide there is no realistic reason to vest hope 
in any version of the idea that the world is good and getting better” (ibid.). 
43 
 
modern mentality, which assumes an objective dichotomy between sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk on a universal linear path of development.  
My study is based also upon recognition that culture is a significant power 
affecting the materiality of society. For cultural theorists, as Friedland and Mohr 
(2004:28-9) note, “power is the capacity to produce the dominant categories of social 
life, categories that organize its materiality.” In this respect, I pay attention to the role of 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, as a specific form of culture, in constructing South Koreans’ 
national identities and worldviews, and directing the material transformation of the 
society.12 As hegemonic struggle involves denaturalizing taken-for-granted positivities 
of subordination (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), this study attempts to problematize and 
historicize the discursive system naturalizing the oppression of hujin’guk by sŏnjin’guk, 
or of various social relations by developmentalism.  
 
Methodology 
As noted, a practical goal of this study is to problematize and historicize the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk, which is a popularly circulated taken-for-granted knowledge system. 
                                                 
12 Among various uses of the concept of culture, I understand it mainly as the “entire way of life.” This 
does not mean that I do not recognize the usefulness of the concept of culture in other uses, such as 
intellectual properties, artistic products, etc. (Smith 2001). This conceptualization of culture as the entire 
way of life is distinguished from the Marxist base-superstructure model, which prioritizes the materiality 
of society over cultural aspects. This Marxist model presupposes not only that the economic is separated 
from the cultural but also that the former is the fundamental factor determining the epiphenomena of the 
latter. Disputing this binary model, recent cultural theorists tend to recognize that culture is “integral to 
the production of the social” (Friedland and Mohr 2004:2). In this perspective, culture is rather the social 
itself, than merely its component. For Laclau and Mouffe (1987, 2001), the formation of the social is a 
discursive formation. For them, no social relations and activities are possible without discourse. In this 
perspective, the conceptual boundaries of discourse, culture, and the social are blurred, and regarded as 
somewhat identical with one another. I understand that discourse is a specific form of culture, while 
culture is a more generic term encompassing specific discursive systems.  
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Thus, in terms of the sphere in which discourse is constructed, the focus of this research 
is primarily put on the public sphere: that is, how the discourse of sŏnjin’guk and related 
historical discourses are constructed in public fields in certain historical circumstances. 
In this respect, I use newspapers as main research materials, i.e., Korean newspapers 
representative of different historical periods.  
As many theorists note, the mass media are a “field or space, in which 
contending discourses, offering different ways of looking and speaking, struggle for 
visibility and legitimacy” (Golding and Murdock 2000:85). While suggesting a 
“propaganda model,” Herman and Chomsky (1988:1) note that “[t]he mass media serve 
as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace.” I 
understand newspapers in a market system as an important part of cultural industries, 
which play central roles in constructing and distributing public discourses. Newspapers 
communicate with the public and construct public discursive fields by producing 
meanings and symbols (Schudson 2003). As for the relationship between the sender and 
recipient of message, I am aware of that the “all-powerful media” model is too 
simplistic and the interpretation of media messages involves far more complex 
processes than was traditionally assumed (Hall 1980; Hay, Grossberg, and Wartella 
1996; Bennett 1996). 
As for the newspaper’s main function in society, two models are notable: one is 
the model of information and the other is that of public forum (Nord 2001). The model 
of information focuses on the newspaper’s role in providing information to social 
members. In this model, the newspaper is mainly considered as an institution reporting 
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“facts” from a detached stance from the empirical world. To keep journalistic 
“objectivity” is assumed to be the newspaper’s principal professional duty. In contrast, 
the model of public forum focuses on the newspaper’s function as a main institution 
making social issues and public opinions. In this model, the supposed cool-headed 
professional objectivity of the newspaper is a kind of “myth” as its covering, reporting, 
and editing processes are inevitably selective. As Nord (2001:7) notes, “facts do not 
speak for themselves; indeed, they do not exist until they are ‘constructed’ by someone 
as culturally significant.” Thus, the information, not to mention opinions, carried in 
newspapers inherently reflects certain ways of looking at the world. On these grounds, 
the public forum model pays attention to the newspaper’s role in building communities. 
The newspaper constructs the “public sphere” by facilitating conversations, opinions, 
and discourses among social members, which is an important precondition for building 
a community. In this regard, Nord (2001:2) points out that “[c]ommunities are built [. . .] 
in communication.”  
Another important problem to consider in regard to the newspaper’s role is its 
materiality. This involves questions such as: what material conditions affect the 
newspaper’s construction of public discourses; and what opinions and values it is 
inclined to represent. As for this, liberal perspectives tend to perceive the press as the 
Fourth Estate, which plays a role for checks and balances vis-à-vis the government. In 
this respect, the newspaper is basically a free institution searching for truth and justice, 
serving for public interests. As such, the newspaper is an important pillar of mature 
democracy. In the history of the British press, newspaper enterprises employed this kind 
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of liberal views in their struggle with the government’s control in the mid-nineteenth 
century, by emphasizing freedom and independence of the press (Boyce 1978). Against 
“taxes on knowledge,” liberalists advocated the role of the press as a free institution 
committed to facts and objectivity with keeping watch on the possibility of power abuse 
by the government. In this perspective, the press is considered mainly as “the 
institutional embodiment of the democratic principle of freedom of expression” (Curran 
1978:51).   
In contrast, critical perspectives argue that the entire notion of the Fourth Estate 
is a myth, impossible in the empirical world. In these perspectives, the press is 
inextricably interrelated with the political system (Boyce 1978). As the “fact” does not 
exist until it is given cultural significance, the newspaper is to naturally reflect certain 
political views in its construction of the facts. In particular, the press is likely to reflect 
the dominant groups’ political economic interests in society, as its tone of argument is 
conditioned by its materiality. In terms of materiality, not many newspapers are free 
from the influence of political economic power, whether it is from the government or 
from capital. In capitalist societies, the press is likely to be under the influence of 
capital. In the case of Western industrial societies, especially the U.S. and Britain, the 
press has generally come to be under the control of the “free” market since its 
industrialization around the turn of the twentieth century (Curran 1978:67; Lee 1978). 
Dependent upon advertising patronage in the competitive market system, newspapers 
are susceptible to the dominant values of society for their survival as corporation. In this 
context, Curran (1978:74) maintains that “most journalists have been socialised into, 
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and internalise, the dominant values of society.” Furthermore, the advertisement-
dependent competition in the “free” market tends to bring about the concentration of 
ownership of the press in major companies, which enables the recognition of the press 
as industry. In this condition, the press is inclined to reflect the interests of capital.  
Taking the positions of the forum model and the critical perspective, I consider 
the newspaper in general as a central institution engaged in the construction of public 
discourses that are likely to reflect the dominant values of society. In relation to 
community, I think that the newspaper plays an important role in creating a sense of 
community based upon common (dominant) values and worldviews. As Curran 
(1978:74) notes, the modern press “links together socially differentiated and 
geographically dispersed groups, emphasizing collective values [. . .] and collective 
symbols of identification.”  
As with other phenomena, the historical background of the appearance and 
development of modern newspaper vary across societies. Unlike newspapers in many 
Western societies, which appeared mainly as a private institution in competition with 
state power, Korean modern newspapers started and developed in close relations with 
the state in various historical circumstances. Thus, the history of Korean modern 
newspaper strongly reflects the transition of political power. Considering newspapers’ 
main role in society, and its relation to the state and capital, I distinguish the following 
notable periods in the history of modern Korean newspaper: the periods of kaehwa 
(enlightenment) (1883-1910); Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945); U.S. military rule 
(1945-1948); the Lee Seung-Man regime (1948-1960); the Park Chung-Hee regime 
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(1961-1979); the Chun Doo-Hwan regime (1980-1987); and the post-democratization 
(1987-).13  
In the period of kaehwa, newspapers were published mainly by the kaehwa 
intellectuals, who recognized a need for sharing information about the rise of “modern 
world” and distributing it to the public. In the face of the imperial expansion of the 
West, the Korean intellectuals began to be aware of the seriousness of the new world 
order and, thus, intended to publish newspaper as a way to “enlighten” (kaehwa) people 
about the changing world accompanying various new phenomena. With conservative 
traditional intellectuals having significant political power, the kaehwa intellectuals used 
newspaper as a major institution to publicize their voices for the reformation of the 
country.  
In a situation where capitalist development was weak, newspapers generally 
maintained close relationship with the state in this period. The Hansŏng Sunbo (1883-
1884), the first modern Korean newspaper, was published by the government. As for the 
purpose of publication, the Hansŏng Sunbo acknowledged that “it is to educate people 
internally, and to prevent harm and war externally” (Chung 1983:ii). As such, the 
Korean modern newspaper was born as a government project for the education of 
people, and pro-kaehwa intellectuals were actively involved in that project. After the 
Hansŏng Sunbo, private newspapers were published by various social, political groups, 
which included the Tongnib Sinmun (1896-1899), the Cheguk Sinmun (1898-1910), and 
the Taehan Maeil Sinbo (1904-1910). Despite the difference in detailed political 
                                                 
13 Given that newspapers have relatively remarkable independence from governmental control after 
democratization (1987), I do not distinguish governmental changes for the last period. 
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position, those private newspapers generally showed a commonality in advocating the 
need for kaehwa and the transformation of the country to effectively deal with the 
challenges of the new world order. In this respect, they promoted the need for learning 
the West and criticized many aspects of traditional life. In relation to promulgating the 
need for kaehwa, they played an important role in raising national awareness in the face 
of Japanese and Western imperial expansions.  
The government gave direct and indirect supports for the foundation and 
operation of the private newspapers, as is shown in the case of the Tongnib Sinmun 
whose foundational fund was given by Emperor Kojong. In terms of popularity, those 
early modern newspapers did not have large circulation. Generally, it is estimated that 
they had some thousand copies of circulation. In this respect, their popularity was quite 
limited to relatively a small number of privileged people, that is, those who were 
capable of reading and purchasing the newspapers. Nonetheless, with no comparable 
mass media existent, the newspapers played a central role in promoting kaehwa thought 
and national awareness in those times.  
The period of Japanese colonial rule was the time when the endogenous 
development of modern Korean newspaper was seriously interrupted. In particular, the 
first decade of the rule from 1910 to 1919 is often referred to as the “period of darkness” 
in Korean journalism as no publication of Korean newspaper was permitted by imperial 
Japan (Chung 1990:312). It was not until 1920 when imperial Japan began to permit the 
publication of Korean newspaper. Intrigued by the March First Independence 
Movement in 1919 organized by Korean people nationwide, imperial Japan allowed the 
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publication of Korean newspaper as a way for more efficient colonial rule. Imperial 
Japan gave permits to those Koreans who they thought were cooperative to the colonial 
rule. In this situation, some Korean newspapers came into existence including the 
Chosun Ilbo (1920-) and the Dong-a Ilbo (1920-). Amidst severe censorship and 
oppression by imperial Japan, Korean newspapers in many cases made efforts to raise 
national awareness for independence. In this period, the Korean newspapers’ circulation 
generally reached tens of thousands. With the increase of circulation, they obtained an 
increased popularity, and some of them were able to grow to large industry in the 1930s 
(Park 2000).  
In the period of U.S. military rule, the license system of the publication of 
newspaper changed to the registration system. As the military rule officially advocated 
the freedom of speech, the situation for the press became far better compared with the 
previous period of Japanese rule. However, this did not apply to leftist newspapers. The 
military rule severely oppressed leftist newspapers, as is well shown in the case of the 
suspension of the publication of the Maeil Sinbo in November 1945, which maintained 
a leftist stance and was critical of the military rule (Kang 2007:302-303). Despite the 
popularity of leftist ideologies and movements in Korea just after the independence 
from Japan, the military rule distributed the media properties obtained from imperial 
Japan only to the rightist people who they thought had pro-U.S. dispositions. In this 
situation, Korean newspapers generally showed a strong right-wing propensity in their 
ideological spectrum. In this regard, Cha (2000:143) points out that the Korean 
newspapers’ general ideological bias before democratization in the late 1980s is 
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historically rooted in the basic frameworks of journalism created through the periods of 
the U.S. military rule and the following Lee Seung-Man regime. 
The Lee Seung-Man regime inherited the U.S. military rule’s oppressive policy 
on leftist journalism. In the wake of the Korean War, its anti-communist rhetoric and 
measures became stronger and the room for leftist newspapers got smaller. Even with 
rightist newspapers, it did not much tolerate the criticism of the government. 
Newspapers in this period are generally referred to as “political papers” in the sense that 
they had specific relationships with political parties. For instance, the Kyunghyang 
Sinmun was one of the representative journalism supporting the opposition party. In 
terms of circulation, the Kyunghyang Sinmun held the second rank with the circulation 
of 200,000 copies (Kang 2007:335). The Lee regime made this newspaper cease to 
publish in 1959, which signaled the collapse of the regime in the following year. As is 
shown by the circulation of the Kyunghyang Sinmun, newspapers in general made a 
considerable growth in the industrial sense, but their freedom of speech was 
continuously checked by the state.  
The basic framework of the relationship between the press and the state in the 
period of Park Chung-Hee regime was established in a series of harsh policies on the 
press made just after the success of Park’s coup in May 1961. A small number of 
newspapers, which were in particular subservient to the regime, survived through those 
policies. In relation to its emphasis on national economic growth, the Park regime 
supported the growth of newspapers as industrial enterprise. Thus, while controlling 
criticism of government policies, the Park regime provided various special benefits to 
52 
 
newspaper corporations and provided a good environment for their industrial growth 
(Kang 2007:459).  
With the rapid national economic growth, this was the period when the 
industrial growth of the press was notable. The size of circulation rapidly increased: for 
instance, the total number of circulation grew twice in just six years, from 740,000 in 
1961 to 1.5 million in 1967 (Kang 2007:460). Accompanying this, dependence on 
advertisement for newspapers’ revenue rapidly increased. This tendency became 
stronger in the 1970s. The total number of newspaper circulation became 5.4 million in 
1980, which was far greater than 2 million in 1970 (Kang 2007:532). Ju (2000:166) 
suggests four main factors for the rapid increase of circulation through the 1960s and 
70s: the improvement of living standard; the increase of nuclear families; the increase 
of the need for knowledge and information; and the increase of competition in 
circulation among newspapers. Thus, while being restricted in their freedom of speech, 
newspapers could achieve much growth in industrial terms due to economic growth and 
urbanization in this period.  
The policies on the press exercised in 1980 just after the success of the military 
coup led by Chun Doo-Hwan is regarded as another massive attack on journalism, along 
with those conducted by the early Park regime. The Chun regime’s merger and abolition 
of the mass media created a favorable environment for those cooperative with the 
regime. Somewhat similar to the previous period, this was the period when newspapers 
continued rapid industrial growth. The reduction of the number of the mass media 
resulted from the regime’s policies contributed to the growth of a small number of large 
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newspaper corporations. In particular, the growth of the conservative Chosun Ilbo, the 
biggest newspaper today, was notable in this period.  
After democratization, the relationship between the press and the state 
dramatically changed. Above all, the post-democratization period witnessed the 
apparent weakening of the state power vis-à-vis the industrially grown newspapers. The 
foundation of the Hankyoreh in 1988, which was unique in the history of world 
journalism in the sense that its ownership was shared by 27,000 ordinary people, 
signaled the re-appearance of “leftist” mainstream journalism critical of conservative 
ruling groups. Reflecting the growth of capital and the increase of its power vis-à-vis 
the state after democratization, the indirect control of the press by capital, rather than 
the direct state control, became notable in this period.  
Another notable phenomenon in this period is the emergence of the digital and 
broadcasting media. Even though newspapers obtained relative power in relation to the 
government, their relative influence on the public weakened with the rise of the new 
media, especially the internet after the late 1990s. The number of internet users reached 
13 million in 2000, which was one out of every 3.24 persons of the population (Kang 
2007:662). Various kinds of “cyber community” and “cyber culture” made a boom 
among young generations in the late 1990s, and the social, political influence of the 
internet as a type of interactive communication media rapidly increased (Kim 2008). 
Along with this, the journalistic influence of the broadcasting media grew fast, vis-à-vis 
the printed media. With the launch of the era of cable TV in 1995, there was a dramatic 
growth in the number of TV channel. In the same year, various regional private 
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broadcasting corporations came out to compete with the preexistent public broadcasting 
systems. In this regard, the total number of broadcasting TV channel went up from 4 in 
1990 to 46 in 1999 (Lee 2000:250). With the popularity of the digital and broadcasting 
media, the newspaper corporations made efforts to expand their business to those newly 
emerging areas in this period.     
Examining the discourse of sŏnjin’guk popularly constructed in the public 
sphere, this study pays attention to a popular form of the media for its research material. 
In this respect, other sources, such as government documents, are limited in their 
popularity. On the ground of the history of Korean newspaper briefly mentioned above, 
this study chooses to analyze newspapers for the following three reasons. First, as 
printed media, the newspaper is a more appropriate form of the media for delivering 
sophisticated information, idea, and knowledge. This aspect of newspaper is compared 
with the broadcasting news media, which pursue relatively quick information and 
simple ideas. In this respect, I consider that the information and arguments carried in 
newspapers are more sophisticated and, thus, more suitable to the analysis of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk as a system of knowledge.  
Second, newspaper journalism has historically been the most influential media 
for the Korean public opinion. It is a relatively recent phenomenon that the broadcasting 
media began to be recognized as an important journalism in the Korean context. The 
status of TV and radio as journalism is well shown in the fact that the reporters in those 
media were not included in the press group for many institutions until the 1970s. In this 
regard, the journalists for newspapers were reluctant to recognize those in TV and radio 
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as colleagues with such a perception as “is broadcasting journalism?” (Choe 2002:450) 
One of the important reasons why broadcasting did not get much recognition as 
journalism was that it was started by imperial Japan as a colonial institution and played 
a major role as a public propaganda institution for the regimes of dictatorship afterward. 
In relation to this, the broadcasting media were generally regarded as the media for 
entertainment, e.g., soap opera, rather than for information and opinion. 
And last, the newspaper is more appropriate form of the media for historical 
research as it is one of the easiest and oldest forms of the media for preservation. In this 
regard, the broadcasting media have relatively a short history and do not provide 
sufficient materials for the early periods of Korean modern history. The history of radio 
in Korea began in the 1920s and that of TV in the 1960s as state projects, but the access 
to their materials is far limited compared with newspaper materials. In this regard, the 
internet offers a more serious problem for historical research due to its far short history.  
This study employs two main qualitative research methods: discourse analysis of 
newspapers and semi-structured interview skills (Denzin and Lincoln 1998, 2005). For 
the analysis of the contemporary discourse of sŏnjin’guk, I investigate three leading 
newspapers representing either conservative or progressive voices in the South Korean 
political context, such as the Chosun Ilbo, the Dong-a Ilbo, and the Hankyoreh. For the 
analysis of the historical variation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk from the 1950s to the 
present, I focus on the Chosun Ilbo, one of the most traditional conservative newspapers 
representing a mainstream voice in the country. For the historical analysis of the 
kaehwa and munmyŏng discourses, I look at early modern newspapers in the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as: the Hansŏng Sunbo (1883 - 1884) and 
the Hansŏng Jubo (1886 - 1888); the Tongnib Sinmun (1896 - 1899) and the Taehan 
Maeil Sinbo (1904 - 1910); and the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-a Ilbo (both 1920 - ).  
In order to analyze challenges and resistances to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, I 
interview representative persons from various counter-developmentalist social groups, 
using semi-structured interview techniques (Fontana and Frey 2005). The primary 
reason for employing interview skills, rather than analyzing documents, is that those 
social groups do not actively respond to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk at the public level 
as its basic concepts and assumptions are so naturally accepted among the wide 
population.  
 
Chapter Organization 
This dissertation consists of five substantive chapters. Employing historical approaches, 
the first and third chapters examine the historical transformation of discursive foci from 
kaehwa (enlightenment) and munmyŏng (civilization) to sŏnjin’guk. The second and 
fourth chapters look into the discourse in terms of the contemporary historical phase, 
focusing on its concepts, representations, and characteristics, on the one hand, and the 
contestations over the discourse, on the other hand. The last chapter adopts a 
comparative transnational approach, and explores the commonalities and differences 
among the dominant discourses of three neighboring East Asian countries.    
In detail, the first chapter examines historical roots of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk, focusing on temporal differences within kaehwa and munmyŏng discourses, 
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and historical continuities and discontinuities between them. Koreans’ discourses of 
kaehwa and munmyŏng popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
reflected their acceptance of Western interpretations of the world and their willingness 
to learn the West in the competitive Eurocentric world order. This chapter examines the 
formation and transformation of those discourses in terms of the historical backgrounds 
of the appearance of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. The second chapter examines basic 
assumptions and characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, focusing on its 
Eurocentric bearings. It investigates the ways of how Eurocentric representations of the 
world are reflected and naturalized in the discourse; how South Koreans negotiate and 
reconstruct their national identities in the hierarchy of the discourse; and how they 
imagine the future of their society based upon it. 
The third chapter aims to examine the historical transformation of the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk from the 1950s to the present, and the historical conditions that entailed 
its formation and transformation. It investigates the changing connotations, political 
implications, and interpretive frameworks of the discourse and the historical conditions 
associated with them. The fourth chapter examines the contestations over the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk. For this, it pays attention to how the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is perceived, 
contested, and challenged by various counter-developmentalist social groups. And the 
last chapter analyzes different national self identities, perceptions of the West, and 
subjectivities of modernities among three East Asian countries. Through the 
comparative analysis of the discourses of Korean sŏnjin’guk, Japanese nihonjinron, and 
Chinese new nationalism, this chapter argues that the three neighboring East Asian 
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countries express somewhat different modern identities and worldviews from one 
another.  
Based upon the notion of discourse as a system of relations meaningful only 
within the system itself, this dissertation pays attention to how central concepts of the 
concerned discourses take on regularities and, thus, construct representations within the 
discursive systems in regard to Koreans’ perceptions of national self vis-à-vis the West. 
In particular, chapter one examines the discursive formations surrounding the concepts 
of kaehwa (enlightenment) and munmyŏng (civilization). Reflecting Foucault’s idea of 
the rupture and discontinuity in identifying objects across historical knowledge systems, 
this chapter attends to a rupture in Koreans’ representation of the West between pre-
kaehwa and kaehwa periods. In this regard, the status of the West dramatically changed 
from “barbarians” to “kaehwa-guk” or “munmyŏng-guk,” which shows that the nature of 
the West is basically Koreans’ discursive construction, rather than an entity “out there” 
waiting for epistemological discovery. Given that both objects and subjects are defined 
within the system of discourse, this chapter aims to examine how the West is differently 
represented in relation to Korean national identity within the discursive systems of 
kaehwa and munmyŏng. 
When it comes to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, the West and Korea are related 
with each other in a far different discursive system from those of the previous periods. 
Within the system of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, Korea and the West take on 
regularities in relation to each other around the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. In 
this respect, chapter two aims to analyze the basic structure of the discourse of 
59 
 
sŏnjin’guk. Considering that the hierarchical conceptual structure of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk reflects the Eurocentric hierarchy between the West and the non-West, this 
chapter investigates the basic elements of the discourse, such as central concepts, 
representations, and characteristics. Its main foci of discourse analysis are on: how the 
central concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk are constructed and represented; how these 
two are related with each other; and how South Koreans construct their national self in 
relation to those concepts and representations. With regard to the notion of discourse, 
this chapter pays attention to that different concepts are defined and ordered in a way 
they create a system of relations, constituting the basic structure of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk. And, chapter three focuses on how the formation of relations between Korea 
and the West has changed through Korean modern history, which brought about 
variations within the discourse of sŏnjin’guk reflecting different historical 
circumstances.  
 
Significance 
The significance of this study can be considered in terms of global studies, cultural 
studies, development studies, and Korean studies. As for global studies, this study 
examines the impact of the global discursive change, along with the hegemonic 
transition, in the postwar era on the discursive formation and transformation at the 
national level, with the case of Korea. The findings of this study would provide a 
detailed knowledge of the historical interactions between global and national hegemonic 
discourses, which reflect certain global and national power relations. In regard to 
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cultural studies, this study explores Korea’s modernization process from a cultural 
perspective, focusing on the formation and transformation of taken-for-granted 
dominant discursive systems. Based upon discourse theories, Gramsci’s idea of 
hegemony, and Foucault’s ideas of knowledge and power, this study analyzes the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk as a hegemonic knowledge system having legitimated the 
formation of Korean developmental regime and its drive for Korea’s modernization and 
economic development.  
In terms of development studies, this study investigates the role of “development” 
as a hegemonic discursive formation in the transformation of Korean society. It 
examines Korea’s development process, focusing on the formation and transformation 
of a dominant knowledge system giving legitimacy to it. And as for Korean studies, this 
study provides important knowledge of Koreans’ (re)constructions of national identities 
and worldviews vis-à-vis the West in the post-colonial context. In relation to this, it also 
contributes to the studies of Korean Eurocentrism, by showing that the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk is a primary Eurocentric interpretive system justifying the epistemic 
hierarchy between Korea and the West. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF KOREANS’ 
EUROCENTRIC WORLDVIEWS: KAEHWA AND MUNMYŎNG DISCOURSES 
 
The late nineteenth century in Korean history witnessed a sea change in Koreans’ 
perception of the world. In terms of the history of Eurocentrism in Korea, in particular, 
it was the time when Koreans started to recognize the reality of the Eurocentric world 
order and accept Eurocentric interpretations of the world. In the face of Western 
imperial expansion accompanied by the discourse of civilization, the previous 
Confucian ethics-based perception of the West as “barbarians” began to lose intellectual 
hegemony and the new perception of it as the “civilized” started to gain power. 
Recognizing the seriousness of the new world order in the “age of empire” (Hobsbawm 
1987), Koreans realized that their country might not survive without substantial material 
power, and started to be curious about the secrets of the power of Western countries. In 
this context, pursuing national wealth and strength, kaehwa (enlightenment) theorists in 
the late nineteenth century first tried to modernize Korea modeling the West (Kang 
1985; Lee 1989; Shin 2000).  
Discourse, as a socially constructed system of meanings and relations, provides 
a way of identifying and interpreting the world, reflecting certain power relations 
(Foucault 1976, 1980; Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 2001). In this respect, kaehwa and 
munmyŏng (civilization) discourses, reflecting early Korean modernists’ ways of 
interpreting the world, played a great role in “modernizing” Korean society. A 
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noticeable feature of these discourses was their Eurocentric classificatory system of 
various forms of societies, in which the type of Western societies was ranked the 
highest. Reflecting the global discourse of civilization, which was premised upon a 
hierarchical distinction between civilization and barbarism, kaehwa and munmyŏng 
discourses were, basically, grounded upon a distinction between kaehwa and mi-kaehwa 
(unenlightenment), and between munmyŏng and yaman (barbarism), respectively. For 
instance, a representative kaehwa theorist Yu Giljun (1856-1914) categorized countries 
in the world into a three-tier classification system: kaehwa-guk (enlightened country), 
pan-kaehwa-guk (half enlightened country), and mi-kaehwa-guk (unenlightened country) 
(Yu 2004). 
In these representational frameworks, the non-West tended to be represented as 
the deficient counterpart to the sufficient West (Y. Chung 2004; Gil 2004; J. Kim 2005). 
Set as a deficient being, mi-kaehwa-guk continuously dreams of achieving the status of 
kaehwa or munmyŏng, based upon a feeling of shame at the self of mi-kaehwa or yaman 
(Gil 2004). In this process, people in the supposed mi-kaehwa-guk or yaman-guk project 
their negative values into the representations of their society as mi-kaehwa or yaman 
and positive values into those of the West as kaehwa or munmyŏng. In the case of Korea, 
kaehwa and munmyŏng frameworks contributed to the construction of Koreans’ “auto-
Orientalism” by assuming the supposedly deficient aspects of the Korean society as 
something existent in Western societies (Y. Chung 2004). In this way, non-Western 
worlds internalize the two important pillars of Eurocentrism: European exceptionalism 
and Orientalism (Kang 2004). This internalization process of Eurocentric assumptions 
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does not necessarily occur voluntarily, but is rather strongly affected by the competitive 
world order.   
Although preexisting researches tended to focus on distinctions between kaehwa 
and mi-kaehwa, and between munmyŏng and yaman, which were the primary features of 
kaehwa and munmyŏng discourses, they did not pay sufficient attention to contextual 
differences in the basic assumptions of those discourses across time. In fact, kaehwa 
and munmyŏng discourses were not unitary and consistent throughout periods, and nor 
were Koreans’ perceptions of national self and the world. Rather, as historical 
constructs, the discourses transformed their basic assumptions and connotations 
reflecting the changes of historical circumstances. For instance, despite the prevalence 
of the munmyŏng discourse in the 1900s, Koreans often showed a sense of superiority 
vis-à-vis the West and imperial Japan in the spiritual, historical, and cultural terms, and 
this tendency became strong in the 1920s when the Western discourse of civilization 
lost authority in the wake of World War I. Besides, while the concept of munmyŏng 
referred virtually to Western civilization in the 1900s, it took on universal bearings by 
admitting diverse equally-valued regional civilizations in the 1920s and 30s.  
Given those aspects, this chapter aims to analyze historical continuities and 
discontinuities of the assumptions and connotations of kaehwa and munmyŏng 
discourses across early modern periods of Korea. It pays attention to the fact that 
Koreans’ perceptions of national self and the world, the West in particular, changed in 
relation to the contextual transformations of the discourses in their early periods of 
interactions with the West. There were continuities and discontinuities, and remains and 
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changes in the transitions of the discourses, reflecting national, regional, and global 
historical circumstances.  
In this regard, this chapter focuses on three notable periods: (1) the 1880s, when 
the new recognition of the West as another civilization with material wealth and 
strength gained power; (2) the 1890s - the 1900s, when kaehwa and munmyŏng 
discourses became popular with regard to Koreans’ perception of national self and the 
West; and (3) the 1920s - the 1930s, when the munmyŏng discourse developed under 
Japanese colonial rule. For each period, it analyzes two representative newspapers 
showing Korean modernists’ interpretations of national self and the world.   
For the first period, it investigates two old newspapers: the Hansŏng Sunbo 
(1883-1884) and the Hansŏng Jubo (1886-1888). The Hansŏng Sunbo is known as the 
first modern-style Korean newspaper, which was published by early kaehwa theorists 
working in the government to distribute kaehwa thoughts to the public. After this 
newspaper ceased to publish due to Kapsin chŏngbyŏn (the failed three-day coup) in 
December 1884, the Hansŏng Jubo succeeded it. As the whole articles of the Sunbo and 
the majority of the articles of the Jubo are written in Chinese characters, this study uses 
a Korean translation version edited by Chung (1983). Among various types of articles, 
this study focuses on “kakguk-kŭnsa” (international news) in the Hansŏng Sunbo and 
“saŭi” (editorial) in the Hansŏng Jubo, which are especially relevant to the perceptions 
of the West and other international affairs. Besides, as “kakguk-kŭnsa” usually cited 
foreign news sources, “saŭi” is especially focused, which directly reflects the 
newspaper’s own perspectives.  
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For the second period, this study analyzes two representative private newspapers: 
the Tongnib Sinmun (1896-1899) and the Taehan Maeil Sinbo (1904-1910). The 
Tongnib Sinmun is the first private modern newspaper in Korea published by influential 
pro-West modernists, and the Taehan Maeil Sinbo is a modern newspaper best 
representing national voices during the 1910s under Japanese colonial threats. Using the 
Korea Integrated News Database System, I obtained articles for these two newspapers. 
In order to see Koreans’ perceptions of the West in relation to kaehwa and munmyŏng 
discourses, I used seven keywords for article search: “sŏyang” (the West), “oeguk” 
(foreign country), “sŏnjin” (advanced), “munmyŏng” (civilization), “kaehwa” 
(enlightenment), “kurap‘a” (Europe), and “yaman” (barbarianism). Limiting the search 
to editorials for manageability, I obtained total 326 editorial cases (81 for the Tongnib 
Sinmun and 245 for the Taehan Maeil Sinbo).  
And for the third period, this study investigates two representative newspapers: 
the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-a Ilbo. These were founded in 1920 and have been 
influential journalism in Korea until today. For this period, it focuses on the binary 
distinction between munmyŏng and yaman. Using these keywords on the Chosun 
archive, I obtained 353 article cases for “munmyŏng” and 62 for “yaman.” From the 
Dong-a data base, I collected 410 cases for “munmyŏng” and 60 cases for “yaman.”   
In order to see the nature and characteristics of kaehwa and munmyŏng 
discourses, and historical continuities and discontinuities between them, this chapter 
analyzes the contexts in which the key concepts are used in each newspaper. Main 
research questions are: what concepts and discourses were used for Koreans’ 
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representations of national self and the world for each period; and, how did Koreans’ 
perceptions of the West and their self-identities change through the historical periods?  
This chapter is organized in three main sections according to periodization. First 
section investigates how early Korean modern newspapers perceived national self and 
the West in the 1880s. Second section examines how Korean modern newspapers’ 
perceptions of national self and the West were reflected in the discourses of kaehwa and 
munmyŏng in the 1890s and 1900s. And third section analyzes how the munmyŏng 
discourse in the 1920s and 1930s was similar to and different from the discourses in the 
previous periods.  
 
 
APPRECIATING THE POWER OF THE WEST: 
THE HANSŎNG SUNBO (1883-1884) AND THE HANSŎNG JUBO (1886-1888) 
 
The late nineteenth century was the period when Western economic and military power 
began to be recognized by Koreans. Their traditional gaze of ignorance and hatred at 
“Western barbarians” started to change in this period. National independence being 
threatened in the hostile world circumstance, which was created by imperial Western 
expansion, Koreans started to recognize a need for learning the West as a way to raise 
their national wealth and strength. In this situation, primary values of the Hansŏng 
Sunbo and the Hansŏng Jubo with regard to national and international affairs were 
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concentrated in such concepts as “pugang” (wealth and strength), “puguk kangbyŏng” 
(wealthy nation and strong military), and “chagang” (self-strenuous effort).   
In these early modern newspapers, the West was, first of all, recognized as a 
world of material wealth and physical power. The newspapers threw envious eyes on 
the achievements of the West in the fields of economy, machinery, technology, and 
military. They hoped to make Korea achieve wealth and strength by learning the merits 
of Western systems in those fields. Above all, Western economic systems were 
recognized as a basis for their wealth and strength, as reflected in an article of the Sunbo: 
 
These days, Western countries establish companies to draw merchants, which is 
actually the ground for pugang. [. . .] In Western countries, steamships run on the sea, 
freight cars run on the ground, and electric wires are laid and streetlights are turned on, 
the wonders of which are beyond description. They wield wealth and strength all over 
the world and show dignity to their neighbors by sending forces to every sea and 
commerce with all countries, which is unprecedented. This has been possible only since 
they established company. (Chung 1983:38)14  
 
This article noticed the importance of company as a main source of the wealth 
and strength of Western countries. This was a far departure from the traditional 
Confucian value system that somewhat ignored material values in pursuit of mental and 
ethical values. The term “pugang” was a key word in this article, in which the writer’s 
aspiration was condensed. The things made with engineering and scientific technologies, 
such as steamships, freight cars, and electric wires, were referred to as the indices of 
“pugang.” In terms of the possession of those things representing material development, 
                                                 
14 All citations of the Hansŏng Sunbo and Jubo are from Chung (1983), so I indicate just page numbers 
for them hereafter. 
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the gap between the West and Korea was seriously recognized. The article emphasized 
that the West was the subject of “pugang” and the main secret of it was the 
establishment of company.  
Another important perceived feature of the West was its military power. The 
West was conceived of primarily as the world-dominating military power, based upon 
the development of machinery, technology, and industry. The newspapers recognized 
that material wealth (pu) and military power (kang) were not separated, but closely 
intertwined with each other. With regard to this, an article of the Sunbo introduces 
Britain like this:  
 
Mainland Britain is just an island country, but has early developed navigation skills and 
exerted its ambition around the world, broadening its territories, by taking advantage of 
machinery. [. . .] Britain puts its top priority on military affairs. It subjugates its 
tributaries by making many warships and completing military preparations, and always 
keeps the full number of military with an ambition of dominating its neighbors. [. . .] 
British people respect for manufacture and make many convenient machines, and their 
“puguk kangbyŏng” is the best in the world. (93-5) 
 
The change of the perception of the West accompanied the change of the 
understanding of the world order. With regard to this, the newspapers thought that the 
newly emerging world order is not ideal at all, but deplorable because of its militaristic, 
competitive, and power-dominating features. The spread of social Darwinist ideas 
contributed to justifying the world order, but it was too far from the ideal one that 
Koreans usually imagined. In this regard, the Sunbo mentions that “countries in the 
world are now all concerned with military affairs and compete with one another to 
become more powerful” (115). As for the dominance of the West in this new world, an 
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article of the Jubo writes that among numerous countries in the six continents, “only the 
countries in Europe monopolize wealth and strength, and many countries in other five 
continents are in the situation of being subjugated” (748).   
The world order was also mistrusted in relation to international treaties. In this 
regard, the Jubo regrets that “the countries [in the East and West] are not afraid of 
ignoring public laws in front of self-interests, and do not feel shameful of annulling 
treaties” (748). This perception of the world circumstance played a role as a solid 
ground upon which the newspapers actively promoted the need for raising Korea’s 
wealth and strength for itself. This attitude of accepting the deplorable world situation 
as a reality was distinguishable from that of the traditionalists who still tended to deny 
participation in the “barbaric” world. This world situation provided ample reasons for 
building a strong military, and for the accumulation of wealth. As for this, the Sunbo 
emphasizes that: 
 
Generally, the military is deadly weapon. However, the reason to build the military in 
spite of knowing its evilness is not to exercise violence but to prevent war. It is urgent 
today, but one cannot merely build the military. It needs sufficient wealth. (115)  
 
 In this context, a significant degree of mistrust was shown towards the West. In 
the newspapers’ perceptions, not only was the West militaristic but was untrustworthy. 
Rather than promoting universal values, as in the argument of “civilizing mission,” the 
West was mainly perceived as behaving out of its own self-interests with a certain 
degree of hypocrisy. For the newspapers, the West was the main subject responsible for 
putting the world under the law of jungle and the logic of power. In this respect, the 
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colonialist discourse of civilization did not get hegemony in Korea at the time. With 
regard to this, the Jubo writes that: 
 
The people who busily interact with one another only aim at profit, so how can we say 
that there is no law of the jungle? For example, France first subjugated Vietnam as its 
tributary, and England subjugated Burma. France and England always took treaties and 
international laws as the golden rule, but they have eventually subjugated others, while 
insisting benevolence and righteousness [. . .]. (842)  
 
Wariness to Westerners was often explicitly expressed in the newspapers. 
Reporting Western countries’ aggressive attitudes against other countries, the Sunbo 
deplores that “an old man did not deceive me, who said that ‘[Westerners] were not our 
race and their mind was always different [from ours]’” (541). An article of the Jubo 
says that “one should be very careful when interacting with foreigners” (842). As such, 
Western wealth and strength, aggressiveness, and self-interestedness were not perceived 
separately, which was far from Eurocentric yet.  
For pugang, the newspapers upheld the need for learning Western social, 
cultural, political, and economic systems, such as commerce, economy, education, laws, 
etc. These are the fields that were particularly regarded as the main sources of the 
wealth and strength of the West. The pursuit of Western systems went along with the 
recognition of the “impracticalness” of traditional values, and the reformations of social, 
cultural, and economic systems were urgently raised. With regard to education, for 
instance, the Jubo argues that “everyone thinks that it is most important to establish 
schools, modeling after the Western system, whereby raising necessary brains and 
making them a basis for self-reliance” (717). As for the importance of commerce, the 
71 
 
Sunbo argues that “without [commerce], all farming and crafts would become 
impoverished, and [. . .] people cannot maintain their lives” (38). In relation to this, 
some articles criticized Koreans’ conventional ways of life as somewhat lethargic and, 
thus, unsuitable for the dangerously competitive world. An article of the Jubo, for 
instance, regrets that “having accustomed to peace for a long time, our people have been 
satisfied with small achievements, have not pursued development, and, eventually, have 
made a habit of idling and playing, with lavishness being a custom” (779). 
However, while recognizing the wealth and strength of the West, the 
newspapers did not conceive of the West as superior or advanced entity as is usually 
assumed in Eurocentric discourses. Rather, they showed pride in their own history and 
civilization, and a kind of surprise at the “abrupt” rise of the West. With regard to the 
“rise” of Britain, the Sunbo says that “England was destitute just a short time ago with a 
short history, but it has achieved this development. We may well research what made it 
possible” (97). Citing a Chinese journal, another article of the Sunbo mentions that “in 
ancient times, no country was more destitute than the West and no country was worse in 
luck than the West” (137). As such, the newspapers thought of the “rise of the West” as 
a recent, incidental phenomenon. This perception supports a type of historiography that 
tends to consider the “rise of the West” as much later phenomenon than is assumed by 
Eurocentric historiography, e.g., circa 1800 (Frank 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Hobson 2004; 
Nederveen Pieterse 2006). Furthermore, in the face of Western belligerence, the 
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newspapers maintained a sense of superiority over the West in ethical and spiritual 
aspects.15  
In a similar vein, natural circumstances and the sizes of population of the West 
were not considered as reaching those of the East either. This perception of the West 
became a basis of the newspapers’ confidence in Korea’s potential in its pursuit of 
national wealth and strength. With regard to this, the Jubo argues that: 
 
Our country is blocked by seas in three directions, its soil is fertile, and its population is 
prosperous. Its mountains, rivers, and seas are abundant, and, moreover, its 
transportation is convenient. If making efforts in the policies of “pugang” with these 
good conditions, we will be able to reach almost the six continents, going ahead of 
other countries.” (794)   
 
 Although arguing for reformations in various fields modeling the West, the 
newspapers did not quest for them blindly. They, rather, thought that the reformations 
should be conducted in prudent ways. In this regard, while the two newspapers are 
known as published by kaehwa theorists, it is interesting that the Jubo criticized kaehwa 
people’s supposedly hasty attitudes. It points out that “people who are now mentioning 
kaehwa thoughtlessly have the names in vain, but do not know much about reality [. . .]” 
(842).  
                                                 
15 The traditional distinction between civilization and barbarism depends upon whether one knows 
Confucian ethics or not. Confucianism in the Korean tradition is a philosophical effort to understand the 
principle of the universe. In this framework, humans and human society are basically defined and 
understood as parts of the whole universe (Choe 1997). As for its cyclic conceptualization of time, Choe 
(1997:121) notes that “when a principle of the universe gets to the end, it starts again, so it becomes 
limitless.” As their learning and practice were based upon self-discipline in pursuit of the principle of the 
universe, Confucians’ primary interests lay in spiritual, rather than material, aspects (Chang 1996; Hyun 
2003). In this respect, “li” (interest) was conceptualized as somewhat opposite to “ŭi” (virtue). In this 
framework, Western civilization based upon material and military powers were short of the Koreans’ 
traditional concept of munmyŏng.    
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Summary 
In short, the 1880s was the period when Korea started to recognize the power of the 
West and the reality of the world dominated by physical power. Perspectives on the 
world, reflected in the Hansŏng Sunbo and the Hansŏng Jubo, were a far departure from 
those of traditionalists, who put priority on Confucian ethics. Unlike the traditionalists’ 
views, which basically regarded the West as “barbarians,” the modern newspapers 
argued for learning the merits of Western systems, as a way to raise national wealth and 
strength, and ultimately to maintain national independence in the face of Western 
expansion.  
However, their perceptions of the West in this period were not necessarily 
Eurocentric. In their perceptions, the West was wealthy and powerful being, but not 
superior being. The West was frequently recognized as self-interested, belligerent, and 
untrustworthy, and, thus, not reaching the ethical and spiritual level of Korea and the 
East. For the newspapers, the “rise of the West” was a recent and incidental 
phenomenon and thus could be outrun by Korea and the East on their strong strenuous 
efforts, which supposedly had better historical, cultural, and natural conditions. Korea 
and the East were still supposed as the possessors of better ethics and cultural heritages 
while the West was perceived mainly as the promoter of technology and industry. In 
those respects, the colonialist discourse of civilization could not exercise its hegemony 
in Korea in this period. As for the Sunbo’s and Jubo’s perceptions of the world, Gil 
(2004:66) appropriately states that “the ‘East’ was still civilized countries, and, at the 
same time, the ‘West’ was also civilized countries in the sense that they were wealthy 
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and technologically advanced.” In these old modern newspapers’ interpretive 
frameworks in the 1880s, there was yet no apparent Eurocentric hierarchy between 
Korea and the West. 
 
 
EUROCENTRISM IN THE DISCOURSES OF KAEHWA AND MUNMYŎNG: 
THE TONGNIB SINMUN (1896-1899) AND THE TAEHAN MAEIL SINBO (1904-
1910) 
 
The Tongnib Sinmun (1896-1899) 
With regard to Korea and other East Asian countries’ responses to the West in the 
nineteenth century, three temporal phases can generally be distinguished: the phases of 
hostility, limited acceptance, and all-out acceptance (J. Kim 2005). If the period of the 
Hansŏng Sunbo and Jubo was that of limited acceptance, recognizing Western power 
with great caution, the period of the Tongnib Sinmun and the Taehan Maeil Sinbo could 
be considered as that of all-out acceptance. This was the period when Korean modern 
thinkers started to show somewhat uncritical attitudes of approving Eurocentric 
assumptions and ideas. Tongnib Sinmun writers frequently showed an attitude of 
observing Korea from the perspective of “civilized man” by internalizing that of the 
West (S. Chung 2004). In this regard, Gil (2004:73) points out that “it was the period of 
the ‘Tongnib Sinmun’ when [the meaning of] ‘munmyŏng’ was totally transformed into 
Western civilization [. . .].” 
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 In fact, when it comes to the Tongnib Sinmun in the 1890s, a perceptual 
hierarchy between “the West and the Rest” is somewhat distinctive (Hall 1996). An 
article of it, for instance, classified countries in the world into four hierarchical 
categories according to the degree of kaehwa, such as: kaehwa (enlightened), pan-
kaehwa (half-enlightened), mi-kaehwa (unenlightened), and yaman (barbarian).16 
Departing from the idea of the previous period in which Korea was perceived as another 
civilized country with long history and valuable cultural heritages, the Tongnib Sinmun 
positioned it at the status of pan-kaehwa in the classificatory system of the kaehwa 
discourse. In this perceptual framework, only the West (including Japan in many cases) 
was in the category of true kaehwa.  
The most popular concept in which the need for learning the West was 
condensed in this period was kaehwa.17 As for this, the Sinmun says that “the term 
kaehwa is originally created in Ching. It means that one should work on everything 
according to its reality, with reason by enlightening ignorance” (30 June 1896). In fact, 
the concept of kaehwa at the time was so popular that people listened to it to “make 
                                                 
16 As for these categories, the newspaper explains that: “the country of yaman is called as the bottom 
level. They have little knowledge and thus cannot do duties as humans, and just eat fish and wild animals 
without knowing how to cook with grains. [. . .] The country of mi-kaehwa has a little knowledge and 
they can keep livestock and manage agriculture, but do not respect for study and system is inconsistent. 
[. . .] It is not that the country of pan-kaehwa does not make efforts on people’s works in every field, but 
always respects for old customs and looks down on new information. [. . .] In the country of true kaehwa, 
people are good at various skills and techniques, with developed knowledge, and wealth is affluent by the 
promotion of business, and people make efforts for progress every day, pursuing good studies [. . .]” (11 
September 1899). In Sŏyu Kyŏnmun, which was published in 1895, Yu Giljun, one of the most famous 
kaehwa theorists at the time, classified countries into three categories: “mi-kaehwa,” “pan-kaehwa,” and 
“kaehwa” (Yu 2004). 
17 The term “sugu” was used as an opposite term to kaehwa. In this regard, an editorial of the Tongnib 
Sinmun reports a person’s saying that “when talking about rural people’s living, one may not know 
whether it is kaehwa or sugu [. . .]” (2 November 1899).  
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their ears worn” (2 November 1899). In addition to this, other terms such as munmyŏng 
and chinbo (progress) were also used to mean the positive transformation of the country.  
In this period, the West was represented by such positive terms as “kaehwa-guk” 
(enlightened country), “munmyŏng-guk” (civilized country), “munmyŏng-kaehwa-guk” 
(civilized enlightened country), “sangdŭng-guk” (upper-class country), and “ildŭng-guk” 
(first-class country), implying the highest stage of civilization. The social, cultural, 
political, and economic systems of the West were somewhat idealized at the expense of 
the deepening of supposed undesirability of non-Western societies including Korea. 
Various aspects of non-West worlds including Korea and China were disrespected vis-
à-vis the West in this perceptual framework. In this regard, an editorial of the Tongnib 
Sinmun writes that: 
 
Even a country in Europe, whose size is just a tenth of Ching’s, gets treated by the 
world ten times better than Ching, and its government and people are hundred times 
stronger. This is because in European countries, regardless of their sizes, every man and 
woman learns various studies at least ten years, whereas Ching just learns the old Seven 
Chinese Classics. Thus, the reason why Ching always gets defeated by foreign countries 
is that people in munmyŏng-kaehwa countries know how to train military [. . .]. (25 
April 1896) 
 
Korean traditional systems and customs were criticized for the country’s 
weakness. Traditional intellectuals sticking to Confucian values were frequently 
designated as “sugu” (the conservative in a negative sense) and the need for kaehwa 
was actively promoted. In this context, an article argues that “if Korea wants to keep the 
country to next generations forever, it needs to abandon wrong old customs and to learn 
good systems and Western studies” (20 January 1899). This, yet, does not mean that 
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kaehwa intellectuals totally relinquished pride in their country’s cultural heritages. 
Rather, they also regarded Korea’s cultural and natural conditions as a potentiality for 
its success in the future, although the degree of pride in them might not have reached 
that of the previous period. With regard to this, the Sinmun argues that: 
 
Korea is one of the big countries in the world, and its land quality is the best in the East 
and its climate is also good, and thus various grains, fruits, and vegetables would 
become comparable to those of Europe or America. As there are limitless amount of 
gold, silver, cooper, and coal, Korea would also become a sangdŭng country in the 
world if we make efforts on this land. (30 May 1896) 
 
It is also apparent that Western knowledge and ideas were somewhat uncritically 
accepted. In this respect, various colonial and racial ideas, which were prevalent in the 
West at the time, spread in Korea without undergoing any suspicion of their 
Eurocentricity. Many of them maintained their intellectual authority under the name of 
“science,” and Eurocentric ideas were often imported in the form of “scientific 
knowledge,” such as ethnology, geography, anthropology, etc.18 An editorial, for 
example, introduces a Western study, which argues for the superiority of Western 
dietary life: 
 
According to the analysis of various grains by Western chemists, wheat flour is the best 
for human body, corn is the next, and rice has the least nutrients. We may easily know 
superiority and inferiority between them by witnessing the robustness of Westerners, 
who eat wheat flour, and the weakness of Easterners, who eat rice. (25 August 1898) 
 
                                                 
18 With regard to racial studies, for instance, an editorial says that “in foreign countries, a study called 
ethnology is a great study and people studying ethnology are very respected” (6 April 1897).  
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Another editorial argues for the superiority of Western and Japanese customs over that 
of China: 
 
Koreans always say that it is a strange custom that Western women make their waist 
thin, that Japanese women paint their teeth, and that Ching women bind their feet. If we 
consider the merits and demerits of these in terms of people’s living, painting teeth and 
thinning waist are not harmful for working, but the custom of binding feet not only 
obstructs work but also is harmful for health [. . .]. (14 October 1899) 
  
This kind of perception well reflected the reversed statues of China and the West 
on the international stage at the time. An important political implication of this 
perception was that it could serve for the powerful countries’ colonial purposes. The 
supposedly rational subject’s interventions of the non-rational subject’s affairs were 
justified in this kind of hierarchical perceptions. In this regard, the newspaper adds that 
“it is truly wonderful that Western women try to establish chŏnjokhoe [foot-binding 
club] these days, to change the bad custom of Ching’s foot-binding” (14 October 1899). 
As for British colonization of India, an editorial directly expresses a colonialist 
perspective: 
 
After England first conquered India, they lamented people’s ignorance there, and 
decided to educate them with new studies by spending 40,000 ryang of silver annually 
[. . .] It is commendable that new studies are greatly promoted in India [. . .]. (20 
September 1899) 
 
This kind of perception, however, did not remove Korean modern thinkers’ 
feeling of concern about Western expansion. Some editorials explicitly show their 
uneasiness about the aggressive outreaches of the West. With regard to this, an editorial 
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writes, “Generally, Westerners aim to get rid of different religions and dominate other 
races. They try to make themselves high alone by seeing high and walking broad in the 
world” (9 November 1899). Given Korea’s troubled situations surrounded by imperial 
powers, however, many Korean modern thinkers might have had to observe the 
behaviors of Western countries with a somewhat mixed feeling of awe and envy.     
 
The Taehan Maeil Sinbo (1904-1910) 
The 1900s in Korean history was the period when Japanese colonial intention came to 
the fore, under the legal discourse of international law system approved by Western 
countries (Dudden 2005). In this circumstance, Korea’s deplorable situation was well 
recognized by the Taehan Maeil Sinbo, and the need for learning the West was urgently 
advocated in this context. Lamentation over the national situation intensified towards 
the year of 1910 when Japan “officially” colonized Korea.  
The Sinbo interpreted the deplorable national situation in a historical and 
civilizational perspective. As did many Korean intellectuals at the time, the newspaper 
contrasted Korea’s boastful civilizational status in the past with its contemporary 
miserable situation in the context of the rise of the West. As for this, an article of the 
Sinbo deplores the Korea’s situation like this: 
 
Alas, the Korean peninsula, why have you alone met such a bad luck? With miserable 
appearance, you are not like England that has broad territories around the world, not 
like Germany that sheds the bright luster of studies, and not like the U.S. that boasts 
great wealth [. . .] You also produced heroes, were wealthy and strong, and were 
civilized in the past, and thus when China and India shined, you also arose with them. 
When such countries as Japan did not have the name of nation at the beginning, you 
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already showed the development of culture. Alas, aren’t you considered as a brother for 
China and India, and a senior for Japan? Then, how could you lose the past honor and 
meet this tragic bad luck today? (27 March 1909)       
 
Despite their desperate efforts for learning the West, many Korean modern 
thinkers did not abandon whole pride in their country’s cultural heritages and traditions. 
Rather, as shown in this article, they tended to interpret the Eurocentric hierarchy as 
“reversed” in a short period of time and, thus, temporary. The pride in Korea’s past 
made the newspaper writers feel far much sorry for their country’s current situation. 
They were curious about the causes of the country’s being in such a deplorable situation 
insofar as the causes were not considered as rooted in its historical inferiority. For this, 
an article of the Sinbo focused on the problem of kaehwa: 
 
The reason why our country today is in this pitiful situation is not that people do not 
have power but that we thought of kaehwa too late [. . .] About seventy to eighty years 
ago when Western missionaries came to our country, if the government had known 
where our benefit was, it might have made treaties with Western countries through them, 
instead of killing them, and been able to do true kaehwa, maintaining national 
independence. However, it did not open its door at the time and came to be forced to 
open it today [. . .]. (21 August 1907) 
 
The term kaehwa was still a popular and influential concept in this period, in 
regard to the acceptance of the West. However, the frequency of its use was far reduced, 
with the use of the term munmyŏng on the increase. In data for this study, the number of 
cases containing the term kaehwa was 16 in the Tongnib Sinmun and 13 in the Taehan 
Maeil Sinbo, while the number of cases containing the term munmyŏng was 4 in the 
former and 118 in the latter. Given this, the 1900s was the period when the primary 
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concept expressing the need for modernization was in transit from kaehwa to 
munmyŏng.  
 In the face of the national crisis, the binary perception of the West and the East 
deepened. While the strength of the West was idealized, the deplorable national 
situation made Koreans harsh on themselves. Many aspects of Korean society were 
easily subject to self-criticism, which became a solid pillar of Koreans’ self-Orientalism 
and Eurocentrism. An article of the Sinbo, for instance, writes that “across the past and 
the present, and the East and the West, no other public officials do not do their duties 
than those in Korea today, and no other ordinary people are unenlightened than those in 
Korea today” (6 October 1908). In contrast, another article argues that in the West 
“hope for humanity is unlimited and human progress is also unlimited [. . .]” (13 August 
1908).  
As a main threat to Korea’s independence, Japan’s status was also contrasted 
with Korea’s. The achievement of Japan, which went through the Meiji restoration, was 
well evaluated by the newspaper. It sought for the secret of the wealth and strength of 
Japan from its “successful” accommodation of the West. Korean modern thinkers took 
on the significance of the “learning the West” attitude in front of the power of Japan, 
which they traditionally regarded as a kind of yaman. However, although recognizing 
the kaehwa or munmyŏng status of Japan, the newspaper did not lose a sense of 
superiority towards Japan in historical and cultural terms. Showing confidence in 
Korea’s potentiality, the Sinbo argued that Japan’s advance over Korea was temporary 
and merely a matter of learning the West.  
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In this sentiment, the subjugation of Korea by Japanese colonialism was 
considered as unacceptable. In this regard, a sense of superiority over Japan in historical 
and cultural terms played an important role in promoting resistant discourses to Japan’s 
colonial intent against Korea. With regard to this, an article of the Sinbo argues that: 
 
In the past, Japan was a country that learned kaehwa from Korea. Its shintoism was 
created based on the things from the Shilla kingdom, its Confucianism and Buddhism 
were imported from the Paekje kingdom, and other engineering and arts were all 
learned from Korea. So, no matter how Japan’s power today is prominent, the Koreans 
have the willingness to fight against it, but do not have any intention to surrender, and 
thus will not tolerate colonization. (7 January 1910)    
 
In this situation, Korean modern thinkers tended to think of the learning of the West as 
the only practical way to fight against Japanese colonialism and ultimately retrieve 
sovereignty.  
 Reflecting the Korea’s situation, on the other hand, the negative perception of 
the world order intensified. An article of the Sinbo says that “today’s world is the world 
of blood. Civilization cannot be bought without blood, and wealth and strength are not 
achievable without blood [. . .]” (16 May 1908). Some articles used the concept of 
“chegukjuŭi” (imperialism) for their understanding of the world. An article, for instance, 
says that “as this world is that which respects for imperialism, the stronger subjugates 
the weaker [. . .]” (22 February 1910). On the other hand, yet, these situations were not 
merely regarded as deplorable, but considered as a reality in which Korea had to engage 
in. Affected by social Darwinism, which had spread to Korean intellectuals through 
various routes of translations, some articles of the newspaper even advocated the logic 
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of the “survival of the fittest.” In this regard, an article praises the idea of Darwin, 
arguing that competition is the vehicle of progress (11 August 1909).  
 
Summary  
When it came to the Tongnib Sinmun and the Taehan Maeil Sinbo, a hierarchy between 
the West and the East appeared manifest. In their perceptions, the West was mainly 
represented as a world of kaehwa or munmyŏng while the East including Korea and 
China were pan-kaehwa or pan-munmyŏng. In terms of the history of Eurocentrism in 
Korea, the 1890s and 1900s can be regarded as a critical period when the Eurocentric 
hierarchy between Korea and the West appeared and developed. The most popular 
concepts that reflected the need for modernizing Korean society in regard to the 
learning of the West were kaehwa in the 1890s and munmyŏng in the 1900s.  
 Koreans’ acceptance of the Eurocentric hierarchy did not occur automatically, 
but occurred amidst the hostile expansion of the West. Confronting a situation where 
national independence was threatened, Korean modern thinkers blamed tradition for the 
country’s weakness, and advocated the need for learning the West. They thought that 
the active acceptance of the West was the only way to maintain national independence 
and to compete in the world. Japan’s “successful” embracement of the West through the 
Meiji restoration often functioned as a model for some Korean modern thinkers’ 
promotion of reformation.  
 On the other hand, Korean modern thinkers in this period thought that the rise of 
the West and Japan was temporary. Despite its supposed second-tier status in the 
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discourses of kaehwa and munmyŏng, for them, Korea was still a country that had 
brilliant historical and cultural heritages, as well as good natural conditions. In this 
respect, the Eurocentric hierarchy was not considered as inherent and permanent, but 
incidental, temporary, and thus reversible. Korean modernists’ perception of the 
hierarchy was thus based upon actual power difference, rather than the intrinsic nature 
of societies. That is to say, although the discourses of kaehwa and munmyŏng reflected 
Eurocentric stage theory, which assumed the advancement and universality of European 
societal systems to some extent, they did not consider the “progress of Europe” as 
rooted in European inherent superiority. This is a clear difference between Koreans’ 
version of Eurocentrism at the time and ordinary Eurocentric ideas, which are obsessed 
with European exceptionalism.     
 
 
THE CRISIS AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MUNMYŎNG DISCOURSE: 
THE CHOSUN ILBO AND THE DONG-A ILBO (1920s-30s) 
 
The Crisis of the Munmyŏng Discourse 
In the wake of World War I, the early 1920s witnessed the serious undermining of the 
authority of Western civilization across the world. In front of the unprecedented 
tragedies and atrocities committed by the so-called munmyŏng-guk or “civilized 
countries,” the belief in “human progress” and the argument for “civilization mission” 
were seriously doubted. This historical situation provided a ground for Koreans to 
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question the universality as well as desirability of Western civilization, which was 
considered virtually equivalent to civilization itself in the previous period. As for the 
concept of munmyŏng, thus, Koreans developed somewhat relative perspectives on it 
and began to appreciate the values of various civilizations in different regions. And, the 
West was no longer regarded as an ideal world, which was a far departure from the 
epistemic attitude in the previous periods. 
 The undermined authority of the West and Western civilization is easily 
observed in the newspapers in the 1920s. Far from idealizing the West, the newspapers 
often described it as a world of uncertainties and confusions. Under the title “The new 
tendency of Western civilization after world war,” for instance, the Chosun Ilbo points 
out that “recent Europe is a term of transition and a world of confusion. These transition 
and confusion are unique phenomena to Western countries after the big war” (30 April 
1921). As discourse reflects power relations, the demise of the authority of the West 
was closely associated with the crisis of the discourse of civilization. In this respect, its 
basic assumptions, which had been taken-for-granted before, started to be questioned. 
The Korean newspapers raised some basic questions about it such as: “What is 
munmyŏng?” “What is yaman?” In this vein, the Eurocentric way of distinguishing 
between civilization and barbarism was challenged. The civilization supposedly 
promoting the logic of power was severely criticized in this period especially as 
Koreans were direct victims of colonial rule.  
As for the concepts of munmyŏng and yaman, a column of the Chosun argues 
that “it is clear that a people who ignores humanity with mere belief in power is yaman, 
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and that a people who loves peace and respects for justice is munmyŏng” (20 June 1921). 
By this criterion, the West was not necessarily a world of munmyŏng. On this ground, 
this column goes on to harshly criticize the pursuit of power by the West: 
 
If that Western scholar argues that psychology, politics, institution, and economy are 
the elements of civilization, and exaggerates that they themselves are the civilized 
people, this is a bias of provincial pride and racial arrogance. This is because, when we 
look into their psychology, what lofty mind do they have, individually or nationally, 
except for invasion, plunder, misconduct, and pilferage? The extreme material 
development has contributed to humans’ living, but invention and discovery are all for 
them. If there are no manners, nor is the sense of shame. Even if they exist, they are just 
display and deceit. If we call them munmyŏng-in [civilized people], this is not different 
from calling a thief as a kunja [a man of virtue]. (Chosun 20 June 1921)  
 
On the basis of this redefined concept of munmyŏng, the column concludes that peace-
loving civilization such as Korea’s is true munmyŏng.  
 The undermined authority of the West also well appeared in the discredit to its 
universality. As its universality was doubted, the West had to reposition itself as a 
region (of confusion and transition), instead of the world, and so did a nation in the 
West as a political entity legitimate within its national boundary. In this regard, an 
article of the Dong-a (27 June 1921) criticized an argument of the British media that 
Britain’s parliament was an institution for world peace: 
 
The first Imperial Conference of Britain after world war was held in London [. . .] The 
British media designate it as “the institution of world peace” and compare it to the 
League of Nations. We are to comment on this interesting matter that as merely a 
meeting of Britain, the Conference discusses its national interests, that is, national 
defense, foreign policy, and the relationships between main land and its tributaries. 
Then, why do they call it as the institution of world peace?  
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 The concept of munmyŏng in this period strongly reflected Koreans’ sense of 
victimization. That is to say, their discredit to the West or the conventional notion of 
munmyŏng echoed their feeling of being victimized by a country that claimed itself as 
munmyŏng-guk. In this respect, the re-conceptualizations of munmyŏng and yaman were 
closely related to resistance to colonialism. By defining a civilization promoting the 
logic of dominance by power as pseudo-munmyŏng or yaman, and peace-loving 
civilization as true munmyŏng, Koreans sought for justification for their resistances to 
the Japanese colonial rule. In this regard, an article of the Chosun (13 November 1925) 
reports an address of Lee Sangje, then president of the Chosun Ilbo, under the title 
“Rise, the youth of Korea, who are infringed by the civilization of invasion”:  
 
The president of this newspaper, Lee Sangje, slowly approached the podium and 
addressed, under the title of “the responsibility of the youth,” that the youth of Korea 
should stand up, who are infringed by the so-called modern violent science and the 
civilization of invasion. He said that in order to save the world, the youth in Korea 
should rise first than those in any other country that is infiltrated by money and 
perverted science, to conquer the world of evil with the great power of true love [. . .].   
 
The Reconstruction of the Munmyŏng Discourse 
With the image of the West seriously damaged, the concept of munmyŏng took on 
different bearings to recognize the values of various regional civilizations. While 
munmyŏng referred virtually to Western civilization in the previous period, it came to 
connote a society’s certain degree of artificial achievement, which was distinguishable 
from the state of nature (Dong-a September 15, 1925). In this sense, the concept of 
munmyŏng came to take on diversity and specificity to pay attention to various kinds of 
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civilizations, such as civilization of spirit, civilization of material, civilization of science, 
civilization of peace, civilization of Tao and virtue, civilization of invasion, civilization 
of the East, civilization of the West, etc. The concept of munmyŏng was no longer 
monopolized by the West. Rather, Western munmyŏng, as one of various forms of 
munmyŏng, was often regarded as materially developed but lacking spiritual and 
harmonious aspects. As such, the connotations of the concept of munmyŏng 
significantly changed while the term was continuously used. If the concept of 
munmyŏng in the previous period was stuck to a kind of “European universalism,” the 
concept in this period became somewhat closer to the notion of “universal universalism,” 
which recognized the common ground of munmyŏng out of the diversity of humanity 
(Wallerstein 2006).    
 In this respect, it is obvious that the Eurocentric hierarchical system with the 
West in the highest rank also collapsed. There was no ideal image of Western 
civilization at the expense of other civilizations, such as Korean and Eastern ones, 
which were frequently stigmatized as irrational, unscientific, and unpractical in the 
previous period. Rather, Western civilization (sŏyang munmyŏng) was regarded as a 
mere regional civilization with its unique characteristics, and so was Eastern civilization 
(tongyang munmyŏng). An article of the Chosun (26 July 1921), for instance, refers to 
Eastern civilization as todŏk munmyŏng (civilization of Tao and virtue) and Western 
civilization as kwahak munmyŏng (civilization of science). This article well 
demonstrates a relativist perspective on the two regional civilizations: 
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If we would like to discuss the values of rise and decline by the situations of the East 
and the West, they [the West] may see us lacking material development, but may not be 
able to say that our ethics vanished too. Similarly, when seeing them, we may not be 
able to say that their scientific civilization is not developed just because they are weak 
in ethics. (Chosun 26 July 1921)  
  
Upon this basis, it raised a need for combining the merits of the two civilizations: 
 
Therefore, as Eastern civilization has maintained its center with Tao and virtue so long, 
it would enjoy the permanent peace when combining Western civilization of science, 
and at the same time, they may not either be able to ignore this kind of exchange value. 
(ibid.)   
 
With regard to the “universal universalism” of the concept of munmyŏng, the 
newspapers showed a tendency of considering it in terms of humanity, which had 
various kinds of sub-munmyŏng, such as Eastern and Western ones. On this ground, the 
specific values of certain regional civilizations were judged by their contributions to the 
broader universal concept of munmyŏng. As a product of human efforts, munmyŏng was 
considered as “making human behaviors progress from stark animality to humanization” 
(Dong-a 15 September 1925). This ideal and universal type of munmyŏng was 
conceptualized in close relation to the promotion of peace and humanity. With regard to 
this, the Dong-a (15 September 1925) says that: 
 
When seen outside, munmyŏng is all artistic activities and methods, wealth and 
prosperity, and thus industry and commerce, or science and machinery, but when seen 
inside, it is impossible without respect for humans, taking responsibilities, and 
compatibility that is based on understandings and contacts among people.  
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When judged by this concept of munmyŏng, Western civilization tended to be regarded 
as lacking the latter aspect of inside virtues. This is one of the most obvious departures 
from the 1890s and 1900s when Western civilization was considered as on the top stage 
of civilizational development and thus virtually equivalent to the term munmyŏng itself.  
 In terms of the contribution to humanity, the importance of material values, e.g., 
the development of science and technology, was still recognized. The concept of 
munmyŏng often provided justification for the pursuit of science and technology. In this 
respect, the concept of munmyŏng functioned as a stimulus to Koreans’ situation of 
lagging behind the development of science and technology. As for the German airship 
Graf Zeppelin’s historic first round-the-world flight in 1929, an article of the Dong-a 
(20 August 1929) reports that: 
 
What kind of feeling do Koreans have, merely seeing this rapid progress of science in 
wonder? As there are no trains and steamships that are made by us, and there is no place 
for us to make even a cheap car, what face do we have to the world? As we are not 
behind the consumption following the trend, without contributing to constructions of 
creative cultures, the damage to our honor as a people and a world citizen is too severe. 
In the past, we have invented and built the “Turtle Ship,” metal type, and ch‘ŏmsŏngdae. 
We had the finest craftworks such as the pottery of the Koryŏ Dynasty, gold crowns, 
and gold shoes. However [. . .].  
 
As expressed in this article, it is also notable that Koreans developed a certain 
degree of identity as world citizen under the concept of munmyŏng. In relation to this, a 
perception was somewhat popular that the world was being closely connected by the 
development of communication and transportation technologies. Somewhat similar to 
the contemporary notion of globalization, the perception of “one world” developed to a 
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certain degree. With regard to this, an article of the Dong-a (7 August 1929), for 
instance, argues that: 
 
In this way, the distance becomes shortened day by day and the world is becoming a 
family both nominally and virtually. As the national economy leaps to the world 
economy, world rich class and world poor class come to confront each other. It is not 
strange that thoughts are spreading through the air and an incident taking place here 
today moves around the whole world tomorrow. [. . .] The conditions for the realization 
of world peace and world organization are getting better daily [. . .].  
  
The Munmyŏng Discourse for Resistance or Domination 
In the historical context in which the scramble of imperial countries was rushing to its 
doom, another notable use of the concept of civilization (munmyŏng) in this period was 
its functioning as a political tool in international politics. As a discourse reflecting 
power relations, the discourse of civilization was used by countries to judge others for 
political purposes. For Koreans, it provided criteria for judging Japanese colonial 
policies. Hence, the concept of munmyŏng was a ground upon which they criticized the 
colonial rule and revealed its unjustness. Colonial countries, on the other hand, 
appropriated it as justification for their interventions of weaker countries. In the 
discourse of civilization, labeling barbarism played an important role in damaging the 
legitimacy of a certain political group, which, in turn, legitimatized resistance to, 
intervention of, or domination of that group, depending upon power relations.   
 In terms of the relationship between Korea and Japan in the discourse of 
munmyŏng, Japanese oppressive colonial rules frequently fell into the category of 
yaman by the criteria of munmyŏng. In this regard, the newspapers often pointed out 
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that Japan’s oppressive rules contradicted its self-claim to munmyŏng-guk. In this way, 
the newspapers tried to lead Japanese colonial activities in a desirable direction by using 
the concept of munmyŏng. As for Japanese police’s use of inhumane interrogation 
methods, such as torture, the Chosun (9 March 1923) argues that “there is no torture for 
the judicial systems and police of munmyŏng.” In another article, the newspaper raises a 
need for “civilizing the police,” arguing that:  
   
A reason why we desire for a munmyŏng society and rational systems is that we can live 
relieved when our lives, properties, freedoms, and honors are guaranteed. If our lives 
and properties are threatened, and freedom and honor are infringed in the so-called 
munmyŏng and law-governed society, we would rather prefer to go back to the 
primitive society and live in the unenlightened society. (Chosun 12 July 1924) 
 
In this article, the “primitive” or “unenlightened” society is contrasted with the 
“munmyŏng” and “law-governed” society. And, the munmyŏng society is imagined as a 
society in which individuals’ lives, freedoms, and properties are guaranteed on the basis 
of just judicial systems. In this respect, the article points out that there is a contradiction 
between the rhetoric of Japan as munmyŏng-guk and the reality of its colonial rule. 
Exposing realities contradictory to the ideal of munmyŏng, this article aims for policy 
changes. With regard to this kind of the politics of munmyŏng, another article of the 
Chosun (9 September 1924) seriously criticizes the harshness of the colonial police: 
 
But, we cannot help but feel horror and shivering, which may appear in a martial law 
area or in a revolution period, in watching various policies of the police and the 
policemen’s high-handed authorities. We feel a shivering horror by the patrol 
policemen’s violence including killing, injuring, and assault, or their daily-occurring 
misconducts, which are heard daily but are not freely released. [. . .] Then, how could 
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the Japanese say about their munmyŏng, and how could they hide their barbarity? 
Rather, we, as barbarians from the Japanese perspective, criticize the self-styled 
civilized Japanese for the remaining of such practices.  
 
The munmyŏng discourse also exerted its reflexivity on power relations at the 
individual level, by providing criteria for judging an individual’s behaviors. In a similar 
way to the functioning of the discourse at the international level, the discourse also 
played a role in inducing individual behaviors in a “desirable” way. In this regard, 
individual behaviors that were considered as not reaching the expectations of the 
munmyŏng society were subject to criticism. An article of the Chosun (6 June 1921), for 
instance, reports a Japanese couple’s inappropriate sexual behavior on the train, 
questioning that “could they still call themselves as munmyŏng-guk citizens?” As shown 
in this article, the operation of the discourse at the individual level was often closely 
interrelated to international politics. Another article reports a Japanese attempted 
murder, questioning “how could a people of the so-called munmyŏng make light of 
one’s life like this?” (Chosun 22 May 1924) On the other hand, some Japanese also 
tried to stigmatize Koreans as yaman. In this regard, some articles report Korean 
students’ protests against Japanese teachers’ designations of Koreans as yaman (Dong-a 
26 October 1925; 1 March 1926; 3 November 1927). 
While the discourse of munmyŏng was used as a discourse of resistance in ways 
as noted above, colonialist countries used it against others for their political purpose of 
domination. In this regard, some articles reported conflicts between Italy and Ethiopia 
over the former’s designation of the latter as yaman. As for this, the Dong-a (13 
September 1935) reports: 
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Ethiopia asks the League of Nations for the dispatch of investigators to examine the 
validity of Italy’s argument that Ethiopia is a yaman-guk. Even if the Italian 
government has presented the proof showing Ethiopia as a yaman-guk, with a summary 
of a written document of the denial of Ethiopia, it can be said to be fabricated. 
 
On the other hand, an article of the Chosun (26 September 1935) reports that Italy 
criticized the League of Nations for its treatment of Ethiopia as munmyŏng-guk. Shortly 
after these reports, Mussolini’s Italy invaded Ethiopia.19  
 
Munmyŏng, Yaman, and “Scientific Knowledge” 
Despite the drastic changes of the connotations of the discourse of munmyŏng in this 
period, the authority of “science” did not much wane. In this regard, the discourse’s 
binary distinction between munmyŏng and yaman was shored up by a variety of 
“scientific” form of knowledge generated from the West. Much of “scientific” 
knowledge came from such academic fields as ethnology, anthropology, genetics, 
medical science, etc. Yet, it is interesting to note that many “scientific” findings 
introduced in the newspapers become nonsensical from today’s perspective. Citing an 
                                                 
19 It is interesting to note that the identity of yaman-guk was received in a derogatory sense in the 
discourse of munmyŏng. As noted above, the designation of someone as yaman could instigate a conflict. 
In terms of international relations, this is a noticeable difference between the discourse of munmyŏng and 
that of sŏnjin’guk (or discourse of development). Unlike the identity of yaman-guk, the designation of a 
country as hujin’guk, “underdeveloped,” or “developing” does not invoke a strong resistance from the 
country. Rather, the distinction between the “developed” and the “developing” is even accepted by the 
“developing” themselves within the framework of the discourse of development. In fact, the antagonistic 
relationship in the discourse of civilization turns into the reciprocal one in the discourse of development. 
As for this, Rist (1997:74) appropriately states that “[c]olonized and colonizer had belonged to two 
different and opposed universes [. . .] Now, however, ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ were members of 
a single family” (emphasis in the original).  
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American genetics scholar’s study, the Dong-a (16 July 1926) reports that the more 
people are civilized, the higher are their noses: 
 
Through human history, there was no hero who had a low nose. [. . .] The barbarians in 
Africa and Australia have somewhat higher noses than monkey’s, but have lower noses 
than those of the extinct people of the Stone Age. This demonstrates that the Stone Age 
people were not barbarians, despite their childishness. However, as barbarians and 
primitive people of the Stone Age were stupid and had short knowledge, compared with 
modern superior civilized races, their noses were low and ugly, and it is hard to find 
among them such high and shapely noses as those of modern people’s. The beautiful 
nose necessarily indicates the superior civilized race, as was the case with the Egyptians, 
the Greeks, and the Romans. History and pictures prove that, among civilized races, the 
famous people who dominated the races had distinctively high noses. This was proved 
by an American doctor “Wood” [. . .]. 
 
Some other articles introduce a similar kind of racial propositions in relation to 
munmyŏng, which are also controversial from today’s perspective: for instance, there is 
no wisdom tooth for civilized people as a result of thorough evolution (an English 
scholar’s finding; Dong-a 26 June 1929); civilized people have round-type faces (an 
American dental scholar’s finding; Dong-a 11 February 1939); and civilized people talk 
fast (an English stenographer’s finding; Dong-a 8 August 1936).  
  
Other Faces of Munmyŏng   
Another notable characteristic of the munmyŏng discourse in this period was that its 
dark sides were also recognized. This was another departure from the attitude in the 
previous period when the concept of munmyŏng virtually referred to Western 
civilization with idealized images. Some opinion columns and articles of the 
newspapers point out the awkwardness and dangerousness of munmyŏng. In this context, 
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the concept of munmyŏng was often used in reference to “modern” civilization. An 
opinion column of the Dong-a (13 July 1935) written by a woman intellectual, for 
instance, expresses a concern about the infringement of Koreans’ cultures and identities 
by munmyŏng: 
 
Looking down the downtown of Seoul from the high point of Mt. Pugak, we can see the 
structure of the city shining with munmyŏng. [. . .] We may not distinguish Seoul from 
the West or Japan. This is the landscape achieved by the benefit of munmyŏng these 
days. [. . .] However, from the perspective of Korean munmul [culture and material], 
this progressive and luxurious phenomenon, on the contrary, loses its genuineness and 
does not have the unique local color at all. It is so awkward, bothersome, uneasy, and 
uncomfortable that I feel as if we inhaled that munmyŏng in a wrong way. [. . .] People 
from the U.S. try to follow the U.S., and people who studied in Japan try to copy Japan. 
Culture and munmyŏng are to be different according to each people and custom. [. . .] 
Of course, it is good to know our situation and accept [other] munmyŏng as a 
supplement for our custom, which can be said as the benefit of munmyŏng, otherwise, it 
is deplorable thing.  
 
As a resistance to the concept of munmyŏng as modern civilization, the 
appearance of a relativist perspective on munmyŏng is also obvious. According to an 
article of the Chosun (28 May 1931), Eskimo’s munmyŏng is different from that of the 
West, and one cannot say which one is superior. Rather, this article argues that 
munmyŏng is even not reaching yaman in terms of the spiritual aspect. It points out the 
inhuman aspects of a munmyŏng society, compared with a warm and simple primitive 
society: 
 
According to Mr. Masuss’s perspective on munmyŏng, [who is an Eskimo young man 
who recently visited the U.S.,] munmyŏng is very superficial and it is behind of the 
Eskimo country in terms of the spiritual aspect. That is, he emphasizes that whereas 
munmyŏng people do not care about other people’s starving or sickness to death, people 
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in the Eskimo country would give them foods and treat them for free. (Chosun 28 May 
1931)     
 
Munmyŏng was also regarded as accompanying a lot of side-effects such as 
crime, disease, and pollution. In this respect, while the U.S. was conceived of as 
boasting the most prosperous material munmyŏng, the dark side of it was also discussed. 
Under the title of “U.S. munmyŏng surrendered before crime - the overflow of 
tremendous criminals,” an article of the Dong-a (9 May 1936) reports about the high 
crime rate of the U.S. In a similar vein, another article of the Dong-a (18 June 1938) 
writes that: 
 
New York city in the U.S. does its best to remove criminals, but big crimes 
continuously appear, as if all of the world’s big crimes occur in the U.S. [. . .] A reason 
why these horrifying crimes occur in the U.S., which boasts of the best munmyŏng, is 
that it is somewhat hard to reduce this kind of crimes as New York city is created by 
people from various countries. 
 
On the other hand, under the title “A slice of U.S. munmyŏng - massive private 
punishments against blacks,” an article of the Dong-a (14 June 1936) reports in detail 
an incident of “white” people’s reckless killing of black brother and sister in Virginia. 
About this, the article says that the “white” people “divided the bodies into parts and 
took each part as a memento,” and adds that “there is something hard to understand in 
Americans’ psychology” (ibid.). As for an incident of hundreds of Japanese’s invasion 
of a town, which accompanied firing, killing and injuring, and the destruction of houses, 
the Chosun (21 January 1925) calls it the “barbarity of human beings” and adds that 
“[. . .] human beings do not seem to be able to handle their instinctive urge of animality.” 
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With this kind of incidents, the conventional Eurocentric distinction between 
munmyŏng and yaman had to be somewhat blurred, and the need for diversified 
understanding of munmyŏng got power. 
The perception of the dark side of munmyŏng was related to Koreans’ 
pessimistic view on international circumstances. The newspapers reported the 
possibility of another large-scale conflict among Western powers. An article of the 
Chosun, for instance, argued that “world conflicts will be caused by conflicts among 
capitalist countries” (February 20, 1926). Another article warned that “war between 
Britain and the U.S. will be the destruction of Western civilization, and war between 
Japan and the U.S. will be a nightmare” (Chosun 4 May 1927). In this respect, Koreans 
perceived the West as the sources of both advanced technology and world conflict in 
this period. This conflicting perception reflected Koreans’ skepticism about the progress 
of Western material civilization.    
 
Summary 
The 1920s and 30s were the period when the universality of Western civilization was 
highly suspected. In the wake of World War I, which was committed by the so-called 
munmyŏng-guk, the authority of the West and Western civilization was far weakened in 
this period. The concept of munmyŏng came to take on relativist and diversified 
bearings, recognizing the values of various civilizations. In this respect, Western 
civilization tended to be perceived in a limited sense as a material one while Eastern 
civilization was regarded as a spiritual and ethical one. Various civilizations were rather 
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considered as having their own strengths and weaknesses, and thus basically being in 
equal positions with each other.   
 The concept of munmyŏng played a role in international politics by providing 
causes for resistance or domination. In the context of Japanese colonial rule, the concept 
of munmyŏng was appropriated for the purpose of resistance by Koreans. By arguing 
that brutal ruling methods, such as torture, were not supposed to be adopted by 
munmyŏng-guk, Korean newspapers tried to induce the Japanese rule in a desirable 
direction. At the same time, by revealing the unjust behaviors of the so-called 
munmyŏng-guk, Korean opinion leaders called for resistances to unjustness. In this 
context, peace-loving civilizations such as Korea’s were often designated as “true” 
munmyŏng.   
 While the concept of munmyŏng diversified, the distinction between munmyŏng 
and yaman was still maintained. A lot of “scientific” knowledge, much of which was 
nonsensical in today’s perspective, was imported from the West to strengthen the 
Koreans’ distinction of munmyŏng and yaman. On the other hand, many negative 
aspects of Western material civilization were also recognized, which was an apparent 
departure from the previous period’s tendency of idealizing Western civilization.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined that Koreans’ early modern perceptions of national self and 
the West have variations from period to period, reflecting different historical 
circumstances. In this sense, the natures of kaehwa and munmyŏng discourses, in which 
Koreans’ modern understandings of national self and the world were concentrated from 
the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, were not unitary, but multifarious.  
In the 1880s, Korean modernists did not have a hierarchical perception between 
Korea and the West. Recognizing the reality of Western material power, they reflected 
their ways of looking at the West mainly in such terms as “pugang” and “chagang.” 
Although the West was regarded as a subject of wealth and strength, it was not yet 
perceived as a superior entity vis-à-vis the East including Korea, which supposedly had 
longer history and richer cultural and natural heritages.  
It was the 1890s when the Eurocentric hierarchic classifications of the world 
began to appear in modern Korean newspapers. In the kaehwa discourse, countries were 
classified into hierarchical categories according to the degree of kaehwa, such as: 
kaehwa, pan-kaehwa, mi-kaehwa, and yaman. Positioning Korea and China in the group 
of pan-kaehwa vis-à-vis the kaehwa of the West, the kaehwa discourse showed a strong 
Eurocentric feature, departing from the traditional perception of the West mainly as 
“barbarians.” In terms of popularity, the prevalence of the munmyŏng discourse in the 
1900s succeeded that of the kaehwa discourse of the 1890s. However, kaehwa and 
munmyŏng discourses showed a difference from usual Eurocentric discourses in the 
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sense that they thought the “rise of the West” as temporary. Still keeping pride in 
Korea’s cultural and natural heritages, the discourses considered that the hierarchy 
could be reversed on Koreans’ hard efforts.   
 In the 1920s and 1930s, the nature of munmyŏng discourse drastically changed 
in the wake of World War I. While the concept of munmyŏng virtually referred to that 
of the West in the 1900s, munmyŏng in this period was rather regarded as a universal 
concept with Western and Eastern civilizations as its regional constituents. Unlike the 
hierarchical perception in the previous period, the spiritual richness of Eastern 
civilization vis-à-vis the material advancement of Western one was re-valued. In this 
discursive framework of munmyŏng, Korea became one of munmyŏng-guk with affluent 
and peace-loving cultural heritages. In the wake of the wars and colonial dominances, 
committed by the countries self-claiming munmyŏng-guk, the newspapers in this period 
also recognized the hypocrisy and dark sides of (muljil) munmyŏng. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE DISCOURSE OF SŎNJIN’GUK: CONCEPTS, REPRESENTATIONS, AND 
IDENTITIES 
 
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a historically constructed knowledge system based upon 
the discursive relations constructed around the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. 
Reflecting the transition of global discursive focus from “civilization” to “development” 
in the post-colonial era, South Koreans have constructed their national identities and 
worldviews around those concepts. One of its most notable characteristics is a 
hierarchical distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, in which the former has the 
latter as its alienated other. In constructing the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, 
South Koreans projected their positive and negative developmental values into them 
respectively. Frequently referring to Western countries as sŏnjin’guk, South Koreans 
tend to idealize those countries. As an ideal image, sŏnjin’guk has played an important 
role in guiding the transformation of the Korean society, as an urgent national goal and 
a central reference point. So widely used and taken-for-granted discursive system in the 
contemporary era, it exerts great influence on Koreans’ imagination of their country’s 
future. 
This chapter examines the characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in the 
contemporary context, focusing on its basic concepts, representations, and social roles. 
It aims to answer main research questions: what are represented in the discourse and 
how they are utilized in the Korean society. Through the analysis of three leading South 
103 
 
Korean newspapers from 2000 to 2008, it tries to figure out, first, the meanings of the 
discourse’s two primary concepts, sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, along with their roles, 
attributes, and contexts in which they are used. Second, it investigates how these 
concepts are represented in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. 
And last, it explores how the discourse is related to South Korea’s constructions of its 
national identity and worldview.  
Methodologically, this chapter analyzes the editorials of three leading 
newspapers in South Korea: the Chosun Ilbo, the Dong-a Ilbo, and the Hankyoreh. This 
selection encompasses a broad ideological spectrum of the society as the first two 
deliver conservative voices and the latter progressive one. According to a survey on the 
subscription rate of the print media in the Seoul metropolitan area in 2006, the Chosun 
Ilbo was the most read newspaper with 13.5 percent household subscription rate (Lee 
2006). The Dong-a Ilbo took the third position (8 percent), and the Hankyoreh the 
seventh (1.3 percent). In another survey in 2006, the Hankyoreh was selected as the 
most trusted newspaper by South Korean journalists, with a reliability rate of 15.0 
percent (Chang 2006). The Chosun Ilbo and Dong-a Ilbo are the two most traditional 
leading newspapers.20 Given that targeting all newspaper articles takes extreme time-
consuming efforts and resources, I have limited research focus to editorials, which are a 
type of news articles best representing newspapers’ opinions.    
Thus, this chapter analyzes the three newspapers’ editorials from 1 January 2000 
to 31 December 2008. The selection of the period is somewhat arbitrary, but I consider 
                                                 
20 Both newspapers were founded in 1920, and the Hankyoreh in 1988. 
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that this is a reasonable recent historical period that demonstrates the contemporary 
form of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Using the Chosun Ilbo archive, I obtained 277 
cases of editorial for this newspaper, which contained the term sŏnjin’guk in either title 
or body.21 From the Korean Integrated News Database System, I obtained 418 cases for 
the Dong-a Ilbo and 241 cases for the Hankyoreh.22 To make it manageable, I selected 
the cases on a biannual basis: for the Chosun, years 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, and for 
the Dong-a and the Hankyoreh, years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. This reduced 
the number of total cases to 469 (Chosun 138, Dong-a 219, and Hankyoreh 112).23 As 
some editorials in data used the term sŏnjin’guk more than once, the number of the term 
sŏnjin’guk used in 469 editorials was 607. 
According to data, the number of editorials containing the term sŏnjin’guk is 
generally on the increase from 2000 to 2008 (Table 2). In the case of the Chosun, the 
increasing trend is distinct especially from 2004, and the annual number of cases is the 
highest in 2005 with 55, followed by 54 in 2007. In the case of the Dong-a, the number 
of cases peaks at 98 in 2008, followed by 93 in 2007. The Dong-a shows the strongest 
tendency of using the term sŏnjin’guk among the three newspapers. The Hankyoreh 
shows the weakest tendency of using the term, and its highest number of cases is 49 in 
2007, followed by 48 in 2006. The annual number of cases shows a high degree of 
popularity of the term sŏnjin’guk.  
                                                 
21 In the Chosun Ilbo archive system, data for year 2008 was unavailable as of February 2009. Thus, I 
focused on the period of 2000-2007 for the analysis of the Chosun Ilbo.    
22 It made 936 cases total for the three newspapers. 
23 I excluded some cases that were wrongly assorted, and thus irrelevant to the term sŏnjin’guk. Originally, 
the total number of cases was 494 (the Chosun 154, the Dong-a 224, and the Hankyoreh 116).   
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Table 2. The Annual Number of Editorials Containing the Term Sŏnjin’guk 
 (2000-2008) 
 Chosun  Dong-a  Hankyoreh Total 
2000 21 26 11 58 
2001 16 26 28 70 
2002 22 24 14 60 
2003 29 22 17 68 
2004 40 26 20 86 
2005 55 53 31 139 
2006 40 50 48 138 
2007 54 93 49 196 
2008 n/a 98 23 121 
Total 277 418 241 936 
Sources: Chosun Ilbo archive, KINDS 
 
As for hujin’guk, I collected 56 cases of relevant editorial (21 cases for Chosun, 
19 for Dong-a, and 16 for Hankyoreh), with the same methods as those for sŏnjin’guk. 
The number of the term hujin’guk used in 56 editorials was 66. Some of these cases 
were overlapped with those for sŏnjin’guk. 
Based upon the Foucauldian notion of discourse as a system of relations among 
discursive elements, I conduct discourse analysis of newspaper texts. In analysis, I aim 
to figure out what relations are constructed around the central discursive concepts of 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. In this regard, I look closely into what meanings, 
representations, and identities are constructed around those concepts and relations. I 
also investigate what roles those discursive elements and relations play and how they 
are utilized in contemporary Korean society.  
106 
 
This chapter is organized in five substantive sections. The first section 
investigates meanings constructed around the term sŏnjin’guk, along with its social 
roles and the various contexts in which it is used. The second section looks into 
meanings built around the term hujin’guk, together with its attributes and the contexts of 
its use. The third and fourth sections focus on the ways in which sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk, respectively, are represented in political, economic, social, and cultural 
aspects. And the last section discusses Koreans’ self national identities reflected in the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk. 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF SŎNJIN’GUK: MEANINGS, ROLES, AND CONTEXTS 
 
The Meanings of Sŏnjin’guk 
The term sŏnjin’guk literally means “ahead-going country,” with the syllables “sŏn,” 
“jin,” and “guk” denoting “ahead,” “go,” and “country” respectively. In a similar vein, 
the term hujin’guk means “behind-going country” with the syllable “hu” meaning 
“behind” or “backward.” The Standard Korean Dictionary (Pyojun kugŏ taesajŏn) 
defines sŏnjin’guk as “the country that is ahead in the development of politics, economy, 
culture, etc” (National Institute of the Korean Language 2008). In a historical sense, it is 
the year 1938 when the term sŏnjin’guk first appeared in Korean dictionary. Chosŏnŏ 
sajŏn [Korean Dictionary] written by Mun Se-Yeong (1938) defined sŏnjin’guk as “a 
country whose cultures and materials are developed ahead of a certain country.” At that 
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time, the term sŏnjin’guk was used interchangeably with the term munmyŏng-guk 
(civilized country), both of which virtually referred to the West, even though the term 
munmyŏng-guk was a far more dominant one under the global hegemony of the 
discourse of civilization. It was the post-colonial era, especially during the 1960s, when 
the concept of sŏnjin’guk replaced munmyŏng-guk as the dominant term referring to the 
West. This discursive transition reflected the global and national historical 
circumstances in which South Korea launched aggressive modernization project under 
U.S. hegemony in the Cold War context. With South Korea having incorporated into the 
Western hegemonic sphere, the national discursive change from munmyŏng-guk to 
sŏnjin’guk reflected the global hegemonic discursive transition from the discourse of 
civilization to that of development (Sachs 1992; Patterson 1997; Nederveen Pieterse 
2001).   
In the contemporary context, the concept of sŏnjin’guk is analytically 
distinguishable in two types according to the degree of concreteness: the concrete type 
and the abstract type. The concrete type of sŏnjin’guk refers to specific countries, 
international institutions, or international status groups. Sŏnjin’guk of the abstract type 
indicates the following: an abstract entity, a national goal, a national status, a certain 
(desirable) level, or a certain (desirable) type (Table 3).   
In the editorial texts, total nineteen countries are explicitly designated as 
sŏnjin’guk in various contexts, such as: the U.S. (66 cases), Japan (33), Britain (10), 
Germany (9), France (7), South Korea (6), Australia (3), Sweden (3), Russia (2), 
Finland, Russia, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, 
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and Ireland (1 case each).24 In terms of the international institution, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is most frequently referred to as the 
group of sŏnjin’guk (7 cases), and the Group of 7 and the Group of 8 are mentioned as 
the sŏnjin’guk group once respectively. The concrete type of the concept also includes 
international status groups classified in international treaties, which is usually termed as 
“developed country”: for instance, the Annex groups in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 However, the term sŏnjin’guk is more frequently used in highly abstract senses. 
First, it refers to an abstract entity, without explicitly designating specific countries or 
organizations (323 cases). In this case, sŏnjin’guk is assumed as a homogeneous group 
with various positive and exemplary attributes. For instance, an editorial of the Dong-a 
(25 March 2008) argues that: 
 
Sŏnjinhwa is far to go unless people could consume foods without concern. This is the 
reason why sŏnjin’guk strengthens regulations on food safety and the environment 
while executing deregulations to make the country good for business.  
 
In this example, sŏnjin’guk is not specified, and exists as a highly abstract 
representation.  
Second, it refers to a national goal, which South Korea should achieve in the 
near future (91 cases). The use of the term of this type tends to be combined with 
certain words related to achievement, such as “chinip” (entry), “toyak” (leap), “kkum” 
(dream), “hyanghada” (head for), “toeda” (become), and “naagada” (go forward). The 
                                                 
24 Korea and Russia were not regarded as sŏnjin’guk in general terms: rather, they were referred to as 
sŏnjin’guk in certain areas such as information technology and soccer (Korea), and space technology 
(Russia).   
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Hankyoreh (12 January 2006), for instance, says that “these are problems to be solved 
on the way for a harmonious mature community and a true sŏnjin’guk.” In this case, 
sŏnjin’guk is not just an abstract entity, but a national goal that South Korea has to aim 
for. All of the cases in this concept considers Korea as the subject of pursuing 
sŏnjin’guk.  
 
Table 3. The Concept of Sŏnjin’guk: Meanings, Roles, and the Contexts of Its Use  
Meanings Roles Contexts 
(Concrete Type) 
 Specific country 
 International 
organization 
 International status 
group 
 
(Abstract Type) 
 Abstract entity 
 National goal 
 National status 
 Certain (desirable) 
level 
 Certain (desirable) 
type 
 Point of 
direction 
 Standard of 
comparison 
 Desirable model 
 Reference case 
 Trend to follow 
 Preceding 
subject 
 Criterion of 
normality 
 Reference for 
national identity 
 Competitor 
 Criticizing domestic 
matters 
 Providing authority to 
certain arguments 
 Understanding 
international affairs 
 Presenting a national 
vision 
 Evaluating and 
promoting domestic 
events 
 Understanding 
domestic matters 
 Making a national 
identity 
 Criticizing 
international 
institutions 
 
Third, it indicates a national status given to certain countries (42 cases). For 
instance, the Chosun (13 April 2005) argues that “this is the reason why the more a 
country is sŏnjin’guk, the more it gives weight on sports in the education curriculum 
[. . .].” The term sŏnjin’guk in this case is assumed as a national status in the discourse’s 
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hierarchical classificatory system. Although being considered as a desirable status, it 
does not take on strong directionality as is shown in the concept as a national goal. 
And last, combined with such words as “sujun” (level) or “hyŏng” (type), it 
means a desirable condition, which South Korea should pursue in various areas (38 
cases). In this case, sŏnjin’guk sujun (sŏnjin’guk-level) and sŏnjin’guk-hyŏng 
(sŏnjin’guk-type) refer to a high level and a desirable type respectively, which are 
assumed to appear in the countries of sŏnjin’guk. 
 
The Roles of Sŏnjin’guk  
Since its cultural and material expansions to the global range, the West has been 
identified as the most significant other to many non-Western societies. In this context, it 
has played a role as a positive referent for some, while as a negative referent for others 
in their modernization processes (Dittmer and Kim 1993). During the Cold War era, 
many countries in the “free” world regarded it as a positive referent under U.S. 
hegemony, which was culturally supported by the discourse of development or 
developmentalism. With its global hegemony, the West often played a role as an ideal 
model for the non-West to follow, and, in many cases, modernization and 
Westernization were considered as virtually the same. As for the specific roles of the 
West in global power relations, Hall (1996:186) notes that: 
 
First, it allows us to characterize and classify societies into different categories – i.e. 
‘western,’ ‘non-western.’ [. . .] Secondly, [. . .] It functions as part of a language, a 
‘system of representation’ [. . .] for example, ‘western’ = urban = developed; or ‘non-
western’ = non-industrial = rural = agricultural = under-developed. [. . . ] Thirdly, it 
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provides a standard or model of comparison. [. . .] Fourthly, it provides criteria of 
evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive 
and negative feelings cluster [. . .].  
 
These cultural roles of the West can be applied to South Korean developmental 
process, and are well reflected in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. The concept of sŏnjin’guk 
takes on certain roles in various contexts, which somewhat parallel those of the West. I 
identify the following nine main roles: a point of direction (140 cases), a standard of 
comparison (99), a desirable model (77), a reference case (61), a trend to follow (54), a 
preceding subject (38), a criterion of normality (27), a reference for national identity 
(26), and a competitor (14 cases) (Table 3). 
 First, it plays a role in suggesting a direction for the country to go in various 
areas. With regard to this, the Chosun (22 August 2007) argues that “Korea should go 
forward to become sŏnjin’guk, a leading part of the world [. . .].” In this example, the 
concept refers to a national goal, and, at the same time, plays a role in providing a point 
of direction for the country. This role is not assumed only by the concept of sŏnjin’guk 
as a national goal. When mentioned in such phrases as “sŏnjin’guk sujun” or 
“sŏnjin’guk-hyŏng,” it can also suggest a point of direction which the country should 
pursue. 
Second, it provides a standard of comparison. In judging or evaluating certain 
aspects of Korean society, the newspapers tend to compare it with sŏnjin’guk. For 
instance, the Chosun (16 November 2007) mentions that “our country’s percentage of 
health insurance coverage [. . .] is short of sŏnjin’guk’s 70~80 percent.” In this case, 
sŏnjin’guk is used conceptually as an abstract entity without specific societies or 
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countries designated, and plays a role in providing a standard by which Korean health 
insurance policy is evaluated, regardless of the circumstantial differences between 
countries.       
 Third, it assumes a role in suggesting a desirable model. In this regard, the 
Hankyoreh (1 May 2008) argues that: 
 
It is the teacher that decides the success and failure of school education. The secret of 
the success of Finland, which is regarded as the best sŏnjin’guk of education, lies in its 
policies on teachers. The Finnish government employs only those who have a master’s 
degree or beyond as teachers, and gives them a level of treatment similar to that for 
doctors and lawyers.  
 
In this case, sŏnjin’guk is specified as Finland, and plays a role in providing a desirable 
educational model for Korean society.  
 Fourth, it is used for a reference case. This is somewhat parallel to the role of a 
desirable model, but does not take on strong desirability. With regard to the Amnesty 
International’s criticism of the Korean government’s suppression of civil 
demonstrations, the Dong-a (21 July 2008) disputes that the Amnesty International 
“does not seem to know how the police in sŏnjin’guk, such as the U.S. and Japan, treat 
demonstrators [. . .].” In this case, a legal custom in sŏnjin’guk provides a point of 
reference for South Korean society, but is not necessarily regarded as desirable.   
Fifth, it assumes a trend to follow. The editorials argue that there are trends that 
sŏnjin’guk adopts with certain issues, e.g., neoliberal policies in the context of 
globalization. This is often assumed as “world trends,” which Korea should follow in 
order not to become a straggler of the world.  
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Sixth, it assumes a role in showing a preceding subject in various areas, such as 
technology, economic development, welfare, and so forth. The Dong-a (9 December 
2008), for instance, argues that: 
 
Our country’s export has passed $400 billion this year, which is the 11th in the world. 
Having reached $0.1 billion in 1964, it has grown over 4,000 times in 44 years. It took 
13 years for the export amount to reach $400 billion from $100 billion (FY 1995), 
which is more than 4 year short of the average period taken by sŏnjin’guk (17.2 years), 
which stepped the height of $400 billion ahead of us.   
 
Echoing modernization theory, this editorial implies that sŏnjin’guk has already passed 
a point on a universal path of economic growth, where South Korea is currently on.  
Seventh, it takes a role providing a criterion of normality and common sense. 
With regard to this, it is assumed that social systems and policies of sŏnjin’guk are 
basically normal and commonsensical, against which other societies’ degree of 
“normality” or “abnormality” can be assessed and evaluated.  
Eighth, it is used as a reference for national identity. In this regard, many 
editorials identify South Korea as a country pursuing sŏnjin’guk with the current status 
of “almost sŏnjin’guk.” And last, it plays a role as a competitor with which Korea has to 
compete in various fields, such as economy, technology, and trade.  
   
The Contexts of the Use of Sŏnjin’guk  
As a positive referent for South Korean society, the concept of sŏnjin’guk is used in a 
variety of contexts: criticizing domestic matters (224 cases); providing authority to 
certain arguments (224 cases); understanding international affairs (60 cases); presenting 
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a national vision (32 cases); evaluating and promoting domestic events (28 cases); 
understanding domestic matters (20 cases); making a national identity (11 cases); and 
criticizing certain countries or international institutions (8 cases) (Table 3). The 
contexts of its use are closely related to what sŏnjin’guk means and what role it takes.  
First of all, it is very frequently used in the context of criticizing South Korean 
society. In the hierarchical scheme of the discourse, South Korean society is positioned 
just below the full-fledged sŏnjin’guk, incurring a process of self-orientalization. In the 
process of continuous comparison of their country with sŏnjin’guk, Koreans 
psychologically undergo a certain degree of “inferiority complex” and “double 
consciousness” (Fanon 1967; Du Bois 1994). In this context, many editorials make 
harsh criticisms on South Korean society, relying on the idealized images of sŏnjin’guk. 
Second, it is also frequently used in making arguments or opinions. When 
justification or authority is needed for certain arguments, the newspapers tend to lean on 
the ideal image of sŏnjin’guk, saying, for instance, that “it is a common thing in 
sŏnjin’guk.” As an assumed bearer of authentic modernity, sŏnjin’guk makes a good 
source of authority for South Koreans.    
Third, it is employed in the context of understanding international affairs. This is 
mostly related to the distinction in national statuses in international negotiations or 
treaties. As for international climate change meetings, for instance, Annex countries are 
typically expressed as sŏnjin’guk vis-à-vis “developing countries.”  
Fourth, as a central concept of the discourse supporting South Korea’s 
modernization process, sŏnjin’guk is utilized in suggesting a national vision. The 
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concept of sŏnjin’guk is referred to in the context of suggesting what South Korea 
should pursue and where it should go. This context is especially relevant to the concept 
of sŏnjin’guk as a national goal and its role as a point of direction, which suggest a 
direction of the transformation of Korean society. 
Fifth, it is also used in the context of evaluating and promoting certain policies, 
events, or phenomena appearing in Korea. As noted above, sŏnjin’guk plays a role as a 
yardstick to measure the performance of Korean society. In this context, the newspapers 
tend to ahistorically compare Korean domestic matters to those of some countries that 
are typically referred to as sŏnjin’guk in order to encourage them. When a certain event 
in Korea is considered as common in sŏnjin’guk, it gets a great authority. This is closely 
related to the sixth frequent context of the use of sŏnjin’guk, which is to understand 
domestic affairs. In this case, the domestic affairs are not necessarily encouraged, but 
sŏnjin’guk provides a reference case to “properly” understand the nature of affairs.    
Seventh, it is also drawn on to construct national identity, which is very relevant 
to the role of sŏnjin’guk as a reference for identity. Through the continuous comparison 
with sŏnjin’guk, the newspapers tend to identify South Korea as a country pursuing the 
status of sŏnjin’guk. And last, it is used in the context of criticizing foreign countries or 
organizations. In this case, sŏnjin’guk becomes a universal referent against which their 
policies, systems, and practices are evaluated.     
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THE CONCEPT OF HUJIN’GUK: MEANINGS, ATTRIBUTES, AND CONTEXTS 
 
As the non-West is a constituent part of the construction of the West, so is hujin’guk to 
the creation of sŏnjin’guk. In the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, hujin’guk plays a role as the 
constituent “other” into which South Koreans’ negative values are projected. Some 
Korean theorists call this process as “pokje Orientalism” (copied Orientalism), which 
resembles the epistemic hierarchy between the “West and the Rest” in Western 
Orientalism (Lee 2002). In this regard, Lee (2002), an expert on Indian history, points 
out that South Koreans have constructed their own “Orient” reflecting Western 
Orientalism and perceive other non-Western countries, such as India, through this 
Orientalist framework. Even South Korea as a non-Western country is not free from this 
Korean version of Orientalist gaze, as is reflected in their self-criticizing attitudes.     
As with sŏnjin’guk, the concept of hujin’guk can be identified in two types: the 
concrete type and the abstract type (Table 4). For the concrete type, certain countries 
are designated as hujin’guk, such as: South Korea (23 cases), Bangladesh (2 cases), 
China, Southeast Asia, Guatemala, Surinam, and Ireland in the past (1 case each). Those 
designated as hujin’guk are economically poor countries in general by certain economic 
criteria, such as GDP per capita. It is interesting to note that South Korea is most 
frequently designated as hujin’guk. In a contextual reading, however, this should be 
understood as reflecting a sarcastic attitude of self-criticism on certain aspects of 
Korean society. In this context, Korea is referred to as a certain type of hujin’guk, rather 
than “overall hujin’guk,” such as a hujin’guk of human right, traffic, politics, disaster 
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prevention system, or aviation policy in certain contexts. To designate Korea as 
hujin’guk is a strong value-charged attitude signifying that those negative aspects 
should not belong to Korea, a country of “near sŏnjin’guk.”  
 
Table 4. The Concept of Hujin’guk: Meanings, Attributes, and the Contexts of Its 
Use  
Meanings Attributes Contexts 
(Concrete Type) 
 Specific country 
 International 
status group 
 
(Abstract Type) 
 Abstract entity 
 National status 
 Certain 
(undesirable) 
type 
 Certain 
(undesirable) 
level 
 Anti-human right 
 Backwardness 
 Unhygienic condition 
 High risk and 
insensibility to safety 
 Incapacity and 
irresponsibility 
 Corruption 
 Low women’s status 
 Confusion 
 Conflict 
 Anti-trend 
 Disorder 
 Fault and error 
 Poverty 
 Lack of principle 
 Short-sightedness 
 Nonsense 
 Inefficiency 
 Criticizing 
domestic 
situations 
 Arguing for 
certain policies 
 Understanding 
international 
affairs  
 Criticizing foreign 
countries and 
situations 
 Evaluating 
domestic events 
 Understanding 
domestic matters 
 
In terms of the abstract type, many editorials refer to hujin’guk as an abstract 
entity, without designating any specific country or group, which therefore exists as an 
abstract form of representation (14 cases). In a somewhat similar vein to the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk, the concept of hujin’guk also refers to “hujin’guk-hyŏng” (hujin’guk-type) 
(19 cases), a national status (2), or “hujin’guk sujun” (hujin’guk level) (1 case).  
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Various negative attributes of society are associated with the concept of 
hujin’guk such as: anti-human right; backwardness; unhygienic conditions (8 cases 
each); risk and insensibility to safety (7 cases); incapacity and irresponsibility (7); 
corruption (4); low women’s status (4); confusion (3); conflict; anti-trend; disorder; 
fault; poverty (2 cases each); lack of principle; short-sightedness; nonsense; and 
inefficiency (1 case each).  
 The contexts in which the term hujin’guk are used are also parallel to those for 
sŏnjin’guk, regardless of the differences in substantial contents between the two, such as: 
criticizing domestic situations (43 cases); arguing for certain policies (13); 
understanding international affairs (3); criticizing foreign countries and situations (3 
cases); evaluating domestic events; understanding domestic matters (2 cases each). In 
these cases, hujin’guk is mostly used as a negative referent that South Korea should not 
resemble.       
 
 
THE REPRESENTATION OF SŎNJIN’GUK 
 
In Eurocentric discourses, the West is constructed in a way various positive values are 
attributed to it. In this sense, it is rather a culturally constructed “set of images” than an 
empirically grounded entity (Hall 1996). Furthermore, the positive values are often 
supposed as derived from “exceptional” Western history, which is disconnected from 
the history of the rest of the world. This kind of “disconnected” Eurocentric “tunnel” 
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historiography naturalizes an essentialistic interpretation of the universal and superior 
West (Blaut 1993; Subrahmanyam 1997; Washbrook 1997). 
Those Eurocentric aspects are well reflected in ways sŏnjin’guk is represented in 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Being constructed as an advanced, normal, and mature 
being, sŏnjin’guk appears as a perfect society to South Koreans, which presumably has 
all that they aspire to attain in their development process. With regard to politics, many 
editorials imply that the status of sŏnjin’guk is the natural outcome of the desirable 
political system. Sŏnjin’guk politics is generally assumed as normal, mature, stable, and 
transparent. For instance, under the title “it needs to make a device to reduce the harm 
of polifessor [political professor],” the Dong-a (9 April 2008) argues that “it is a 
common sense in sŏnjin’guk that a professor resigns his (her) professorship to become 
an elected public official.” Whether it is true or not, a supposed political practice of 
sŏnjin’guk in this editorial is naturalized as “common sense.” As the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk is used in an abstract form, yet, we cannot know in which countries this 
political practice is “common sense.”  
On the other hand, a seemingly wrong practice is excused when it is considered 
as a practice common in sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, an editorial of the Chosun (22 
January 2003) writes that: 
 
Of course, it is a common phenomenon in sŏnjin’guk too for the ruling group to reward 
its members by political appointments of public positions. However, the reason why the 
“nakasan appointment” [from-the-top appointment] makes a problem especially in our 
society is that the appointment is not just limited to governmental institutions [. . .]. 
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As far as “nakasan appointment” is considered as common in sŏnjin’guk, it is excused 
as an acceptable political phenomenon. Yet, the problem is, the editorial argues, that 
Korea’s “nakasan appointment” is excessive while that of sŏnjin’guk is moderate.    
It is argued that the normality of sŏnjin’guk politics is closely related to 
efficiency, especially in its support of the economy. An editorial of the Dong-a (25 
September 2006), for instance, states that “the political circles in sŏnjin’guk rarely call a 
business person as a witness unless s/he is involved in a big scandal, because it risks 
shrinking the business administration.” The newspaper expresses its position against the 
National Assembly’s summons of businessmen, relying on the authority of sŏnjin’guk. 
Sŏnjin’guk politics is also considered far from corruption, and its fair and transparent 
political system is often supposed as based upon stable and well-managed legal systems. 
This is related to an assumption that sŏnjin’guk is generally under the leadership of the 
mature and responsible ruling classes.  
In terms of the economy, sŏnjin’guk is generally described as having a high 
level of income, advanced technology, and a big and competitive economy. With regard 
to this, an editorial of the Chosun (22 February 2007) argues that “in today’s world, a 
country which has a lot of competitive global corporations is sŏnjin’guk, and hujin’guk 
otherwise.” It is said that the sŏnjin’guk economy exceeds that of non-sŏnjin’guk not 
merely in scale, but in technology as well. The sŏnjin’guk economy is also regarded as 
“being advanced.” Implying a kind of linear path of economic growth, an editorial of 
the Dong-a (28 January 2008) argues that “[Korea’s] per capita income has barely 
passed $20,000 last year, with $20,081. It has taken 12 years, which is a few years more 
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than sŏnjin’guk, to reach it [. . .].” In this perception, Korea has just passed the point 
where sŏnjin’guk, which is used here in an abstract form, went by in the past. In a 
similar vein, another editorial argues that: 
 
Our country’s export has passed $400 billion this year, which is the 11th in the world. 
Having reached $0.1 billion in 1964, it has grown over 4,000 times in 44 years. It took 
13 years for the export amount to reach $400 billion from $100 billion (FY 1995), 
which is more than 4 year short of the average period taken by sŏnjin’guk (17.2 years), 
which stepped the height of $400 billion ahead of us. (Dong-a December 9, 2008)   
 
The sŏnjin’guk economy is generally assumed as based upon rational and 
transparent decision-making processes. It is considered that transparency and freedom 
from corruption are secrets for the strong and competitive sŏnjin’guk economy. As 
sŏnjin’guk’s wealth is assumed mainly as a result of their efficient, rational, and 
transparent economic (and political) systems, sŏnjin’guk is conceived of as respectful 
country. In this way, to become sŏnjin’guk is not just a matter of raising national 
income, but should accompany the establishment of honest economic system. With 
regard to this, the Chosun (3 September 2003) argues that: 
 
According to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, South 
Korea has been ranked at the bottom among the OECD countries for years. It is 
impossible for an economy, in which corporations survive by corrupt money instead of 
ability, to have competitiveness to get into sŏnjin’guk. Even if it succeeds in forcibly 
raising GNP, others would not recognize it as sŏnjin’guk.   
   
This editorial implies that sŏnjin’guk is a transparent respectful country, whose 
economic competitiveness is based upon competence rather than corruption. In this way, 
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the process of becoming sŏnjin’guk is supposed as quite rational, transparent, and 
respectful.25  
The Chosun and the Dong-a use the concept of sŏnjin’guk in their support of the 
principle of liberal market economy, asserting that there is no sŏnjin’guk that is not 
based upon this principle. The newspapers’ promulgation of market ideology represents 
their conservative voices in the South Korean political context, which also values the 
principle of “liberal democracy.” Under the title “we will defend liberty and the market,” 
the Dong-a (1 April 2006) argues that “one cannot be sŏnjin’guk with an anti-market 
ideology.” Reflecting the Korean conservatives’ disposition to go in tandem with 
neoliberal globalization, the image of sŏnjin’guk is often associated with neoliberalism. 
Under the title of “2006 sŏnjin’guk trend,” the Dong-a (26 December 2006) argues that 
some keywords are found in the trends of sŏnjin’guk policies, such as downsizing of 
government, privatization of public enterprise, deregulation, pro-business policy, and 
the open market. It adds that the trends are summarized in a phrase of “small 
government, big market.”26  
                                                 
25 This perspective does not take into account that the processes of capitalist economic development have 
historically accompanied unprecedented levels of violence, destructions, and “irrational” activities around 
the globe (Hobsbawm 1962; Hobson 1965; McNeill 1982; Blaut 1993; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Rist 
1997). Disputing Britain’s technological superiority as a secret for its Industrial Revolution, Hobsbawm 
(1962:53), for instance, argues that “British industry [in the early nineteenth century] had established a 
monopoly by means of war, other people’s revolutions, and her own imperial rule.” This historical 
explanation of the secret of global economic inequality is still supported today by theorists focusing on 
external and structural factors in understanding capitalist economic development, e.g., the asymmetric 
power relations among countries within the exploitative world capitalist system (Frank 1989; Wallerstein 
2004).  
26 In contrast, the Hankyoreh (1 December 2008), reflecting its progressive and anti-neoliberal position, 
argues that “it is a trend in sŏnjin’guk to increase tax for the wealthy and support the weak class in order 
to stimulate the economy and to make social harmony [. . .].” Despite the difference in perspectives on 
neoliberal globalization between the conservative and progressive newspapers, they share in common the 
tendency of relying on the authority of sŏnjin’guk for their arguments.   
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In terms of the social, sŏnjin’guk is generally represented as a mature society, 
which has well-established law systems, efficient disaster prevention systems, civility, 
transparent decision-making processes, high awareness of human right, tolerance 
toward differences, and so on. The Chosun (16 October 2003) argues that the “world 
media,” which virtually refer to the Western media, consider “the degree of respect for 
laws and systems as the most important thing to distinguish between sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk.” Another editorial’s criticism of China reflects the image of the sŏnjin’guk 
society very well: 
 
It is not a first-class nation just because it has the largest amount of U.S. dollar and 
launches satellites into the air. When it is the situation in which a foreigner goes to the 
[Chinese] hospital, risking his (her) life, who would respect China as a leading country 
of the world? [. . .] Regardless of its size, [China] would not be regarded as sŏnjin’guk 
if it does not have the national consciousness of valuing human life and frankness, and a 
social system that punishes dishonesty and the evasion of the law. (Chosun, 22 August 
2007) 
 
This editorial argues that China is not sŏnjin’guk because of its lack of frankness, 
disregard for human life, and unjust social system, which conversely implies that the 
sŏnjin’guk society has frank, human-valuing, and fair and just social system. 
Furthermore, it also implies that sŏnjin’guk is a country that is respected in the world. In 
this regard, another editorial of the Chosun (26 February 2007) mentions that 
“sŏnjin’guk is not one which has a lot of money, large territory, or large population” 
and that “sŏnjin’guk is one that is respected in the international system.” As such, 
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sŏnjin’guk’s economic power does not just mean material richness, but is well 
associated with its cultural authority.27  
The sŏnjin’guk society is supposed as mature, harmonious, and very generous to 
the weak. People in sŏnjin’guk are portrayed as behaving responsibly according to their 
social roles. This is assumed as closely related to the leading role of the ruling classes, 
which are described as moral, generous, and responsible. With regard to this, an 
editorial of the Chosun (2 May 2007) argues that: 
 
The power supporting the sŏnjin’guk society is said to be “noblesse oblige.’ [. . .] The 
number of fallen soldiers from Eton College, which the children of English high class 
attended, was over 2,000 during World War I and II. It was some times the rate of 
casualties of those from the working class. World super-rich Warren Buffett donated 
$37.4 billion, 85 percent of his total wealth. [. . .] The accumulation of these incidents 
makes a solid base for their societies, and gives justification to wealth and power 
accumulated by one’s own efforts, and creates a social eye to distinguish discrimination 
from distinction [. . .].   
 
In relation to this, inclusiveness toward foreigners and alienated people is 
regarded as a prerequisite for becoming sŏnjin’guk. An editorial of the Dong-a (4 
October 2008) argues for the embracement of immigrants and foreign laborers, saying 
that “no matter how per capita income is high, we cannot be a true munmyŏng-guk, an 
                                                 
27 With regard to this, it is interesting to note that the recently highlighted phenomenon of the “rise of 
China” is not reflected in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Despite China’s (re)emergence on the global stage 
and its recently achieved status as the biggest trading partner to South Korea, its cultural power does not 
yet reflect its material power in the dominant Korean discourse.  
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upright sŏnjin’guk without embracing these people.”28 The assumption of inclusiveness 
is also applied to other weak social groups such as the disabled, children, women, etc.  
Safety awareness is also frequently attributed to sŏnjin’guk. An editorial of the 
Dong-a (3 September 2002) criticizes the disaster prevention system of Korea, saying 
that “it would be an actual sŏnjin’guk when it maintains a firm infrastructure that is safe 
against any typhoon stronger than ‘Sarah’ and ‘Rusa’ [. . .].” In a similar vein, an 
editorial of the Chosun (2 August 2001) disapproves of South Korean flood prevention 
measures, arguing that “even if [Korea] boasts its membership of the OECD, the 
sŏnjin’guk club, we cannot help but have a doubt if it is better than countries like 
Bangladesh, which suffer hundred-thousands of casualties for a flood.” It is interesting 
to note that Bangladesh, which is frequently referred to as hujin’guk, is considered as 
the example of an undesirable country in this editorial. Regarding the traffic safety issue, 
an editorial of the Dong-a (12 May 2000) argues that “sŏnjin’guk has long been 
prohibiting the use of cell phone while driving.”29 As such, many of the attributes 
associated with sŏnjin’guk are, in fact, Koreans’ own constructions, rather than faithful 
reflections of reality “out there.” 
 Sŏnjin’guk, in the cultural area, is represented as having advanced, high-quality, 
and attractive cultural properties. These properties broadly range from national brand 
and scientific knowledge to the ability of enjoying high culture. This perception makes 
                                                 
28 It is interesting to note that the term munmyŏng-guk (civilized country), which is a central element of 
the discourse of civilization and rarely used in the contemporary era, is employed here as an equivalence 
to the term sŏnjin’guk. 
29 In fact, many states of the U.S., which is most frequently referred to as sŏnjin’guk, do not prohibit 
using cell phone in driving. This example shows that a good amount of “idealized” information about 
sŏnjin’guk is ungrounded.   
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a ground for the cultural hegemony of sŏnjin’guk, and gives justification to the pro-
Western conservatives’ argument for opening Korea’s cultural fields to the outside, 
such as education. As for sŏnjin’guk’s national image, an editorial of the Dong-a (15 
November 2008) argues that: 
 
“The prices of the same products of the U.S. and Germany are $150, while Korea’s is 
just $100.” [. . .] The reason why there is a big $50 difference is that we are weaker than 
sŏnjin’guk  in the “national brand value,” [. . .] If a country’s national brand value is 
low, not only are the prices of the products and services of that country low, but are the 
people of that country treated as “inferior people.” Korea’s low national brand value is 
mainly due to the negative images of illegal strikes, violent demonstrations, North 
Korea’s nuclear issue, and North Korea’s strange behaviors, but is also due to the 
insufficient overseas information activities. President Lee announced in his inaugural 
address that “we will raise the national brand value to the sŏnjin’guk level in my 
presidential term.” 
 
Blaming laborers’ strikes and demonstrations for Korea’s low brand value, this 
editorial shows the newspaper’s anti-labor conservative ideology. And, it also expresses 
a confrontational conservative attitude in terms of the relationship with North Korea by 
linking “North Korea’s strange behaviors” to South Korea’s national image. The 
conservative newspapers tend to emphasize the importance of international events in 
enhancing national image. With regard to this, an editorial of the Chosun (28 November 
2007) argues for taking advantage of the 2012 Yeosu Expo as a ground to upgrade 
Korea’s national brand, saying that “Japan started to be regarded as sŏnjin’guk, getting 
out of the yoke of defeated nation, by hosting the Osaka Expo in 1970.” 
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THE REPRESENTATION OF HUJIN’GUK 
 
As the constitutive other for sŏnjin’guk, hujin’guk is generally represented as opposite 
to it, that is, a lacking entity with various negative attributes. The negative aspects of 
hujin’guk are not limited to certain areas, but appear broadly in such fields as political, 
economic, social, and cultural ones. In this way, it is constructed as a national 
embodiment of undesirability in general terms. In the political area, hujin’guk is 
portrayed as afflicted with “confusing,” “unpredictable,” “corrupt,” “inefficient,” 
“irresponsible,” and “incapable” political systems and situations. Negatively perceived 
aspects of South Korean political practices are well associated with the attributes of 
hujin’guk. For a South Korea’s presidential election problem, for instance, the Chosun 
(30 October 2007) argues that: 
 
In 2002 presidential election, the candidate of the ruling party was decided 24 days 
before the election. [. . .] It seems that the same situation is happening in this election. 
The things that would belong to the Third World hujin’guk have been repeating in each 
election.  
 
Without specifying certain countries, this editorial compares a seemingly confusing 
aspect of Korean politics to the negative image of hujin’guk.   
Hujin’guk politics is also well related to short-sightedness and ignorance. 
Criticizing the Korean National Assembly’s way of dealing with the Free Trade 
Agreement with the U.S., an editorial of the Dong-a (9 May 2008) designates Korea as 
a “hujin’guk of politics,” deploring that South Korean politics’ “short-sightedness and 
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ignorance are surprising and pitiful.” Some editorials construct the corrupt image of 
hujin’guk politics. Denouncing a political scandal in South Korea, another editorial of 
the Dong-a (2 December 2008) argues that “seeing again the summons of the ex- and 
incumbent presidents’ son and relatives by the prosecution [. . .], we feel uneasy to 
think until when this kind of hujin’guk-style corruption should be repeated.”30    
When the politics of hujin’guk is described as such, it may be hard to imagine 
any goodness from hujin’guk in other fields. The characteristics of the hujin’guk 
economy are also assumed in opposition to those of the sŏnjin’guk economy. The 
hujin’guk economy is generally represented as noncompetitive, backward, and 
unreliable. In this regard, the Chosun (22 February 2007) defines hujin’guk as a country 
that does not have many competitive global corporations. Thus, the hujin’guk economy 
is well expected to lag behind global competition and trends. It is often assumed that 
South Korea could roll back to the status of hujin’guk if it does not overcome its 
economic problems.  
Hujin’guk’s social area tends to be associated with the images of disorder, 
dangerousness, irresponsibility, incapacity, nonsense, and unsanitary conditions. People 
in hujin’guk are also portrayed as disorderly and irresponsible in the social arena. In this 
regard, an editorial of the Chosun (7 August 2001) argues that: 
 
The whole land of Korea is a dumping ground. [. . .] The solutions are the education for 
order and manner to get them to be ingrained into individuals from their early ages, and 
                                                 
30 The Hankyoreh (5 March 2002) notes that corruption is not specific to hujin’guk. It argues that 
“everyone knows that a lot of money is put into politics and that there is a room for corruption in that 
process. This is not the case just for Korea, but, broadly exists in sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk [. . .].” 
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the strict regulations on the scene of disorder. [. . .] Or, we will not get out of “spiritual 
hujin’guk” regardless of the income level. 
 
 As for the issue of safety, hujin’guk is regarded as incapable of preventing 
natural or man-made disasters. Thus, it is generally considered as being exposed to 
various kinds of dangers. As for an explosive accident blamed for forty lives in Korea, 
an editorial of the Dong-a (9 January 2008) argues that it is a “tragedy of the hujin’guk 
of safety awareness and prevention system.” Hujin’guk is also represented as weak in 
keeping human right. A “progressive” voice, the Hankyoreh in particular tend to 
problematize Korea’s human right issues in relation to the concept of hujin’guk. This 
newspaper frequently designates South Korea as a hujin’guk of human right. In this 
perception, sŏnjin’guk monopolizes the concept of human right.   
Hujin’guk represents nonsensical situation. As for a situation unexpected in 
common sense, some South Korean internet users reportedly called it as “a piece of 
ridiculous hujin’guk-style comedy” (Hankyoreh, 25 March 2004). It is interesting to see 
that a hierarchy appears even among diseases: there are “sŏnjin’guk-type” and 
“hujin’guk-type” diseases. For instance, the Chosun (8 January 2001; 17 December 
2001) designates certain epidemics as “hujin’guk-type,” such as dysentery, cholera, 
malaria, and the measles. South Koreans tend to take the occurrence of those 
“hujin’guk-type” diseases more frustrating and humiliating.  
In the field of knowledge, hujin’guk is regarded as backward, especially in 
mathematics and science. According to the Chosun (24 February 2007), mathematics 
and science are regarded as “world common sense,” and backwardness in them is 
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considered as “not knowing world common sense.” Emphasizing the importance of 
those disciplines, it argues that South Korea should not be “rolling back to the 
ignorance of hujin’guk.” The field of knowledge is also monopolized by sŏnjin’guk, 
whereby different forms of knowledge, i.e. indigenous ones, are ignored.  
Cultural infrastructure of hujin’guk is also perceived as backward, poor, and 
dangerous. As for this, an editorial of the Dong-a (30 July 2002) writes that: 
 
There is a report that public libraries are in danger of collapsing because of the 
unbearable weight increase of books. [. . .] The ungainly appearance of propping up the 
library with steel poles as a temporary measure symbolically demonstrates the 
appearance of cultural hujin’guk.” 
 
 
SELF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE DISCOURSE OF SŎNJIN’GUK 
 
In the hierarchical framework of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, South Korea’s self 
national identity is underlain by both a sense of superiority over hujin’guk and a feeling 
of lack over sŏnjin’guk. This is related to a perception that South Korea has rapidly 
progressed from hujin’guk to almost sŏnjin’guk today on a supposedly universal path of 
development. In this respect, hujin’guk tends to be regarded as the past of Korea and 
sŏnjin’guk its future.  
Echoing modernization theory’s distinction between the modern (or the 
developed) and the tradition (or the underdeveloped), early South Korean modernizers 
in the development era did not hesitate to designate their country’s status as hujin’guk. 
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On this designation, the country’s poverty, backward economy, and traditional ways of 
life were problematized, providing the South Korean developmental regime with 
legitimacy for its aggressive modernization project. Korean modernizers accepted the 
hierarchical categorization of underdeveloped hujin’guk and developed sŏnjin’guk as 
somewhat objective and universal, without paying much attention to their political 
implications related to U.S. global hegemony (Latham 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 2001).  
It is during the 1970s that South Korean modernizers began to perceive their 
country as having escaped from the status of hujin’guk. When it came to the late 1970s, 
in particular, they began to designate their country as located in the top-tier of 
chungjin’guk (the developing country between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk), which was 
close to the rank of sŏnjin’guk.  
South Korea is now frequently identified as nearly sŏnjin’guk, as is conveyed in 
such a phrase as “sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk” (on the threshold of sŏnjin’guk). With regard to 
this, Koreans feel a sense of pride in their achievement of the status of “almost 
sŏnjin’guk” in such a short period of modernization, which is assumed as having taken 
hundreds of years by the West. Conservative voices argue that this is due to the 
previous generations’ blood, sweat, and tears, and that it is our generations’ 
responsibility to make Korea a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk. Grounded upon its perception of 
the world characterized by limitless competition, the Chosun (20 November 2005) 
argues that South Korea currently has two contrasting options: “to aggressively 
participate in the limitless competition system or to join in the group of grumblers 
falling behind the competition.” The Chosun and Dong-a frequently identify the status 
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of South Korea as “on the threshold of the sŏnjin’guk group” and as the “mediator 
between sŏnjin’guk and developing countries” (Dong-a, 15 November 2008; 17 
November 2008). 
The conservative newspapers’ identification of the country, however, is not 
uncontested. With regard to this, it is interesting to see the Chosun’s criticism of a 
former chief-presidential secretary on his argument that “South Korea is already 
sŏnjin’guk.” According to the Chosun (26 November 2005), he addressed that “South 
Korea is sŏnjin’guk because there is no evidence that it is not.” Criticizing conventional 
ideas, he reportedly stated that “to make arguments such as ‘we have to enter into the 
group of sŏnjin’guk’ or ‘we are on a forked road between sŏnjin’guk or non-sŏnjin’guk’ 
is evidence that we are living under the conventional practices and ideas that are 
forcefully injected [into us] for decades.” In response to this, the Chosun (26 November 
2005) argued that an important criterion for judging sŏnjin’guk was per capita income 
of $20,000, and that the number of countries above this level was thirty five. Thus, 
according to the Chosun, it was nonsense to argue that the country whose per capita 
income rank was the 48th (South Korea) was sŏnjin’guk. 
This kind of debates demonstrates the ambiguity and subjectivity of the concept 
of sŏnjin’guk, which are related to different political implications. For instance, a Dong-
a’s editorial (15 August 2008) suggests $30,000 as a criterion for sŏnjin’guk. The 
currently dominant idea seems to be the criterion of $30,000, which is $10,000 higher 
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than the criterion of just a few years ago.31 It seems that the conservative newspapers 
tend to create a further goal of sŏnjin’guk for the country being close to achieving its 
previous goal. Historically, Presidents Park Chung-Hee in the late 1970s and Chun 
Doo-Hwan in the 1980s frequently mentioned that South Korea was approaching 
sŏnjin’guk and the goal of sŏnjin’guk was “just over there.” National identities 
promoted by them are somewhat similar to that of today’s “sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk.” In this 
sense, South Korea has now been on the threshold of the group of sŏnjin’guk for more 
than thirty years, serving for mobilizing national energy for certain directions.      
It is argued that South Korea’s contemporary status, near sŏnjin’guk, has not 
been easily achieved. Rather, it is considered as a status to which “the ex-generations 
have climbed up, getting bloody bruises on their knees” (Chosun, 1 July 2005). It is 
perceived that South Korea is now chasing sŏnjin’guk and being pursued by 
“developing” countries. In this circumstance, the national strategy for “moving forward,” 
rather than “rolling back,” is vital, about which the Dong-a (22 October 2008) argues 
that Korea is “on a forked road to the progress or to the retreat of ‘national rank.’”  
 
                                                 
31 It is interesting to note that the economic criterion for sŏnjin’guk is far higher than international criteria 
of “high-income” countries. The World Bank, for instance, has set $12,196 of Gross National Income per 
capita as a criterion for “high-income” countries in 2009 (World Bank 2010a). Furthermore, South Korea 
is now generally regarded as an “advanced” country in international developmental terms, as it is a 
member country of “advanced economies” (IMF), “very high human development” group (Human 
Development Index), Development Assistance Committee and the “high-income” group (OECD), etc. On 
the other hand, some international institutions recognize the ambiguity of the concepts of the “developing” 
and the “developed,” and do not use the clear-cut distinction between the two. For instance, the United 
Nations Statistics Division (2008) acknowledges that “[t]here is no established convention for the 
designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the United Nations system.” The World 
Trade Organization (2009) also states that “[t]here are no WTO definitions of “developed” and 
“developing” countries.” The WTO allows certain countries to declare their status as “developing country” 
for their own advantages in negotiation.      
134 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Focusing on basic concepts and characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, this 
chapter has argued that it imagines a world characterized by a distinction between 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, in which the former assumes the latter as its alienated other. 
Through the analysis of newspapers, this chapter has found that the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk is mainly used with various connotations in which certain countries or group 
of countries are specified or not. The countries conventionally included in the concept 
of the “West,” such as the U.S. and Western European countries, along with Japan, are 
typically referred to sŏnjin’guk. However, reflecting South Koreans’ values on desirable 
society, the concept of sŏnjin’guk is used more frequently in an abstract type. In this 
case, the concept represents abstract entity, national goal, national status, certain 
desirable level, and certain desirable type. The concept of sŏnjin’guk plays various roles 
in the country by suggesting various things such as: point of direction; standard of 
comparison; desirable model; reference case; trend to follow; preceding subject; 
criterion of normality; reference for national identity; and competitor. It is also used in 
various contexts reflecting South Koreans’ understanding of their country and the world: 
such as criticizing domestic matters; providing authority to certain arguments; 
understanding international affairs; presenting a national vision; evaluating and 
promoting domestic events; understanding domestic matters; constructing national 
identity; and criticizing international institutions. In this way, the concept of sŏnjin’guk 
plays an important role in directing the transformation of the South Korean society.    
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 This chapter has examined that the concept of hujin’guk constitutes the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk by providing a relationally alienated entity to the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk. Containing South Korea’s negative values about society within itself, the 
concept of hujin’guk is represented with various unfavorable attributes, such as: anti-
human right; backwardness; unhygienic condition; insensibility to safety; incapacity 
and irresponsibility; corruption; low women’s status; confusion; conflict; anti-trend; 
disorder; fault and error; poverty; lack of principle; short-sightedness; nonsense; and 
inefficiency. As a representation that South Korean society should not resemble, it is 
used in various contexts such as: criticizing domestic situations; arguing for certain 
policies; understanding international affairs; criticizing foreign countries and situations; 
evaluating domestic incidents; and understanding domestic matters.  
 This chapter has also found that South Korea identifies itself as “near 
sŏnjin’guk,” or “sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk” (on the threshold of sŏnjin’guk) in the hierarchical 
classificatory system of the discourse. Interpreting South Korea’s economic 
development as an escape from the status of hujin’guk, the discourse assumes hujin’guk 
as the past of the country and sŏnjin’guk as its future. In this respect, South Koreans’ 
mainstream national identity is based upon a feeling of superiority over hujin’guk and a 
sense of lack over sŏnjin’guk. By arguing that the country’s vertical mobility from 
hujin’guk to the contemporary status of “near sŏnjin’guk” is based upon the past 
generations’ hard efforts, the conservative newspapers put a responsibility on the 
contemporary generations to achieve full-fledged sŏnjin’guk in the near future. In this 
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regard, they try to mobilize people in the direction of social transformation that they 
imagine, by utilizing the discourse of sŏnjin’guk.  
 This chapter has argued that the basic concepts and assumptions of the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk are Eurocentric. Given that countries frequently referred to as sŏnjin’guk 
are mostly Western countries, the discourse tends to homogenize and idealize them 
regardless of reality. In this idealizing process, the discourse does not pay much 
attention to the diversity of world societies, each of which is rooted in its distinctive 
historical and cultural backgrounds. Nor does it take into account that a societal form is 
a historical construction enabled through numerous interactions with other societies. In 
this respect, it tends to dichotomize the world, putting the multiplicity of the world into 
a simple representational hierarchical framework with Western societies in the top order. 
This framework somewhat parallels the Eurocentric understanding of the world, which 
tends to distinguish between the desirable West and the undesirable non-West. In this 
respect, I hope that this chapter would be a contribution to problematizing the taken-for-
granted Eurocentric discursive system and to an effort to overcome it.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
DISCOURSE OF SŎNJIN’GUK  
 
As discourse reflects power relations and specific historical circumstances in its 
formation and transformation, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk has changed its assumptions 
and characteristics, reflecting South Korea’s historical developmental conditions. In this 
respect, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is rather variable than constant in the process of 
historical circumstantial transitions. Its main characteristics are affected by various 
factors at the national and global levels, such as governmental goals and policies, public 
sentiment and participation, world political economic situation, and global discourses.   
 This chapter aims to examine the historical formation and transformation of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk from the establishment of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
in 1948 to the present, focusing on the changes of the connotation of the central concept 
of sŏnjin’guk in different historical circumstances. Considering the significance of 
governmental change for historical circumstance, I distinguish the following five 
periods in observing the change of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk: the periods of the Lee 
Seung-Man administration (1948-1960), the Park Chung-Hee administration (1961-
1979), the Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo administrations (1980-1993), the Kim 
Young-Sam administration (1993-1998), and the Kim Dae-Jung administration to the 
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present (1998-2008).32 On the basis of this periodization, this chapter examines the 
continuities and discontinuities of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk throughout those periods 
in terms of its central concepts and ideas, construction of national identities, 
representation of the West, and Eurocentric implications. For this, I conduct discourse 
analyses of newspaper texts, focusing on what relations and meanings are constructed 
around the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. I also investigate how those concepts 
are utilized in the public discursive sphere in certain historical circumstances, in relation 
to other dominant discourses.  
For the analyses of the periods until 1999, I use the articles of the Chosun Ilbo, 
the oldest leading conservative newspaper in South Korea, which has reflected 
mainstream developmentalist voices in the country. Using the search function of the 
Chosun Ilbo archive, I have obtained 860 articles containing the term sŏnjin’guk in their 
title, and 203 articles having hujin’guk in their title from 1948 to 1999.33 For the period 
of 2000-2008, I have used the articles obtained for chapter two: that is, 469 editorials 
from the Chosun Ilbo, the Dong-a Ilbo, and the Hankyoreh, which contain the term 
sŏnjin’guk in either title or body.    
                                                 
32 This does not mean that the transformation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk exactly corresponds to the 
change of political power. I consider that the discourse is so popular that its transformation occurs in a far 
broader historical context than the governmental change. Thus, the periodization is mainly for the 
analytical purpose. 
33 For the term sŏnjin’guk, I obtained 860 cases total: 6 cases (1948-1960); 18 cases (1961-1969); 107 
cases (1970-1979); 257 cases (1980-1992); 381 cases (1993-1997); and 91 cases (1998-1999). For the 
term hujin’guk, I obtained 203 articles total: 66 cases (1948-1960); 53 cases (1961-1969); 24 cases (1970-
1979); 22 cases (1980-1992); 33 cases (1993-1997); and 5 cases (1998-1999). It is interesting to note that, 
in general, the use of the term sŏnjin’guk is on the increase whereas the term hujin’guk is on the decline. 
The increase of the term sŏnjin’guk is especially noticeable in the 1970s and in the period of the Kim 
Young-Sam administration.  
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This chapter has five substantive sections according to the periodization. The 
first section examines the interactions between the discourses of munmyŏng (civilization) 
and development in Korea during the Lee administration in relation to the global 
discursive transition from civilization to developmentalism. The second section 
investigates the rise of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk and developmentalism in relation to 
the formation of the developmental regime during the Park administration. The third 
section explores the changes of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk during the Chun 
administration in relation to the rise of the global neoliberal regime and its pressure on 
Korea to open its market. The fourth section analyzes the characteristics of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk during the Kim administration in relation to its promotion of the 
segyehwa (globalization) project. And, the fifth section looks into the development of 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in regard to Korea’s neoliberal transformation in the 2000s. 
 
 
THE DISCURSIVE CHANGE FROM MUNMYŎNG TO DEVELOPMENT: 1948-
1960 
 
In the period of the Lee Seung-Man administration, the capitalist development of South 
Korea was at the low level. Lacking the infrastructure of economic development, the 
political economy of the Lee administration relied much upon foreign aids. In terms of 
capitalist development, this period is characterized as the times when a zero-sum type of 
the accumulation of wealth advantageous to the dominant class was prevalent, rather 
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than productive activities and competitive accumulation of capital (Seo 1991:73). 
Despite this political economic situation, the Lee administration did not pay sufficient 
attention to economic development (Yoon 2005:85). The Lee administration relied on 
authority and coercive measures for its rule, without providing a good deal of material 
and mental rewards to people. Thus, the Lee administration had many characteristics of 
a “predatory state” (Evans 1995; Cho 2003; Yoon 2005).  
In discursive terms, the discourse of development was not dominant in this 
period. In the wake of the Korean War, the Lee administration focused more on the 
need for anti-communism for its rule, than on the urgency of economic development. In 
some sense, the newly emerging discourse of development at the global level was not 
yet widely accepted by Korean elites as well as the public. In this situation, anti-
communism was the most notable dominant discourse in this period. With the discourse 
of anti-communism, the Lee administration maintained harsh oppression of various 
opposing political groups. In this respect, some researchers characterize the Korean 
society under the Lee administration as “pangong kyuyul sahoe” (anti-communist 
regimented society) (Cho 2003). 
In terms of the history of Eurocentric discourse, the discourse of munmyŏng was 
still popular in this period, which was premised upon a distinction between munmyŏng 
(civilization) and yaman (barbarism). However, the connotations of the concepts of 
munmyŏng and munmyŏng-guk (civilized country) were different from those of the 
times when the global discourse of civilization was in full swing around the turn of the 
century. In the wake of the two world wars, which were committed by the so called 
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“munmyŏng-guk,” the connotation of munmyŏng became diversified, e.g., chŏngsin 
munmyŏng (spiritual civilization) and muljil munmyŏng (material civilization), and the 
Eurocentric notion of human progress in the discursive framework of civilization was 
seriously doubted. As Patterson (1997:49) points out, “[t]he brutality and human 
suffering the war [the two world wars] had brought made it difficult to talk of human 
progress.”  
Above all, the authority of munmyŏng-guk came to be somewhat weak as 
munmyŏng referred to muljil munmyŏng in many cases. In this sense, many articles in 
the Chosun Ilbo casted doubts on the “progress” of munmyŏng (or muljil munmyŏng). 
While munmyŏng was thought to have brought about considerable convenience to 
everyday life, it was also blamed as a source of numerous problems, such as diseases 
(cancer, mental diseases), traffic accidents, the corruption of humanity, the horror of 
atomic and hydrogen bombs, and so forth. In this respect, many articles appreciated the 
value of chŏngsin munmyŏng, which tended to be associated with Eastern or Korean 
civilization in contrast with Western material civilization. With regard to this, an 
opinion column written by Park Jong-Hwa, a famous Korean poet, argued: 
 
Now humankind is in a crisis of being degenerated into the non-human animal even 
though (s)he is said to stand at the peak of material civilization. Human beings are now 
devaluing humanity. It is the sin of Western modern civilization, rather than that of the 
East, that has driven human beings into this inhumane world. It is because the scientific 
civilization of the very recent modern era has run only to mechanic civilization, totally 
deviating from spiritual civilization. It is because ancient people’s, that is, Eastern 
people’s pursuit of spiritual aspects has changed into pleasure-seeking and imitation 
pursuing benefits and wealth of Western material civilization. [. . .] It would be, after all, 
Eastern thoughts that will save human beings. Humankind can get eternal life only 
when we drive ourselves into the civilization in which people love and respect one 
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another, can live being content amid poverty, and can find a pleasure from humble food 
and drink. (Chosun 1 January 1959)      
 
It is important to note that no apparent epistemic hierarchy between Korea and 
the West was found in this discursive situation. Rather, each was regarded as the 
possessor of a different kind of civilization, i.e., spiritual and material ones respectively. 
In the discourse of munmyŏng in this period, Korea was regarded as a kind of 
munmyŏng-guk in the spiritual and cultural aspects. Thus, there was no visible cultural 
hegemony of the West, and the global discourse of civilization, which served for 
Western cultural authority and political economic interests in the colonial era, became 
far weak in Korea.  
At the global level, this discursive change accompanied the decline of Europe’s 
hegemony and the rise of the U.S. as a new hegemon with the newly emerging 
discourse of (economic) development. In the discourse of development, the global 
discursive focus was put on “development,” rather than “civilization.” The status of 
“underdevelopment,” rather than “barbarism” or “savage,” was problematized, and a 
new epistemic hierarchy appeared between the “developed” and “underdeveloped.” The 
relationship between the West and the non-West began to be established in different 
terms within the discursive framework of development. That is to say, the hierarchy 
between the West and the non-West reappeared in the new discursive framework as the 
former was represented as the “developed” vis-à-vis the “underdeveloped” or 
“developing” non-West. With regard to this, Patterson (1997:49) notes that “[a]fter 
1945, the United States, using arguments that echoed those of social Darwinists half a 
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century earlier, began to project itself as the center and driving force of Western 
civilization.” In this new era, he adds, “progress was measured in terms of economic 
growth” (ibid.:50).34 In those respects, the global discourse of development appeared as 
a historical construction, accompanying the global hegemonic transition, at the time 
when the previous discursive framework of progress and evolution of civilization 
seriously lost its authority.  
 In the Korean context, while munmyŏng-guk was an equivalence to the 
“civilized,” the term sŏnjin’guk was mainly used in referring to the “developed” and the 
term hujin’guk was to the “underdeveloped.” The period of the Lee administration was 
the time when the discourse of development was getting global significance. As the 
global discursive transition affected Korean discursive situation, the terms munmyŏng-
guk and sŏnjin’guk were somewhat interchangeably used in referring to Western 
countries in this period. However, the trend was obvious that the latter was gaining 
more and more popularity over the former, compared with previous periods.35 With the 
rise of the global discourse of development, the terms sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk 
frequently appeared in articles, especially, for foreign news. In many cases, they were 
used in the context of discussing the economic development of hujin’guk. It seems that 
those terms were chosen for English words “developed” and “underdeveloped” (or 
“developing”) in the translations of foreign news sources.  
                                                 
34 In a similar vein, Nederveen Pieterse (2001:20) states that “[w]hat Victorian anthropology was to the 
British Empire, modernization theory is to United States hegemony [. . .].” 
35 In data, the number of cases containing the term munmyŏng-guk is 4, while that for sŏnjin’guk is 6 from 
1948 to 1960. 
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As for the use of those terms, it is notable that the term hujin’guk was far more 
frequently used than sŏnjin’guk.36 Reflecting that the global discourse of development 
highlighted the economic development of the underdeveloped, Korean development 
discourse began to popularize the new concept of “hujin’guk kyŏngjegaebal” (the 
economic development of hujin’guk). The main source of this discursive focus was 
international news. Many international news articles reported various policies of 
capitalist and communist blocs’ aids to the “underdeveloped” in the Cold War context. 
In this process, the term hujin’guk was naturally used, especially in relation to the issue 
of its economic development. As such, the concept of hujin’guk began to be formed 
within the discursive framework of development, and so did the concept of sŏnjin’guk 
as its conceptual counterpart. In this respect, the formation of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk was deeply influenced by the emergence of the global discursive focus on 
the “development of the underdeveloped” in the context of the Cold War. It is 
interesting to note that the primary focus was put on hujin’guk rather than on sŏnjin’guk 
in the formative period of the discourse. 
The connotation of the term hujin’guk, however, was in no way stable in this 
period. Some articles reported the ambiguity of its meaning and intellectuals’ debates 
about it. A feature article entitled “hujin’guk-iran muŏsin’ga” (what is hujin’guk?) 
demonstrates well the intellectual atmosphere at the time in regard to the rise of the 
discourse of development (Chosun 12 June 1959). As its subtitle said that “‘it is that 
which national income is low’ – there is also a theory of the impossibility of 
                                                 
36 In data, the frequency of the term hujin’guk is 66, while that of sŏnjin’guk is 6 in this period. This is the 
only period when the frequency of the former is higher than that of the latter.   
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distinguishing ‘sŏnjin and hujin’,” it was the time when the concept of hujin’guk was in 
its initial formative process. According to this article, the phrase “hujin’guk 
kyŏngjegaebal” was a “theme of the latest fashion.” However, it pointed out confusion 
about newly popularizing concepts, such as “hujin’guk” and “kyŏngjegaebal,” and 
expressed a need for understanding them. It introduced intellectuals’ diverse views on 
what hujin’guk was. In terms of the economic aspect, for instance, it reported that some 
focused on low national income, which was generally below $100 per capita while 
others defined it as a country that had a big gap between the rich and the poor. It noted 
that the hujin’guk economy was concentrated on the “primitive” industry such as 
agriculture, fishery, raw material producing, etc, and had a dual structure in which 
advanced capitalism and the primitive industry were mixed. According to this article, 
hujin’guk included Latin American countries and those countries that became recently 
independent after world wars. In relation to its economic underdevelopment, hujin’guk 
was portrayed as having unstable, inconsistent, and corrupt political systems. Some 
pointed out that people in hujin’guk were accustomed to living on family relations 
rather than on contract.   
 One the other hand, there was considerable resistance to the newly emerging 
classificatory system of countries. Above all, it was pointed out that those new notions 
on development unilaterally reflected Westerners’ values and worldviews. In this regard, 
a scholar mentioned that: 
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Hujin’guk is a term indicating a situation that economic development does not reach the 
normal level from the viewpoint of Westerners, and to decide its level in detail is 
obscure so it is unacceptable for us that ourselves are hujin’guk. (Chosun 12 June 1959) 
 
The resistance to the newly emerging discursive framework reflected the 
resistance to the tendency of focusing on materiality, which was deeply associated with 
the newly appearing global hierarchy. In this respect, some refused to identify Eastern 
and Korean societies within the framework of development, and emphasized pride in 
Asian spiritual civilization. In this regard, a scholar argued that: 
 
Eastern societies are considered as hujinjŏk (backward) today from Westerners’ criteria 
because they developed capitalism later than Western societies and the transitions from 
the feudal agricultural social system to the capitalist system were not smooth. However, 
it is not that all hujin areas show the characteristics of hujin’guk. Even though “Africa” 
can be designated as an uncivilized area, it is undeniable that “Asia” has been 
influencing Western cultures, with maintaining its unique spiritual civilizations, 
traditions, and values. Therefore, even though we may accept economic hujinsŏng 
(backwardness), we cannot say it in terms of cultural aspects. (ibid.)    
 
As this article shows, there was a notable tendency of distinguishing between economic 
and cultural aspects in considering advancement and backwardness in regard to the 
rising discourse of development. In this respect, an economically backward country did 
not necessarily mean a culturally backward country.   
In relation to this, there was a considerable degree of resistance to the 
identification of Korea as hujin’guk. In this regard, this article criticized it as “eccentric 
dogmatism” a National Assembly member’s statement that “like the people of various 
hujin’guk, who have shallow experiences in democracy, Korean people are not 
accustomed to the freedom of publication and [. . .]” (ibid.) As noted above, Korea was 
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identified as a munmyŏng-guk within the discursive system of civilization. Thus, even 
within the discourse of development, Koreans tended to distinguish their “culturally rich” 
country from other “uncivilized underdeveloped” countries. In this respect, the 
resistance to the identification of Korea as hujin’guk reflected a kind of national identity 
crisis created by the newly emerging global discourse shored up by U.S. hegemony.  
As the term hujin’guk was a highly controversial one, the relations among 
discursive elements around “development” were not firmly set in this period. In the 
discursive situation in which the preexistent discourse of civilization was strongly 
challenged by the newly emerging discourse of development, the terms belonging to 
each discourse were used in somewhat intermingled ways. For instance, the term 
munmyŏng-guk, instead of sŏnjin’guk, was sometimes used as a counterpart to 
hujin’guk (Chosun 5 April 1959). The status of sŏnjin’guk was not stably established in 
the new discourse of development, and was used somewhat interchangeably with 
munmyŏng-guk. In many cases, the use of the term sŏnjin’guk was limited to refer to the 
degree of capitalist industrial development. That is to say, it was used as a shortcut of 
sŏnjin kongŏp-guk (advanced industrial country) or sŏnjin chabonjuŭi-guk (advanced 
capitalist country).  
In those respects, the relations among discursive elements around the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk were somewhat weak to establish a system of knowledge. Given the global 
discursive problematization of the “development of the underdeveloped,” it is notable 
that the discursive focus was put on the concept of hujin’guk, rather than sŏnjin’guk, in 
this period. Furthermore, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk or development was not yet 
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developed enough to be utilized as a dominant discourse by political elites. The Lee 
administration relied mainly upon ideological confrontation with the North, i.e., anti-
communism, for its political purpose. As the developmental regime, or the alliance of 
political economic elites for economic development, was not manifestly formed in this 
period, the country generally lacked institutional infrastructure for the formation of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk. However, there was a clear trend that the use of new notions -- 
such as hujin’guk, sŏnjin’guk, and kyŏngjegaebal -- was on the increase, challenging the 
preexistent discursive framework of munmyŏng. In this respect, this period can be 
characterized as a period of discursive transition, which cultivated a soil for the 
formation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in the next period.  
 
 
THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCOURSE OF SŎNJIN’GUK:  
1961-1979 
 
It was under the Park Chung-Hee administration when the strong alliance of political 
economic elites was created for the cause of national economic development. Seizing 
power through a coup d’etat in 1961, the Park regime sought for its legitimacy from the 
aggressive economic development project. For this, it launched the Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans in 1962, the first notable governmental project for national 
economic development. In the inauguration speech of the fifth president in 1963, Park 
emphasized national economic development as a historical mission by using such a 
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nationalistic slogan as “choguk kŭndaehwa” (the modernization of fatherland) (Kim and 
Cho 2003:147). The Park administration effectively combined the discursive focus on 
economic development and industrialization with nationalism. Pursuing it mainly 
through the export-oriented industrialization strategy, the government designated the 
year 1963 as the “year of export.” The government effectively orchestrated strategies 
and policies under the urgent national goal of economic development, despite various 
trials and errors.  
In terms of capitalist development, this was the period when the accumulation of 
capital was made through productive activities, which accompanied the rise of industrial 
capitalist class such as chaebol (Seo 1991). The growth of chaebol was remarkable 
under the patronage of the Park administration, and the political economic alliance of 
the Park administration and chaebol made a solid ground for the construction of South 
Korean developmental regime. The discourse of development rose in association with 
the formation of the developmental regime, as a main discursive power legitimating it. 
The Korean discourse of development arose in tandem with the popularization of the 
global discourse of development. In this respect, the Park administration was the first 
notable Korean political power that actively accommodated the global discourse of 
development. In the global historical context, the formation of South Korean 
developmental regime took place “at the peak of U.S. hegemony in the temporal sense 
and at the crossroad of the cold war powers in the spatial terms” (C. Kim 2003:73).  
 This does not mean that anti-communism gave way to the discourse of 
development. Rather, the developmental regime utilized anti-communism for the cause 
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of national economic development. With regard to this, Kim and Cho (2003:149) note 
that the Park regime produced a new synthetic ruling discourse by combining 
development and anti-communism especially after 1968. Anti-communism promoted 
economic development as a means to win communism. As such, the South Korean 
developmental regime in this period was shored up by three dominant discourses: 
developmentalism, anti-communism, and nationalism.37  
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk, as a knowledge system with a classificatory system 
of countries according to its criteria of national development, made an important pillar 
of Korean discourse of development. The classificatory system of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk naturalized and justified Korea’s pursuit of economic development, by 
providing the background ideas of relations between desirable sŏnjin’guk and 
undesirable hujin’guk on a developmental path. In this respect, developmentalism in 
Korea might not have been so effective, were it not for the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. 
With the rise of developmental regime, the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk 
became more popular, and their relations were more stably arranged within the 
discursive system according to the criteria of national development. The development 
path from hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk was assumed as linear universal one, and hujin’guk’s 
pursuit of achieving the status of sŏnjin’guk was constructed as a kind of historical 
                                                 
37 After independence from Japanese colonial rule, South Korea became incorporated into the U.S.-led 
world order (Lee 2004). Being a forefront line against North Korean and Chinese communists, South 
Korea’s geopolitical importance was well recognized by Washington. At the same time, the importance 
of U.S. hegemonic power was also well recognized by South Korean ruling groups. The U.S. saw poverty 
and underdevelopment as a fertile ground for communism in the Cold War context (Wiegersma and 
Medley 2000). Thus, economic development took on strategic bearings as an important tool for 
containing communism. In this respect, the appearance of the Park Chung-Hee regime, which 
discursively combined developmentalism and anti-communism, was generally welcomed and supported 
by the U.S. (Ma 2002; C. Kim 2003).    
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necessity in the discourse. In this discursive framework, South Korea was generally 
classified into hujin’guk and the urgent problem was how to “modernize” it towards 
sŏnjin’guk.  
The rise of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, as a way to categorize countries and the 
world, promoted the decline of the munmyŏng discourse.38 That is to say, the hierarchy 
between countries began to be set more and more according to the value of development, 
rather than of civilization. However, the concept of sŏnjin’guk was not entirely 
idealized in this period, but was used in a limited sense mainly in reference to advanced 
countries in terms of economic development, industrialization, or capitalism. In this 
respect, the term sŏnjin’guk was interchangeably used as a shortcut with sŏnjin kongŏp-
guk (advanced industrial country), sŏnjin kaebal-guk (advanced country in 
development), and sŏnjin chabonjuŭi-guk (advanced capitalist country). In this sense, 
there was still a room for Korea to take pride in its spiritual and cultural affluence vis-à-
vis sŏnjin’guk.  
Thus, the advanced character of sŏnjin’guk was mainly recognized in the fields 
of the economy, industry, and technology. Furthermore, the dark sides of sŏnjin’guk 
accompanied by the process of industrialization were well recognized, such as 
environmental damage, the loss of humanity, the increase of crime, etc. Under the title 
“Sŏnjin’guk’s misbehaviors,” an opinion column pointed out that “in sŏnjin’guk, one 
cannot wash his hands, not to mention drinking, in the river due to industrial sewage, 
                                                 
38 In our data from 1961 to 1979, the number of cases for the term “munmyŏng-guk” is just one, while that 
for “sŏnjin’guk” is 125. The use of the concept “sŏnjin’guk” rapidly increased during the 1970s. With 
regard to this, the number of cases for “sŏnjin’guk” in the 1960s is 18, while that for the 1970s is 107. 
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and all the fishes in it die, and all the seaweeds in the neighboring seawaters die [. . .]” 
(Chosun 2 February 1964). This kind of negative perceptions of sŏnjin’guk was not rare 
in the 1960s. From that perspective, the column argued that South Korea should not 
resemble the negative aspects of sŏnjin’guk in its striving for economic development. 
As such, the concept of sŏnjin’guk in this period is somewhat far from an idealized 
concept of sŏnjin’guk as is prevalent today. 
In the 1960s, one of the most urgent national goals was to escape from the status 
of hujin’guk (hujin’guk t‘alp‘i). As noted above, this was discursively promoted under 
such nationalistic slogans as “choguk kŭndaehwa.” While the national self-identity as 
hujin’guk was prevalent throughout the 1960s, the self-identification of chungjin’guk 
(mid-going country; developing country between hujin’guk and sŏnjin’guk) began to 
appear in the late 1960s (Chosun 14 January 1968, 21 January 1968).  
The 1970s was the period when the South Korean developmental regime was 
solidified (Yoon 2005:151), and its association with the anti-communist regime was 
also strengthened, as was reflected in the slogan of “ilmyŏn kukpang, ilmyŏn kŏnsŏl” 
(defense on the one hand, construction on the other hand) (Kim and Cho 2003). The 
anti-communist developmental discourse broadened its hegemony among the public 
through mass mobilization movements such as saemaŭl undong (the new village 
movement) with a slogan of “chal sal-a bose” (let us live well). The discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk provided the developmental regime with national goals and identities. 
Reflecting the strengthening of the developmental regime, the 1970s witnessed a rapid 
increase of the use of the term sŏnjin’guk. It was also the period when Koreans came to 
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have confidence in their national development process. In this respect, they generally 
identified their country as chungjin’guk or kaebal-dosang-guk, and turned their 
discursive focus onto the concept of sŏnjin’guk. That is, the discursive focus began to 
move onto the achievement of sŏnjin’guk from the escape from hujin’guk. In this 
process, a tendency of idealizing sŏnjin’guk appeared, as an advanced being beyond 
industry and technology.   
Reflecting the increasing popularity of the concept of sŏnjin’guk, a feature 
article in the early 1970s covered what sŏnjin’guk was for South Koreans. With regard 
to the background of covering this topic, this article said that “it is because sŏnjin’guk in 
the Korean sense reflects well what values Koreans think highly of, that is, what future 
of the nation they pursue” (Chosun 9 March 1972). As is shown in this article, 
sŏnjin’guk was constructed by South Koreans as an important reference in their 
modernization process. Thus, it played a central role in guiding Koreans’ imagination of 
the national future. Using a survey method, this article analyzed South Koreans’ 
perception of sŏnjin’guk: 
 
Sŏnjin’guk is perceived in Koreans’ minds as “the countries such as the U.S. and 
Western European countries, which are wealthy economically and advanced not only in 
culture, science, and technology but also in thought and behavior.” (ibid.) 
 
According to this article, sŏnjin’guk appeared as quite an ideal being advanced 
in both economic and cultural aspects in Koreans’ perception. In practice, however, the 
emphasis generally was put on the material aspect in considering sŏnjin’guk, and there 
was a strong degree of resistance to a tendency of perceiving it culturally rich. This 
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article reported that the U.S., Japan, Britain, West Germany, and France were the 
countries most frequently referred to as sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, the article mentioned 
that it was regrettable that people did not bring up Scandinavian countries for the image 
of sŏnjin’guk, which it thought had many valuable aspects that Korea had to learn in its 
drive for modernization. In the article, some Koreans included such countries as the 
Soviet Union and China in the category of sŏnjin’guk, which shows a certain degree of 
the instability of the concept. The article raised a need for a careful approach to 
sŏnjin’guk, pointing out that Koreans tended to perceive sŏnjin’guk too optimistically. 
In this regard, it insisted that “to perceive sŏnjin’guk too positively means that we are 
ignorant of its negative aspects” (ibid.).  
 Set as a national direction, sŏnjin’guk played a role as a reference of comparison. 
In their drive for modernization, South Koreans continuously compared their social, 
cultural, and political economic systems with those of sŏnjin’guk to judge where their 
position was. For instance, an article reported that “the death rate of pregnant women is 
ten times that of sŏnjin’guk [. . .]” (Chosun 27 January 1978). Another article in a 
similar period pointed out that Seoul’s death rate from traffic accident was 44 times that 
of sŏnjin’guk (Chosun 24 January 1978). As such, sŏnjin’guk provided a positive 
reference by which Korea’s status was judged, and directed the transformation of the 
country.  
In the 1970s, the goal of “catching up with” sŏnjin’guk was actively 
promulgated by national leaders. The developmental regime vigorously promoted the 
national aspiration for joining the group of sŏnjin’guk by the 1980s. Under the title of 
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“Joining the group of sŏnjin’guk in the 1980s,” an article reported President Park 
Chung-Hee’s address in the opening ceremony of Pohang Iron & Steel Co.: 
 
President Park addressed today that “this factory is the biggest factory as a single 
project in Korean history, in which ₩120billion is invested, three times the 
construction cost of Kyŏngbu highway, but this is just our start, compared with 
sŏnjin’guk that has factory with a capacity of 10million ton. [. . .] President Park says 
[. . .] that “[. . .] we have pride in that we also can join the group of sŏnjin’guk in the 
1980s.” (Chosun 4 July 1973)  
 
Another article reported Park’s urge for the competition with sŏnjin’guk: 
 
President Park says that “in order to develop our economy further, we need to make 
technology and production unit and scale meet the global standard. We should make 
more efforts to get ahead of sŏnjin’guk because we are becoming a competitor with 
them while having competed with developing countries so far.” (Chosun 20 January 
1977) 
 
In a similar vein, an opinion column written by a business man argued for the need for 
“fighting spirits and efforts to win sŏnjin’guk”: 
 
Pursuing sŏnjin’guk including our neighbor country, we should improve the level of our 
technology and knowledge day by day faster than them, by saving sleep, learning more 
diligently, researching, and developing. [. . .] The things that make sŏnjin’guk’s 
manufactured goods more expensive than ours today are tenacious fighting spirit and 
effort to stick to an assigned work, whether it is small or big, to the extent that others 
cannot follow, and passion for the work, which regards it as a vocation. These are what 
we need today. (Chosun 1 January 1977) 
 
In terms of national self identity, South Korea was generally posited in the 
category of chungjin’guk in the 1970s. In the mid- and late 1970s, there appeared a 
tendency of designating the country as “near sŏnjin’guk,” reflecting confidence in its 
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rapid economic growth. In an article entitled “South Korea’s economic status improved, 
having already entered the rank of sŏnjin’guk,” an economic expert argued that “South 
Korea’s economic development stage is in the middle of entering into the rank of 
sŏnjin’guk from that of chungjin’guk” (Chosun 12 December 1975). This kind of self-
identification was supported by some foreign sources. According to an article, a U.S. 
economic magazine predicted that South Korea would become sŏnjin’guk in ten years 
(Chosun 26 December 1975). This article reported that: 
 
The Journal of Commercial, a leading economic magazine in the U.S., reported that 
Korea is expected to enter into the group of sŏnjin’guk in 10 years because of its 
success in economic development, and to join the OECD in 5 years. (ibid.) 
 
Under the title of “South Korea on the rank of sŏnjin’guk,” an article reported that “a 
recent special report of U.S. State Department said that South Korea moved upward into 
the group of sŏnjin’guk, together with Brazil, Taiwan, and Mexico” (Chosun 22 June 
1978). According to this article, South Korea’s Gross National Product per capita was 
just $697 in 1976, but its annual economic growth rate was 15.5 percent. 
Given this national identity at the time, it is interesting to note that South Korea 
is still represented as on the threshold of the sŏnjin’guk group today. In this perception, 
Korea has been on the threshold of the group of sŏnjin’guk for about thirty years. In 
terms of mass mobilization, the Korean developmental regime and ruling elites have, in 
some sense, benefited from this kind of constant status of being just in front of 
sŏnjin’guk. With the “tangible” national goal of becoming sŏnjin’guk, they have been 
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able to more easily acquire consent from subordinate groups about their project of 
modernization and economic growth. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND IDEALIZING SŎNJIN’GUK: 1980-1992 
 
The Chun Du-Hwan administration inherited much of the pervious administration’s 
legacy of the pursuit of national economic development combined with anti-
communism and nationalism. In this period, however, international pressure on opening 
Korea’s market intensified, and the international factor much affected national 
economic strategies and policies. The Korean discourse of development more 
sensitively reflected changing international development circumstances, such as the rise 
of global neoliberal discourse and the rapid industrialization of the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs). In discursive terms, the international pressure on 
Korea was reflected in the national discourse of development. 
 As other industrial countries targeted the NICs for market opening under the 
auspices of neoliberalism, the Chun regime partly changed its developmental strategy in 
pursuit of developmentalism based on the open door policy (Cho 2003:67). In this 
process, some changes occurred in the characteristics of the developmental regime, 
reflecting newly emerging global development discourse of neoliberalism. In terms of 
the relationship between the government and the private sector, the transition from a 
kind of “guided” development to privately led development became manifest. And, 
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various open door policies symbolized by privatization and liberalization began to be 
promoted in the 1980s (ibid.). In terms of power relationship between the public and 
private sectors, the government’s certain degree of adoption of neoliberal policies 
signaled the relative rise of the latter vis-à-vis the former. In this regard, Seo (1991) 
argues that the 1980s was the period when the capitalist class became strong enough to 
seize economic hegemony vis-à-vis the government.  
 In terms of discursive change in relation to developmentalism, the 1980s 
witnessed the rise of internationalism or globalism. Various global circumstances were 
increasingly taken into account in the national discourse of development. In this respect, 
the nationalistic discourse of economic development began to take on global bearings. 
In some sense, nationalistic aspects of the discourse of development became relatively 
weaker than the previous period in the process of accommodating Eurocentric 
universalism. As for the economic sphere, for instance, the argument for a need for 
meeting the “global standard” became stronger. The discourse of “global standard” was 
dispersed into various fields of Koreans’ social life. Around the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Games, in particular, the argument for becoming “sŏnjin simin” (advanced citizen) 
came to get strong discursive power. Those arguments asked for Koreans’ behavioral 
changes to meet the expectations of the “world” in a broad range of social life (Do 
1988).39  
                                                 
39 To become sŏnjin simin was a major issue in the 1990s as well. For instance, the Chosun (1 January 
1997) featured a series of articles under the title of “Let’s become sŏnjin simin.” In these series articles, 
the Chosun campaigned for having a sense of public order, such as keeping traffic order, showing 
restaurant etiquette, etc.    
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The use of the terms sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk in the early 1980s was 
increasingly related to international, especially trade, affairs. In many cases, the concept 
of sŏnjin’guk referred to international status group in international treaties and 
negotiations, which was in a counterpart position to hujin’guk, kaebal-dosang-guk, or 
the Third World. The OECD and the Group of 7 were frequently referred to as 
sŏnjin’guk groups, in contrast to such groups as the Group of 77, which was typically 
regarded as a group of kaebal-dosang-guk. In this regard, an article reported that: 
 
The “Group of 77” has mainly targeted sŏnjin’guk for its criticisms regarding the world 
economic situation, and among the participating countries of this ministerial meeting 
are partly included those having achieved the middle level of industrialization including 
South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Yugoslavia. (Chosun 29 March 1983)   
 
In terms of international affairs, South Korea maintained a clear stance as a 
country of NICs or kaebal-dosang-guk vis-à-vis sŏnjin’guk, and well recognized 
different political economic interests between the two. In this respect, articles argued 
that the intentions and practices of sŏnjin’guk in international affairs should be 
approached in a cautious way. They frequently criticized sŏnjin’guk’s pressure on South 
Korea in international trade. For instance, an article entitled “Sŏnjin’guk’s 
hypersensitivity” argued: 
 
However, as the shares have noticeably increased, which leading developing countries 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore take in the world trade volume, the 
council of the OECD that is a group of sŏnjin’guk has shown a move from 1978 to 
revoke preferential tariffs and trade statuses, which have been given to hujin’guk, from 
six leading developing countries such as South Korea by classifying them separately as 
NICs. (Chosun 11 March 1984)   
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Another article criticized that the G-6’s Venetian declaration was virtually sŏnjin’guk’s 
targeting of NICs: 
 
The “economic declaration” of the summit and the joint declaration of G-6 must be 
targeting South Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which have been 
steadily growing in Asia, [.. .] even though they do not point out the names of newly 
industrializing countries. [. . .] With this kind of declarations, sŏnjin-daeguk [big 
sŏnjin’guk] have probably demonstrated their solidarity by creating a target. (Chosun 17 
June 1987)   
 
These articles well demonstrate conflicting interests between sŏnjin’guk and the NICs. 
Despite the rise of neoliberalism on the global stage in the 1980s, sŏnjin’guk’s pressure 
for opening NICs’ market was criticized on the basis of Korea’s self-identity as NICs.40  
However, there was also a tendency of regarding market opening as a kind of 
necessary condition for entering into the group of sŏnjin’guk. This linkage between the 
market opening and the achievement of the status of sŏnjin’guk was appropriated by 
people who tended to think that market opening was inevitable. In the governmental 
sector, there appeared an attitude to yield to the international pressure and to gradually 
open Korea’s market to outside. With regard to this, an editorial entitled “Is it 
                                                 
40 The cautious approach to sŏnjin’guk was not limited to the international economic affairs. Many 
articles pointed out sŏnjin’guk’s bad behaviors against hujin’guk or kaebal-dosang-guk in environmental 
and social fields. As for a gas leak incident occurred in India, for instance, an article criticized that it was 
a tragedy related to sŏnjin’guk’s intentional transfer of polluter industries into hujin’guk: that is, 
“However, it draws our attention most of all that environmentalists are pointing out that some of those 
industrial disasters have been caused by sŏnjin’guk’s intentional transferring of their dangerous industries 
into the Third World that does not have any safety measure.” (Chosun 7 December 1984)  
In a similar vein, an opinion column argued for South Korea’s awareness not to import polluted 
materials from sŏnjin’guk: “Anyway, while we have benefited from hasty developments and openings for 
the past twenty years, we have also undergone side-effects such as even importing Japanese industrial 
wastes. Now we should never repeat again this kind of ‘being a pushover’ or ‘being willing to accept lye.’ 
I hope that world-wide movements for protecting life occur in 1985, by which sŏnjin’guk countries 
restrict polluting materials by themselves and the Third World countries strictly enforce anti-pollution 
criteria.” (Chosun 12 January 1985) 
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sŏnjin’guk only if it opens its door?” (Chosun 1 November 1985) reported that the 
Korean government had set a plan to open its market “at the level of sŏnjin’guk” by the 
year of 1988 due to the pressure from the U.S. It expressed a concern about market 
opening, saying that “opening must not go too far.” As such, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
was, in some cases, appropriated by the government for its promotion of open market 
policy. As the articles show, there was a considerable degree of psychological resistance 
to being open to the international society. Yet, this kind of resistance to the international 
pressure and government’s open policy got weaker towards the 1990s, and the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk was often utilized for the cause of Korea’s “internationalization.” 
The period of the Chun administration was a time when the authority of political 
power was very weak. Taking power through such bloody events as the 12.12 coup and 
the Gwangju Massacre, the Chun administration lacked its political legitimacy from the 
beginning. Thus, Chun had to rely on various coercive political apparatuses for his rule 
and maintained severe policies against opposing political groups. In political economic 
terms, this was the period when the contradiction of rapid modernization became 
intensified. Those conditions entailed massive resistance movements against Chun’s 
power, which culminated in the 6.10 Protest in 1987. In this process, the discourse of 
democracy, as a resistant discourse, arose as a hegemonic discourse enough to override 
the discursive power of dominant groups’ developmentalism (Cho 2003:66).  
In this situation, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk was utilized by ruling groups for 
their political interests. By emphasizing the national historical necessity for achieving 
sŏnjin’guk, the ruling groups implied that the massive pro-democratic movements were 
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the activities of creating confusion and division, and of weakening national power. The 
need for achieving sŏnjin’guk was more widely promoted by political leaders in the 
mid- and late 1980s when the pro-democratic movements were getting much broader 
and stronger. President Chun continuously mentioned about a need for joining the group 
of sŏnjin’guk throughout his presidency, and argued that the country was cruising 
toward sŏnjin’guk and its achievement would be possible in the near future. It is 
interesting to note that his use of the concept of sŏnjin’guk got intensified in 1987 when 
his power was in crisis in front of the huge people’s demonstrations. In March 1987, for 
instance, as many as three articles in our data reported about Chun’s emphasis on the 
achievement of sŏnjin’guk. In an article, he mentioned that: 
 
We have now come to grab the doorknob for entering the group of sŏnjin’guk by virtue 
of the achievements we made for the past six years. Based on these, we have to make 
more efforts this year to become a grand leading part of world history [. . .]. (Chosun 5 
March 1987) 
  
In the very next day, he said again that “we will necessarily become sŏnjin’guk after 
transferring the government peacefully next year and successfully hosting the Olympics 
with united power (Chosun 6 March 1987). About a week later, he maintained that “we 
have now finished the preparation for heading for sŏnjin’guk as having overcome 
various hardships for the past six years by uniting all people’s minds and powers 
(Chosun 13 March 1987). 
 Facing massive resistances from national citizens, the South Korean ruling 
groups, which had close historical relationships with foreign powers, might have had 
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more recourse to sŏnjin’guk. In relation to this, a tendency of idealizing sŏnjin’guk was 
notable in this period. In this tendency, the advanced character of sŏnjin’guk came to be 
no longer limited to some material aspects, such as industry and technology, but was 
broadened to spiritual aspects. Thus, sŏnjin’guk was represented not only as materially 
prosperous, but also culturally mature. In this way, the sŏnjin’guk discourse encroached 
the old assumption of Eastern civilization’s cultural superiority vis-à-vis the West. As 
the West was mainly represented as sŏnjin’guk, this was an important point where the 
idealized image of the West reemerged in Korea after the crisis of the discourse of 
civilization. Koreans’ cultural pride vis-à-vis the West became gradually undermined in 
the idealizing process of sŏnjin’guk. The idealization of the West was promoted by 
some high profile intellectuals. In an opinion column entitled “Things that we don’t 
have,” Kim Dong-Gil, a professor at Yonsei University, wrote that: 
 
In the West, men and women in the streets generally dress far better than us. This does 
not mean expensive clothes but that they dress plainly fitting to their bodies in a fancy 
way by coordinating colors. What an artistically touching thing is to be fitting well. [. . .] 
Westerners also make home better than us. Even if they make home in a one-room 
apartment, it has all that are needed and all things are posited in right places, which are 
both convenient and beautiful. [. . .] Isn’t it that we rarely have cultural life? [. . .] A 
reason why I somewhat hurt my self-respect in seeing Westerners is that their rich 
common sense and rationality are lacking to us who are proud of that, so to speak, 
“light is from the East.” I don’t know if light came from the East 5,000 or 3,000 years 
ago, but it is clearly not the case now. This is a very painful realization. Kindness is a 
part of common sense. But, isn’t it that we don’t have kindness. [. . .] I am wondering if 
Koreans are to be this kind of Koreans anywhere in the world. [. . .]. (Chosun 19 
January 1986) 
 
This does not mean that there was no resistance to the national aspiration for 
sŏnjin’guk. In fact, the idealizing process of sŏnjin’guk or the West was continuously in 
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tension with a kind of traditional perspective valuing spiritual and cultural aspects. In 
this perspective, the process of becoming sŏnjin’guk was criticized for its material focus. 
And, various side-effects of material development were well recognized. In this view, 
sŏnjin’guk was still considered in a limited sense mainly as industrially advanced, e.g., 
sŏnjin kongŏp-guk (advanced industrial country), which carried various negative aspects 
with it. An opinion column, for instance, pointed out that: 
 
We frequently hear and see the term “sŏnjin” recently. However, it seems that the 
“meaning of sŏnjin” is mainly weighed on the criteria of material improvements such as 
the increase of national wealth, the growth of national income, export growth, high 
level of mass-consumption, the improvement of productivity, the promotion of 
industrialization, the nurturing of leisure industry, high buildings, the increase of private 
cars, the expansion of paved roads, and so forth. (Chosun 16 November 1983)  
 
On the basis of this, this article emphasized non-material values, such as “greed control” 
and “to practice the wisdom of ancestors to share even a piece of bean.”  
In a similar vein, an opinion column written by a woman artist mentioned that 
“it is said that when it becomes sŏnjin’guk, crimes increase and thus people’s concerns 
get deep while new buildings are going higher and cultural events are getting diverse” 
(Chosun 11 November 1984). Some expressed more direct concerns about South 
Korea’s efforts for becoming sŏnjin’guk. A feature article entitled “The culture and 
things of sŏnjin’guk . . . are they really all ‘good things’?” argued that blind acceptance 
of foreign materials and cultures should be avoided, and that the recovery of pride in 
Korean tradition and culture was important (Chosun 1 January 1983). It acknowledged 
that sŏnjin’guk, mainly as an industrial being, had both advantages and disadvantages 
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associated with industrialization. Some articles contested the concept of sŏnjin’guk in 
relation to Koreans’ national identity and pride. Under the subtitle “A country that has a 
lot of traditions and cultures is sŏnjin’guk . . . ‘let’s have spiritual pride’,” an opinion 
column written by Han Young-Woo, a professor at Seoul National University, wrote 
that: 
 
In regard to a country’s level or wealth, one cannot easily designate sŏnjin’guk or 
hujin’guk just based on visible material. Spiritual wealth should be included in it. A 
country having a lot of precious cultural traditions cannot be called as hujin-jŏgin 
(backward) country even if its material life is somewhat backward. [. . .] We have 
frequently heard our country is chungjin’guk or kaebal-dosang-guk. It is not that this 
does not have any validity in terms of the economy and technology. However, a 
condition should be attached to that kind of expression as long as the economy and 
technology are not all of national wealth. Frankly speaking, there is something that we 
have earned because of the idea of “kaebal-dosang-guk,” but there are many other 
things that we have lost and there are some easy problems that have not been easily 
solved. As long as we have confidence and pride in traditional cultures, our cultural 
heritages can be globalized to any extent, and this may be the biggest potential wealth 
that we have. [. . .] [Our country] is a country that has far more historical cultural 
advantages than the so-called sŏnjin’guk which we are now trying hard to catch up with. 
[. . .] [In the past] we never lost pride even for a moment for ourselves that we were 
sŏnjin’guk. (Chosun 11 March 1986)    
 
 
SEGYEHWA AND GLOBAL STANDARD FOR SŎNJIN’GUK: 1993-1997 
 
Having achieved industrialization and democratization, Korea in the 1990s needed 
different national development strategies. At the global level, the neoliberal trend was 
intensifying with the popularization of the globalization discourse. In these national and 
global situations, there raised a need to “upgrade Korea” to effectively meet the global 
challenge based upon “successful” achievement of “modernization,” e.g., 
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industrialization and democratization (Park 2006). In this context, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration inaugurated with an ambition of drastically reforming the country to be 
competitive in the global circumstance. It actively embraced the global discourse of 
globalization and tried to transform the country to be compatible with the global trend. 
It assumed that the preexisting socio-economic system constructed through the rapid 
modernization period was not suitable to the new era of globalization.   
In this regard, President Kim widely promoted the slogan of “sinhan’guk 
ch‘angjo” (the creation of new Korea) and emphasized the need for achieving 
sŏnjin’guk. He actively employed the discourse of international competition for the 
purpose of his reform policies (Y. Kim 2003). Supposing Korea as facing harsh 
international competitions, he insisted that it would collapse just on the threshold of the 
rank of sŏnjin’guk without curing “han’gukbyŏng” (the problem of Korea) through 
strong reformation drive. In this respect, Kang (2000:444) argues that “reformation” 
and “competitiveness” were “two of the discourse-constituents of ‘New Korea’ in 1993.” 
In his New Year’s address in 1995, President Kim promulgated a need for segyehwa 
(globalization) as a way to win international competition by defining the international 
circumstance as both crisis and opportunity (Y. Kim 2003). In this situation, the 
tendency of judging the Korean society by “global” criteria further intensified. While 
the segyehwa discourse was intended as an active response to the global discourse of 
globalization, it also contributed to uncritically accepting various politically charged 
international neoliberal policies, especially those promoted by the U.S., as “global 
standard” (Seong 2001; Cho 2001). 
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 Another notable aspect of Korea’s development in this period was the change of 
the nature of its developmental regime into that which was actively willing to meet the 
“global standard.” In Cho’s (2003:84) terms, this was a transition from the old 
developmental regime to “neo-developmental regime,” which was based upon the 
discourse of segyehwa as a neo-modernization discourse. In terms of developmental 
discourse, the transition occurred from protective developmentalism to open-door 
developmentalism (ibid.). Neoliberal economic philosophy played an important role in 
providing knowledge to this transition. In this respect, Lee (2003) designates the 
transition as that from the developmental state to a “neoliberal competing state,” which 
prioritized neoliberal values for obtaining competitiveness in international competition. 
With regard to the cause of the crisis of the conventional developmental state, Yoon 
(2005) notes three main factors: the pressure from the world system, democratization, 
and the growth of private capital, which reflect the changes of the developmental state’s 
relationships with the world system, civil society, and capital respectively. According to 
him, the developmental regime virtually collapsed by the Kim administration’s pursuit 
of liberalization and opening of the finance sector in the early 1990s (Yoon 2005).  
The development of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk during the 1990s was deeply 
influenced by the Kim Young-Sam administration’s launch of a strong drive for 
reformation on a broad range of national affairs. In particular, the reformation drive 
promoted under the banner of segyehwa played an important role in forming the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk with the contemporary characteristics. The government carried 
out various reformation policies under the cause of enhancing national competitiveness 
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to meet “global standard” in a variety of areas. In terms of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, 
the Kim administration approached its domestic and foreign affairs with a national 
identity of “almost sŏnjin’guk” in a substantial sense. Along with the “successful” 
hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games in the late 1980s, various incidents during the 
early and mid 1990s gave Koreans confidence in forming this identity, such as the 
establishment of a democratic civilian administration, the plan of joining the OECD 
club, the popularization of abroad trips, and so forth. Under those circumstances, 
significant amount of discursive power was put on the need to make vigorous efforts to 
get the country into the rank of solid sŏnjin’guk.   
Given those conditions, not only the concept of sŏnjin’guk became far more 
popularized in its use in the public, but also its connotation became far more 
generalized and idealized. In regard to this, the term sŏnjin’guk appeared beyond the 
field of industry and technology, and was used in far diverse areas, such as education, 
labor, environment, diseases, traffic, etc. In these various areas, sŏnjin’guk was 
represented as an ideal being. That is to say, it was an advanced being not just in terms 
of industry and technology, but also in almost every aspect of society. Given that the 
concept of sŏnjin’guk is Koreans’ own discursive construction, the idealization of 
sŏnjin’guk as the “other” accompanies, in some ways, the increase of self-
dissatisfaction. In this respect, as sŏnjin’guk was idealized, Korea’s national self got 
smaller vis-à-vis sŏnjin’guk.  
In this period, the desire for achieving the status of sŏnjin’guk appeared to be far 
stronger than those in any previous times. With a self-national identity of “almost 
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sŏnjin’guk,” more Koreans felt that the aspiration had become supported by substantial 
national political economic power and thus that the achievement of national goal came 
to be in a more tangible and realistic historical condition. Given the sentiment of the end 
of century, such a slogan as “achieving sŏnjin’guk in the twentieth-century” became 
popularized (Chosun 24 July 1995). While sŏnjin’guk as a national vision tended to be 
promoted mainly by a relatively small number of opinion leaders in previous periods, its 
necessity was more widely shared by a broader range of population. In this respect, the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk far strengthened its hegemonic status in this period as a 
dominant way of representing national self and the world. Beyond the field of the 
economy and technology, virtually every corner of society was asked to be engaged in 
transformation towards sŏnjin’guk.  
In those conditions, the concept of sŏnjin’guk underwent some notable changes 
in its way of use and connotation. First, the use of the abstract type of the concept 
increased, in which the referent of the term sŏnjin’guk was not specified. Rather than 
being a specific entity, it tended to exist as an image and a representation, to which 
Koreans’ various positive values were projected. This is somewhat unique phenomenon 
observed in this period, in the sense that the concept of sŏnjin’guk in previous periods 
was more frequently used as a concrete type referring to specific countries, international 
organizations, or international status in some limited fields such as the economy, 
international trade, and technology. As the scope of the use of the concept expanded, its 
connotation became more abstract and broader.   
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Second, in relation to the increase of its abstractness, the image of sŏnjin’guk 
became far more idealized. Going beyond a shortcut of sŏnjin kongŏp-guk (advanced 
industrial country) in a limited sense, it tended to get represented as an advanced 
country in virtually every field of society. Sŏnjin’guk was not just an advanced country 
in some limited fields such as the economy and technology, but an advanced country in 
every corner of society including the cultural field, which had been a sphere that 
Koreans maintained a sense of pride over Western industrial countries. The negative 
aspects of sŏnjin’guk or sŏnjin kongŏp-guk frequently recognized in previous periods, 
such as dehumanization, damage to the environment, the increase of crime, etc., were 
rarely pointed out in this period. Challenges to the concept of sŏnjin’guk and to the 
designation of South Korea’s identity within the discourse of sŏnjin’guk became rare 
and marginalized either. Western countries arose as role models by which various 
aspects of the Korean society were to be evaluated. Western models tended to be 
regarded as universal ones and the historical and contextual differences between them 
and Korea were ignored.41  
And third, given the identity shift from kaebal-dosang-guk or NICs to “almost 
sŏnjin’guk” in a substantial sense, the perception of conflicting interests between South 
Korea and sŏnjin’guk abated. There was a rather strong tendency to consider that 
expectations from sŏnjin’guk were to be met in order for South Korea to join the 
sŏnjin’guk club. Groups of major industrial countries, such as the G-7, were mainly 
termed as the group of “sŏnjin’guk” rather than other expressions such as sŏbang-guk 
                                                 
41 With regard to this, it is interesting to see that an article interpreted a low turnout of Korean voters in an 
election as “sŏnjin’guk-hyŏng (sŏnjin’guk-style) voting tendency” (Chosun 21 June 1991). 
171 
 
(Western countries).42 Criticisms of sŏnjin’guk’s policies and strategies in international 
affairs far waned too. Rather, there appeared a tendency to regard sŏnjin’guk as a 
central promoter of the inevitable global trend that South Korea had to follow to achieve 
the status of sŏnjin’guk. With regard to the pressure of market opening from sŏnjin’guk, 
for instance, an article argued that “liberalization and opening to outside are already 
irreversible general trends of the international society” and emphasized that “the 
problem is to quickly prepare policies and institutions for ourselves, which are fitting to 
the era of liberalization and opening” (Chosun 29 March 1995). The requests from 
sŏnjin’guk, which were often perceived as a kind of “pressure” in previous periods, 
came to be frequently regarded as “global standard.” This even played a yardstick to 
gauge the degree of advancement or backwardness of the Korean society. As the nation 
being “almost sŏnjin’guk” as an OECD member, South Koreans partly internalized 
sŏnjin’guk’s interests as their own ones. As for the liberalization of foreign exchange 
transactions in South Korea, for instance, an article argued:  
 
It is needless to mention the financial liberalization of the OECD, a sŏnjin’guk group. 
The contemporary foreign currency law is that which was made to enable the 
government to manage dollar currency in the past when the dollar currency was very 
rare. But, the regulation still remains even though all of the causal factors disappeared 
with increasing amount of dollars. It is only our country that ransacks normal people’s 
purses and handbags in order to check the costs of travelling abroad. (Chosun 5 
February 1994) 
 
                                                 
42 Until the 1980s, the groups of countries such as the G-7 and the OECD, which are regarded as 
representative sŏnjin’guk groups today, were often referred to as groups of “sŏbang guk” (Western 
countries), “sŏnjin kongŏp-guk” (advanced industrial country), or “sŏnjin kaebal-guk” (advanced country 
in development). In this regard, a piece of international news in 1985 called the G-7 as “sŏbang 7 guk” 
(seven Western countries) (Chosun 2 May 1985). 
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Contrasting Korea with the OECD countries in terms of foreign exchange policies, this 
article argued for a need for following the global trend of financial liberalization.   
As for national identity, many articles considered that Korea had been moving 
successfully towards the status of sŏnjin’guk. As noted above, it was the 1970 when the 
identity of South Korea as just in front of the sŏnjin’guk group notably appeared in the 
public sphere. While this national identity was presented by a relatively small number 
of opinion leaders as an optimistic interpretation of national status, it was far more 
popularized in the public during the 1990s. In this regard, an opinion column entitled 
“National character and sŏnjin’guk” argued that “it is because the dawn of the era of 
sŏnjin’guk is just about to begin now, clearly separating from the past” (Chosun 20 
December 1995). In this sentiment, hujin’guk and kaebal-dosang-guk were regarded as 
the past of Korea and sŏnjin’guk as its future. Building a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk was 
accepted as a more tangible national vision that could be achieved in the near future. 
This phenomenon became far more distinct after the mid-1990s, when Korea joined the 
OECD.43 Various governmental policies to cope with Korea’s entering into the rank of 
sŏnjin’guk were prepared (Chosun 29 March 1995, 6 June 1995). Discursive foci were 
put on transforming the virtually every field of society to meet to the “criteria” of 
sŏnjin’guk to push the move over the threshold of sŏnjin’guk towards a full-fledged 
sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, an article argued that “as South Korea has become an 
economic sŏnjin’guk by joining the OECD, shouldn’t we become a sŏnjin’guk in the 
field of broadcasting?” (Chosun 24 November 1997) 
                                                 
43 South Korea joined the OECD in December 1996.  
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Various campaign-style series articles, which argued for learning from 
sŏnjin’guk and upgrading Korea to sŏnjin’guk, were launched in this period. They 
covered a broad range of fields including cultural heritage, civil awareness, the 
environment, energy saving, traffic problems, and so forth. Becoming sŏnjin’guk and 
sŏnjin simin (advanced citizen) arose as an urgent problem (Chosun 1 January 1997). 
Virtually every corner of society became under scrutiny by newspaper articles for the 
cause of building sŏnjin’guk, which generated a clear epistemic hierarchy between 
Korea and sŏnjin’guk. The aspects that were not regarded as those of sŏnjin’guk were 
often stigmatized as those of hujin’guk that were to be quickly redressed. Many series 
articles introduced the examples of sŏnjin’guk as model cases in various fields. In this 
way, sŏnjin’guk became a stronger reference point by which various aspects of Korean 
society were judged and evaluated, and the authority of sŏnjin’guk became far stronger 
as well.  
The concept of sŏnjin’guk was often appropriated for political interests. An 
article entitled “We cannot be a sŏnjin’guk if the real-name financial system is not 
settled,” for instance, used the concept of sŏnjin’guk as a national vision to promote a 
governmental financial policy (Chosun 30 November 1995). It is interesting to note that 
the political appropriation of the concept of sŏnjin’guk was not an exception for 
“progressive” social groups. With regard to this, an environmentalist group raised a 
need for a tightened environmental regulation on gasoline production by arguing that 
“most oil companies are not reaching sŏnjin’guk criteria” (Chosun 3 September 1997). 
This shows that counter-developmental progressive groups in political economic 
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struggle were not necessarily counter-groups in terms of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. In 
this respect, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk could be regarded as “hegemonic” discourse as 
its basic assumptions were naturally accepted by a broad range of social groups.  
With the increase of the popularity of the concept of sŏnjin’guk, the terms 
sŏnjin’guk-hyŏng (sŏnjin’guk-type) and sŏnjin’guk-sujun (sŏnjin’guk-level) were 
frequently used to evaluate certain aspects of the society and eventually to suggest a 
direction of change. An opinion column written by the president of a private university 
demonstrates well the atmosphere of the mid-1990s regarding the concept of sŏnjin’guk:  
 
We all are aspiring for becoming sŏnjin’guk in the upcoming 21st century, and we 
should necessarily become sŏnjin’guk. [. . .] Our country has reached the threshold of 
sŏnjin’guk by achieving miraculous economic development to have GDP per capita of 
$10,000 just in front of us in the late 1995, from the status of hujin’guk that had GDP 
per capita of $80 in the 1960s. However, sŏnjin’guk does not only mean to have big 
trade amount economically, to have a lot of productive facilities, or to have affluent 
mineral resources. Rather, a country that can create new technology and invent new 
productions, and that have capacity to raise high-tech industries competitive world-wide 
is a true economic sŏnjin’guk. [. . .] After all, it is impossible for our country to head for 
sŏnjin’guk without the reformation of technology, living, and education. It would be the 
right way to solidify the road for sŏnjin’guk to nurture human resources that have fair 
personality valuing frankness for one’s life, diligence and the spirit of sacrifice serving 
for neighbors, language ability to meet the high-tech era of international competition, 
and computer ability. (Chosun 24 July 1995)     
 
The aspiration of building sŏnjin’guk became stronger to the extent of regarding 
it as a historical necessity, especially when combined with a perception of increasing 
competition in the “globalizing” world economy. In terms of international trade, many 
articles pointed out that South Korea was in a “sandwiched” situation between the 
quality of sŏnjin’guk’s products and the price competitiveness of hujin’guk’s. As for a 
weakness of Korea’s products in international settings, an article reported that “foreign 
175 
 
productions are rapidly driving away national productions with the opening of the 
domestic market that has been closed” (Chosun 4 April 1993). This kind of sense of 
crisis reinforced the cause of achieving sŏnjin’guk, which in turn exerted a mobilization 
effect across the country.44 As for South Korea’s performance compared with main 
competitors in a race for sŏnjin’guk, an article reported that “our country recorded the 
lowest growth among the Asian NICs last year” and that “only we failed to enter into 
sŏnjin’guk among the four Asian dragons, and now fell into a situation of being 
classified into the same group with Malaysia and Thailand” (Chosun 11 March 1993). 
In this sense, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk requested hard endeavors in every field of the 
country to become sŏnjin’guk lest it should retrogress back to hujin’guk in the twenty-
first century. This served for reinforcing the hegemony of ruling groups by implying the 
importance of integration, rather than split, of the country towards the urgent cause. On 
the other hand, a sense of crisis was well combined with a sense of optimism about the 
future of Korea. In this respect, the goal of sŏnjin’guk was suggested by both domestic 
and foreign sources as a great possibility in the very near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 In this regard, in a series of campaign-type feature articles entitled “Let’s run again too,” an article 
warned about the possibility of “falling into hujin’guk in the 21st century if not running now” in its 
subtitle (Chosun 30 August 1991). 
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NEOLIBERAL SŎNJIN’GUK AND SŎNJINHWA: 1998-THE PRESENT 
 
In the wake of the economic crisis that brought about the IMF intervention in the late 
1990s, South Korea has undergone a drastic neoliberal transformation. Various 
structural adjustment programs exercised in the public and private sectors during the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration were based upon a diagnosis that the economic crisis was 
caused by Korea’s lack of competitiveness to the global circumstances. In this situation, 
strong reformation policies were employed in various fields of the country under the 
cause of strengthening national competitiveness. In this process, neoliberal ideas 
provided justification to transformations as the only way to follow the global trend and 
eventually to survive in global competition.45  
 The discourse of sŏnjin’guk played an important role in the country’s neoliberal 
transformation. The promoters of neoliberalism appropriated it by linking neoliberal 
transformation to the cause of achieving sŏnjin’guk. For them, most sŏnjin’guk were 
neoliberal countries and neoliberal socio-economic system was an inevitable global 
trend. Thus, it was urgent for Korea to transform itself into a neoliberal country to go 
with the global trend and ultimately join the sŏnjin’guk group. This kind of logic has 
been prevalent in the mainstream public discursive sphere until recent years.  
                                                 
45 Neoliberal policies are criticized by many theorists. For instance, Yoon (2005:172) criticizes the Kim 
administration’s neoliberal policies that “it is no more than to solve the economic crisis, which was 
caused by neoliberal economic (and financial) liberalization after the 1990s, by a stronger neoliberal 
prescription.” Chang (2008) argues that neoliberalism has failed in all fronts of main economic dimension: 
growth, equality, and stability.  
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Reflecting the discourse of neoliberal globalization, the “conservative” Chosun 
and Dong-a Ilbo perceived the world as a system of limitless competition, in which only 
competitive countries could survive. In this respect, the term “kyŏngjaeng” (competition) 
and “kyŏngjaengnyŏk” (competitive power) were frequently used in relation to the 
neoliberal need for transformation as well as the necessity of achieving sŏnjin’guk. In 
this situation, South Korea tended to be considered as having just two practical options: 
“to aggressively participate in the limitless competition system or to join the group of 
grumbler falling behind the competition” (Chosun 20 November 2005).   
 On the basis of neoliberal ideas, mainstream newspapers argued that 
maintaining the small government was sŏnjin’guk’s trend and the global trend, and thus 
should be adopted by the South Korean government. For instance, as for governmental 
reformation, an editorial of the Chosun Ilbo argued that:  
 
The OECD, a sŏnjin’guk club, questioned in the “year 2007 economy report for South 
Korea” that “can it become the Hub of Northeast Asia with regulating the metropolitan 
area? And, is the balanced local development driven by the central government 
efficient?” As [our] government runs directly against the global trend, they might not 
have been able to understand the situation. (Chosun 17 March 2007)   
 
This article of the “conservative newspaper” criticized the “progressive” Roh Moo-
Hyun administration’s policies for maintaining a “big” government, by relying on the 
authority of the OECD, a sŏnjin’guk club. It implied that the perspective of the OECD 
as a sŏnjin’guk group was a global trend, which the Korean government should follow.  
Neoliberal policies were advocated by the “conservative” Chosun Ilbo and 
Dong-a Ilbo as a way for enhancing efficiency in terms of the interests of capital. Under 
178 
 
the title of “The 2006 sŏnjin’guk trend,” the Dong-a argued that some keywords were 
found in the trend of sŏnjin’guk policies, such as the downsizing of the government, the 
privatization of public enterprise, deregulation, pro-business policy, and the open 
market (Dong-a 26 December 2006). It insisted that this trend could be summarized by 
a phrase of “small government, big market.” The neoliberal trend was even regarded as 
natural and normal, and policies against this supposed trend was criticized as abnormal. 
Under the title of “‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ – the case of President Roh Moo-
Hyun,” an editorial of the Chosun argued that: 
 
Regarding the unemployment problem, it is normal to absorb unemployed people by 
promoting private business and increasing jobs. However, the President argues that it is 
okay to increase public officials and social jobs paid by the national budget. Because of 
this abnormal idea, for the past 4 years when every sŏnjin’guk strived for the reduction 
of public officials and the privatization of public enterprises, this administration 
increased public officials by 61,000 and stopped privatization. (Chosun 15 October 
2007) 
 
In this article, sŏnjin’guk was represented as the subject employing the “normal” policy, 
which was based upon the reduction and privatization of public sectors, and provided a 
reference point by which the Korean government was criticized. For its promotion of 
neoliberal policies, the editorial used the concept of sŏnjin’guk as a ground for 
justifying it. In a similar vein, an editorial of the Dong-a argued that: 
 
It is a global trend and a correct way to make a “small government” to reduce 
regulations and promote the vitality of the private sector. It is proved by the cases of 
sŏnjin’guk including the U.S. and Japan, which have succeeded in the revitalization of 
the economy by the reduction of the government role and the promotion of the market 
role” (Dong-a 24 January 2008). 
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This article shows well how the concept of sŏnjin’guk was appropriated for the purpose 
of promoting neoliberal policies. In this article, the cases of the U.S. and Japan as 
sŏnjin’guk were used as exemplary cases demonstrating the necessity of neoliberal 
ideas and policies. In this way, the concept of sŏnjin’guk was utilized by the promoters 
of neoliberalism as a source of authority for their arguments.  
The promotion of the market ideology was related to the conservative 
newspapers’ belief in the principle of “liberal democracy.” For instance, under the title 
“We will defend liberty and the market,” an editorial of the Dong-a (1 April 2006) 
argued that “one cannot be sŏnjin’guk with anti-market ideology.” As such, the 
promoters of neoliberalism intended to justify the neoliberal prioritization of liberty and 
the market under the cause of achieving sŏnjin’guk.  
It is interesting to note the difference between the “conservative” Chosun and 
Dong-a Ilbo and the “progressive” Hankyoreh. In terms of neoliberalism, the 
progressive newspaper showed distinct differences from the conservative ones in the 
sense that it clearly opposed to neoliberal ideas and practices. However, in terms of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk, the Hankyoreh did not show a notable difference from them. 
Despite the Eurocentric developmental bearings of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, the 
Hankyoreh did not challenge its authority. Rather, like the conservative newspapers, the 
Hankyoreh also tended to rely on the authority of the concept of sŏnjin’guk in making 
its arguments. For instance, the Hankyoreh (14 October 2008) argued that “many 
sŏnjin’guk including the U.S. are strengthening regulation and conducting 
nationalization after being hit by the boomerang of excessive financial deregulation.” In 
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a similar vein, another editorial of it argued that “it is a trend in sŏnjin’guk to increase 
tax for the wealthy and support the weak class in order to stimulate the economy and to 
make social harmony [. . .]” (Hankyoreh 1 December 2008). As such, the Hankyoreh 
was different from the conservative newspapers in terms of the contents of the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk, e.g., what sŏnjin’guk was. However, it rarely challenged its basic 
discursive structure, such as the authority of sŏnjin’guk vis-à-vis alienated hujin’guk.  
On the other hand, there are not many significant differences between the 1990s 
and the 2000s in terms of the characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Regardless 
of the difference in the strength of promulgation, all of the three administrations since 
1998 have aimed for achieving sŏnjin’guk in the near future. A notable phenomenon in 
this period was that the basic assumptions of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk formed in the 
1990s became more popularized and naturalized. That is to say, while a necessity to 
keep up with the “global trend” to become sŏnjin’guk was actively promoted by the 
government with such a slogan as segyehwa in the previous period, it was more 
naturally accepted in the public during this period.46   
The tendency to diagnose the Korean society by “global standard” also became 
much taken-for-granted in relation to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, 
sŏnjin’guk was often represented as the embodiment of “global standard” and “global 
trend.” Korea’s national identity as on the threshold of the rank of sŏnjin’guk became 
more popularized too. In the late 2000s, there found a tendency of regarding South 
                                                 
46 I also observe strong sentiments and movements against neoliberal globalization in Korea. However, 
these resistance movements are not a primary focus of this study. My arguments of this study are mostly 
relevant to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk as a notable dominant discourse.   
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Korea as a kind of sŏnjin’guk, if not full-fledged one. In relation to this, it is interesting 
to note that the publicly perceived condition of GDP per capita for sŏnjin’guk has 
increased from $20,000 to $30,000 in the late 2000s (Dong-a 15 August 2008) as South 
Korea has achieved the previous nodal point, both of which are far higher than 
internationally used criteria for high-income country. In these circumstances, Koreans’ 
aspiration for achieving a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk is now bigger than any other periods, 
and it is well reflected in the wide promulgation of the slogan of sŏnjinhwa in the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined the variation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk throughout South 
Korean postwar history. The formation and transformation of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk should be understood in the context of the global discursive transition which 
accompanied the changes of power relations. At the global level, the postwar period can 
be characterized by a discursive transition from the discourse of civilization to that of 
development, which accompanied the power change from the hegemony of Europe to 
that of the U.S. Reflecting this, the formation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in the 1960s 
was conditioned by the decline of the munmyŏng discourse and the rise of the South 
Korean developmental regime. The initial South Korean developmental regime was led 
by the Park Chung-Hee administration which sought for its legitimacy from two main 
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discursive sources: anti-communism and developmentalism. Under the slogan of 
“choguk kŭndaehwa,” the Park regime effectively combined those two discursive foci 
with nationalism.  
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk supported the rise of developmentalism, by 
providing the interpretive frameworks of development and, in turn, giving justification 
to the pursuit of economic growth as a historical necessity. As the discursive transition 
from munmyŏng to sŏnjin’guk accompanied the degradation of Korea’s identity from 
munmyŏng-guk (of spiritual civilization) to hujin’guk, considerable resistances to the 
newly emerging perceptual frameworks of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk are found in its 
formative period. Moreover, sŏnjin’guk was far from an ideal being as it was mainly 
perceived in terms of the degree of industrialization. In this respect, negative sides of 
industrialization were also well recognized in regard to sŏnjin’guk, such as 
environmental damage, dehumanization, and the increase of crime. In this sense, the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk was not necessarily Eurocentric in its beginning period.  
Within the framework of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, it was raised as an urgent 
problem to escape the status of hujin’guk in the 1960s. Based upon confidence in the 
improvement of living standard accompanied by economic growth, the new national 
identity as chungjin’guk or kaebal-dosang-guk appeared from the late 1960s and 
became dominant in the 1970s. Furthermore, a perception that the nation was 
approaching sŏnjin’guk began to appear from the mid-1970s.  
It was the 1980s when the South Korean developmental regime, which was 
basically nationalistic, started to take on strong international bearings. Under the 
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pressure from other industrial countries, South Korean developmental regime under the 
Chun Doo-Hwan administration began to consider the inevitability of opening its 
market to outside. With the increase of internationalism, a certain degree of idealization 
of sŏnjin’guk occurred. The connotation of the concept sŏnjin’guk as an advanced being 
in the field of industry became broadened to be somewhat applicable to other fields 
beyond industry. However, as the dominant national identity in the 1980s was one of 
the NICs, the group of sŏnjin’guk was basically considered as having different interests 
from Korea’s on the international stage. From this position, various challenges to and 
criticisms of sŏnjin’guk were made.  
This chapter has argued that the 1990s witnessed the intensification of 
Eurocentric universalism in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk as the Korean developmental 
regime actively adopted the global discourse of neoliberalism. Under the slogans of 
“shin han’guk ch‘angjo” and “segyehwa,” the Kim Young-Sam administration 
vigorously promoted the acceptance of “global standard” as the way to become 
sŏnjin’guk. Setting sŏnjin’guk as a kind of ideal model, the developmental regime 
boosted the reformation of South Korea in virtually every field. In this process, the 
concept of sŏnjin’guk got far idealized and became abstract, and a hierarchy between 
South Korea and sŏnjin’guk became naturalized to some extent.  
In the 2000s, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk was much appropriated by the 
promoters of neoliberal transformation. Amidst the global neoliberal trend, mainstream 
conservative voices argued for a need for neoliberal transformation as the way to 
increase national competitiveness and to, ultimately, achieve sŏnjin’guk. The basic 
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assumptions and ideas of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, which were inherited from the 
1990s, became far more naturalized and widely taken for granted. Under the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk was frequently utilized under 
the slogan of “sŏnjinhwa.”  
The discourse has changed its primary connotations and implications reflecting 
specific historical conditions, and its formation and transformation have been 
contingent upon the particularities of Korean developmental experiences. Given that the 
basic assumptions and characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk are historically 
constructed in the South Korean developmental process, its historicity and 
constructiveness should be well recognized. In this respect, the discourse’s central 
concepts such as sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk are to be understood as historical constructs 
reflecting South Koreans’ values, aspirations, and worldviews. The vigorous pursuit of 
sŏnjin’guk, based upon national self identities such as “on the threshold of the group of 
sŏnjin’guk,” should be understood as reflecting the particularities of South Koreans’ 
value systems that have been historically constructed in their developmental process. 
Thus, this study has challenged the “taken-for-grantedness” of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk and reminded its historicity and constructiveness. I believe that the 
reconstruction of the concept of sŏnjin’guk, which goes beyond the Eurocentric 
developmental framework and values the diversity of humanity, would be possible by 
problematizing and historicizing the currently taken-for-granted discursive system.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CHALLENGES TO THE DISCOURSE OF SŎNJIN’GUK 
 
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a hegemonic discourse. Its assumptions and 
characteristics reflect developmentalists’ hegemony, which is based upon wide consent 
from the general public to the extent that the achievement of sŏnjin’guk has historically 
been set as an urgent national goal. The perceptual frameworks of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk have been so naturally accepted that its historicity associated with the 
formation and transformation of the Korean and global developmental regime is rarely 
recognized. Hence, various developmental agenda built under the cause of achieving 
sŏnjin’guk are not necessarily regarded as serving for the interests of developmentalists 
but for the interests of the whole country. 
 The Gramscian notion of “historical bloc” is contingent basically upon the 
conjuncture of intellectual leadership and material conditions.47 In this regard, Cox 
(1996:97) suggests a concept of “historical structure,” that is, “a particular combination 
of thought patterns, material conditions, and human institutions which has a certain 
coherence among its elements.” In this view, the three categories of forces interact 
cooperatively to configure a stable structure of social relations. An important 
assumption underlying those concepts is that certain social relations and structures are 
historical, that is, subject to change according to the transition of historical 
                                                 
47 As for Gramsci’s concept of “historical bloc,” Forgacs (1988:424) notes that it is “the dialectical unity 
of base and superstructure, of theory and practice, of intellectuals and masses (and not, as is sometimes 
mistakenly asserted, simply an alliance of social forces).” 
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circumstances. In this respect, hegemonic relations are in no way constant, but a sort of 
process of responding to continuous challenges from counter-hegemonic groups.  
 As a system of ideas, which has contributed to the construction of a historical 
structure characterized by its developmental proposition, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is 
well subject to challenges and contestations. The formation and transformation of 
discourse are, in fact, processes of responding to various circumstantial changes and 
challenges from other discourses. The discourse of sŏnjin’guk has been contested by 
other interpretive frameworks even though the strengths of contestations have not been 
so noticeable. Mainly reflecting the interests of the developmental regime, the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk has been challenged by various social forces relatively marginalized and 
oppressed in the process of South Korea’s rapid economic development. Many of the 
discursive challenges are related to the criticisms of growth-centered developmentalism.   
This chapter aims to examine challenges to the basic assumptions and ideas of 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. The main research question is: “how do various social, 
economic, and cultural counter-hegemonic groups understand, criticize, and challenge 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk?” To answer this, it investigates some notable counter-
hegemonic social forces in South Korea, such as laborers, peasants, civic groups, and 
Confucian scholars. The first three groups in particular have formed central social 
forces leading progressive social and political economic movements, with positions 
opposing to mainstream conservative developmental alliances. Methodologically, I 
investigate organizations and people representing those forces. For laborers, I have 
focused on two representative labor unions: chŏn’guk minju nodongjohab 
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ch‘ongyŏnmaeng (Korean Federation of Trade Unions; minju noch‘ong hereafter) and 
han’guk nodongjohab ch‘ongyŏnmaeng (Federation of Korean Trade Unions; han’guk 
noch‘ong hereafter). For farmers, I have chosen chŏn’guk nongminwhoe 
ch‘ongyŏnmaeng (National Association of Farmers’ Meetings; chŏnnong hereafter) and 
kat‘ollik nongminwhoe (Catholic Farmers’ Association; kanong hereafter). For civic 
groups, I have selected ch‘amyŏ yŏndae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy) and hwan’gyŏng undong yŏnhab (Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movement; hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab hereafter). And for Confucians, I have picked two 
professors teaching Confucianism at Sungkyunkwan University.  
In a situation where the discourse of sŏnjin’guk enjoys its stable hegemony, 
competitive and alternative interpretive frameworks have not notably appeared in the 
public sphere. Therefore, analyzing those groups’ public archives, such as documents, 
brochures, and public announcements, would be less fruitful in examining the 
differences between mainstream and challenging ideas regarding the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk. Thus, I have decided to interview representative individuals from each 
organization. I have not assumed that those individuals’ opinions “represent” those of 
the organizations, but that they more or less “reflect” the organizations’ stance. In the 
interviews, I have focused on differences and similarities between the interviewees’ 
understandings of the discourse and mainstream ones. I have interviewed one or two 
from each organization depending on the situation, which makes nine interviewees total: 
two from minju noch‘ong; one from han’guk noch‘ong, chŏnnong, kanong, ch‘amyŏ 
yŏndae, and hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab each; and two Confucian scholars. Interviews took 
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place from September to November in 2009, and most of them lasted for about two to 
three hours. I have used the semi-structured interview technique. 
This chapter is organized in six substantive sections. The first section examines 
general patterns of challenges to the basic assumptions and characteristics of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk. The second and third sections respectively analyze challenges 
to the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. The fourth section focuses on the 
interviewees’ understandings of historical background underlying the distinction 
between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. The fifth section explores contestations over South 
Korea’s national identity and the sŏnjinhwa (achieving sŏnjin or achieving advancement) 
project. And the last section looks into resistances to the Eurocentric implications of the 
discourse.       
 
 
THE GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE 
 
The basic concepts and assumptions of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk are differently 
interpreted and challenged in a variety of ways. As for the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk, some interviewees do not admit the appropriateness of the classification and 
directly challenge them with alternative terms and concepts. They tend to insist that 
those concepts are classified by one-sided criteria to make an unjust hierarchy out of 
diversity. They argue that those concepts idealize countries categorized as sŏnjin’guk, 
masking their historical wrongdoings to human beings as well as nature. For instance, 
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laborers criticize those concepts for obscuring power relations among countries in the 
exploitative world capitalist order.   
Others contest the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk with different 
interpretations, while maintaining their use. For them, the connotations of those 
concepts are differently interpreted from mainstream ones. Thus, instead of discarding 
the classificatory system of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, they show an inclination to 
challenge it by differently designating countries in alternative interpretive frameworks. 
On the basis of the positive connotation of sŏnjin’guk and negative one of hujin’guk, 
they pay attention to a discrepancy between the idealized images of sŏnjin’guk and the 
negative realities of some countries typically designated as such. Against different 
criteria, such as welfare system or eco-friendliness, some advanced capitalist countries 
such as the U.S. become a kind of hujin’guk.  
In general, the authority of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk turns into far weak with 
the interviewees. Its central concepts have different meanings to those people and its 
basic ways of representing the world are criticized in a variety of ways. From the 
interviewees’ arguments are some grounds manifest, upon which challenges to the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk stand. Based upon their arguments, I distinguish the following 
ten grounds of criticism for analytical purpose.  
First, the classificatory system of the discourse prioritizes economic criteria, 
without taking into account other important aspects of society, e.g., mental richness, 
social and cultural aspects, and so forth. Second, the discourse virtually obscures 
diversity among societies by ignoring their unique historical characteristics and merits. 
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Third, the discourse reflects Eurocentric worldviews, marginalizing various forms of 
living in non-Western societies. Fourth, the discourse implies that the rich is good 
regardless of various undesirable conditions associated with it, such as environmental 
damage, exploitation of the earth and people, etc. Fifth, it interrupts the mutual 
understanding and learning of various societies, creating a hierarchy according to some 
limited criteria.   
Sixth, the classification system does not take into account the “quality” of 
economic aspects, such as the sustainability of the economy. Seventh, the discourse 
idealizes excessively consumptive societies. Eighth, it obscures the nature of 
domination-subordination relationship among countries, presenting this as a kind of 
temporal one. Ninth, the discourse promotes distorted worldviews, such as racial 
prejudice, by implying a Eurocentric hierarchy between superior “white countries” and 
inferior “non-white countries.” And last, the discourse still represents a “modern” 
worldview, when the world is moving towards postmodern ones.   
  
 
CHALLENGES TO THE CONCEPT OF SŎNJIN’GUK 
 
The concept of sŏnjin’guk, reflecting South Korea’s mainstream national values and 
visions, is one of the most contested notions in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. In regard to 
the ways of transforming the country, it becomes a site where various values and 
visions compete and struggle with one another. Grounded upon diverse interpretive 
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frameworks, the respondents criticize and resist the notion of sŏnjin’guk promoted by 
mainstream social forces. Some present alternative notions based upon different 
interpretations of the world, while others show a sort of deconstructive positions.  
 In understanding the world political economic order, respondents from minju 
noch‘ong tend to emphasize power inequalities in the capitalist world order, showing an 
inclination towards Marxist ideas. Thus, for them, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk does not 
much take into account these asymmetrical power relations, reflecting powerful 
countries’ ideology. As for the epistemological ground of the concept of sŏnjin’guk, a 
respondent argues that “the distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk 
philosophically shows a convergence tendency” and that “it is a notion that someone 
has temporally gone first with others following it.” For him, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
transforms a matter of power difference into that of temporal difference. Another 
respondent also criticizes the notion of sŏnjin’guk based upon the critique of modern 
epistemology. He says that: 
 
The epistemology that appeared with modern enlightenment thought supposes that time 
runs from the beginning to the end, according to which human history has developed. 
Thus, it is the modern perception of history that those going ahead are to enlighten 
those behind in the time line. But I doubt the validity of this historical view and think 
that the distinctions according to this historical view have created a lot of misfortunes in 
humanity. For example, it played a role in giving justification to oppressions, plunders, 
and wars, as shown in the oppressions of Native Americans, and to the view that they 
were barbarians to be dominated. I think [the distinction between sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk] is based on this kind of epistemology and thus should be overcome.     
 
 These laborer respondents provide alternative interpretive frameworks of the 
world, which take into account domination-subordination relationships among countries, 
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while maintaining a sort of dualistic worldviews. In this regard, one suggests a way of 
classifying countries into the First World (che 1 segye) and the Third World (che 3 
segye), and the other prefers to categorize them into the imperial country (chegukjuŭi) 
and the colonized country (sikminji). In distinguishing between the First and Third 
Worlds, the respondent focuses on the flow of economic profit in the capitalist world 
order, echoing critical political economic theories such as dependency theory and world 
systems theory (Frank 1989 [1966]; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Wallerstein 2004). In this 
perspective, some countries are characterized as having a certain degree of economic 
and political powers to exploit profit from other countries. Unequal socio-economic 
conditions between countries are thus to be understood in “relations,” rather than in 
temporal or sequential ways as are implied by the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. 
With regard to the characteristics of the First World, the respondent mentions that: 
 
The First World is the countries that monopolize political and military hegemony. [. . .] 
They show clear dominance politically and militarily, and have a capacity of putting 
pressure on the Third World or non-First World countries, with political and military 
powers.   
 
This statement implies that power is embedded in the relationship between the two 
worlds and some are in a dominating and exploitative position at the expense of others. 
In this regard, he insists that “the First World refers to the countries at the center, which 
facilitate the economic exploitation of the Third World through various institutions such 
as the IMF and the WTO.”  
193 
 
The respondent, however, does not homogenize the First World. Rather, he 
recognizes differences among First World countries in certain aspects. In distinguishing 
the internal political economic variations of the First World between social democratic 
models and market-oriented ones, the respondent expresses his preference of the former 
to the latter. In this regard, he mentions that: 
 
I think there are wide variations within the First World, as we talk about differences 
between the First World, developing country, and the Third World. It can, of course, be 
generally admitted that the First World has relatively advanced formal democracy, 
given a lot of military revolutions and coups occurring in Africa. However, social 
welfare system and other institutional forms related to people’s quality of life are 
different among them. For example, Japan, the U.S., and Europe are different, and 
within Europe are clear differences between Scandinavian countries with strong social 
democracy movement and other countries. There are also differences in democracy in 
terms of contents. [. . .] In our struggle for social insurance and pension, the U.S. 
appears as an example of country that we should not resemble. So, I would like to say 
that there are variations [among First World countries]. 
 
Focusing on unequal power relations in the world political economy, this 
respondent considers economic scale and political power, rather than per capita income, 
as important criteria for dividing the two worlds. Thus, he tends to count those with big 
GDP scale as the First World, such as the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Japan, 
Canada, and Australia. In this view, those countries typically referred to as sŏnjin’guk 
are differently termed and represented in a different framework. It is interesting to note 
that he considers China, which is typically regarded as hujin’guk in the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk, as being close to the First World. He picks up the U.S. as the most typical 
First World country in the sense that it is “at the peak of exploiting various profits from 
the Third World.” 
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The other respondent also employs a similar interpretive framework. He focuses 
on unequal power relations between imperial and colonized countries. As for 
classificatory criteria, he emphasizes the “mode of production system.” With regard to 
the characteristics of imperial country, he argues that: 
 
Basically, it is said that the highest stage of capitalism is imperialism, but, in fact, it is 
financial capital. So, we can say that financial capital is a common trait [of imperialism]. 
Excessively formed financial capital, such as floating funds and liquid funds, seeks for 
investment places in expanding their territory, such as colony, laborers, inside of human 
beings, women, or race, which appears as colony in terms of nation. 
 
While considering that the imperial country looks relatively more mature and stable, he 
thinks that many negative social and political economic aspects of it are masked by its 
delicate control mechanisms. For him, people in the imperial country are not free from 
the exploitative nature of financial capital associated with various ideologies and 
cultural systems. With regard to this, he states that: 
 
As financial capital has to continuously seek for the place to realize its profit, it creates 
social, political, and cultural ideologies. They can be patriarchy or racism in terms of 
culture. The U.S. has tactfully hidden racism, but racism is not just a problem between 
blacks and whites. It could be educational or regional sectarianism, and could be the 
Seoul National University centrism in the case of Korea. They are continuously 
reproduced in these forms in terms of ideology and discourse.     
 
As for the political system of the imperial country, he argues that: 
 
In terms of democracy, it may be hard to say that it is developing toward true 
democracy. [. . .] In fact, I doubt if it is a progress when the system comes to make 
individuals voluntarily obey it by internalizing oppressive apparatuses. In some aspects, 
it may be a progress as it is not visible oppression, but in other aspects, it is the 
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realization of ruling ideology based on the internalization of advanced domination 
mechanism.  
    
In this interpretive framework, countries typically regarded as sŏnjin’guk are 
alternatively represented as imperial countries. As are perceived as such, their social 
systems appear somewhat differently from the idealized images of sŏnjin’guk, with 
many negative aspects within themselves. Furthermore, imperial countries are 
considered as having committed a lot of mistakes in global history. In regard to the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk, this respondent points out that the term sŏnjin’guk tends to 
mask those mistakes, and that there is a discrepancy between the ideal image of 
sŏnjin’guk and their historical exploitative behaviors. As for this, he argues that: 
 
In common sense, sŏnjin’guk refers to Western European countries, such as Germany, 
but Nazism or holocaust occurred in countries called as sŏnjin’guk. They might have 
developed material civilization, but, given such things as the exploitation of nature and 
environmental pollution, it can not necessarily be said as good, depending on criteria. I 
do not deny material affluence and prosperity, and these are important in themselves. 
But, when we consider whether these are contributing to the virtuous circle of the globe, 
it is hard to see those countries as sŏnjin’guk.   
 
Given the positive connotation of the term sŏnjin’guk, this respondent basically 
considers that there is no country deserving such term yet. In this sense, those referred 
to as sŏnjin’guk are, in fact, imperial countries whose relative material affluences are 
historically based upon the exploitation of people and nature. For this respondent, the 
difference in living conditions between the imperial and colonized countries is the result 
of the unequal accumulation of capital between the exploiting and the exploited. In this 
regard, he says that:  
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In the case of imperial countries, all people get the benefit. Obtaining sufficient profit 
from colonies, they can give a lot of welfare and wages to their laborers and 
marginalized classes. In terms of the labor-capital relationship within the imperial 
country, laborers are in a kind of accomplice relationship with capital.  From capitalists’ 
perspective, they buy off laborers. Thus, within the imperial country, conflicts may not 
be intense. However, in colony, people are generally very poor even though some ruling 
classes may be rich.  
 
Unlike the respondents from minju noch‘ong, which is considered as a more 
radical labor union, the respondent from han’guk noch‘ong does not show strong 
Marxist bearings in his ideas. His criticism of the mainstream way of conceptualizing 
sŏnjin’guk mainly lies in its overemphasis on the averaged income level. Considering 
that there are various aspects to consider in evaluating a society, he distinguishes “true 
sŏnjin’guk” from sŏnjin’guk usually appearing in popular discourses. For him, social 
values, rather than economic values, are more important in evaluating society. In this 
regard, he mentions that “[sŏnjin’guk] should not be a society in which such values as 
human right, solidarity, and friendship are put behind as too much focus is put on the 
endless expansion of profit and capital.”  
While maintaining the concept of sŏnjin’guk, this respondent basically considers 
that it should be redefined as a desirable society by more diverse criteria. In this way, he 
sets a kind of ideal concept of sŏnjin’guk, and suspects if the countries typically referred 
to as sŏnjin’guk truly match the ideal connotation of the term sŏnjin’guk. For him, 
Scandinavian countries are close models to sŏnjin’guk in the empirical world, such as 
Norway, as they have quite good labor and welfare systems. In this respect, he does not 
value U.S. social systems much, which he thinks is relatively weak in distributive 
aspects. By his criteria, the U.S. is rather a powerful country than sŏnjin’guk.   
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The respondent from kanong strongly reflects his organization’s interests in 
defining sŏnjin’guk by putting priority on agricultural aspects, such as the degree of 
food self-support. He also tries to redefine it in a different definitive framework 
reflecting his group interests. In this framework, the conventional notion of sŏnjin’guk 
does not represent truly important aspects of society. For him, a country that does not 
value agricultural sustainability is not sŏnjin’guk no matter how its income level is high. 
In this sense, this respondent also strongly criticizes the economically biased concept of 
sŏnjin’guk, and presents an agro-centered perspective in defining it. As for this, he says 
that:  
 
I doubt if we can say that South Korea is sŏnjin’guk merely based on its economic scale 
when it ignores agriculture. Many sŏnjin’guk countries in the world have more than 100 
percent of food self-support [. . .]. 
 
He advocates collective values that are associated with traditional agricultural 
societies. In this respect, he argues for the importance of non-economic aspects in 
defining sŏnjin’guk, such as social equality, harmony, and welfare system. In his 
interpretive framework, it is regrettable that some high-income countries without 
desirable social systems are idealized under the name of sŏnjin’guk. Therefore, for him, 
certain countries typically referred to as sŏnjin’guk, such as the U.S., the U.K., and 
Japan, are not regarded as desirable sŏnjin’guk, regardless of their economic scales. In 
this regard, he says that: 
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Many people may say the U.S. and Japan are sŏnjin’guk, but I wouldn’t agree to that. 
No matter how they control the world economy, the gap between the rich and the poor 
is serious. In the case of the U.S., there are many homeless people and the health care 
system has collapsed [. . .]. Yet, I think European countries have good welfare systems 
in their ways. A true sŏnjin society is one that tries to eliminate inequality and to 
ameliorate the problems of education, health care, and housing. I think it is dangerous 
and meaningless to consider sŏnjin’guk or sŏnjinhwa with only the criterion of 
economic scale, such as American-, Japanese-, and British-styles, in which the rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer.     
  
 In relation to this, this respondent puts stress on the importance of the contextual 
understanding of society. He points out that the conditions for sŏnjin’guk cannot be 
universal and uni-dimensional, but different and diverse from society to society. He 
emphasizes that each society should make efforts to construct its own sustainable model, 
reflecting its historical and cultural backgrounds. Thus, the concept of sŏnjin’guk is not 
what is to be judged by a unilateral yardstick. In this regard, he insists that any country 
can be regarded as sŏnjin’guk insofar as it “has high income; has escaped from absolute 
poverty; is comfortable to live; and has institutional systems supporting these.” This is 
quite a departure from dominant notions that tend to set a certain type of politico-
economic systems as conditions for sŏnjin’guk, such as liberal democracy and market 
economy. With regard to this, he mentions that: 
 
Every country has its own culture, tradition, and history, as is with Arab countries, 
which should be respected. It is inappropriate to say that it is hujin’guk and 
unacceptable because it is not U.S.-style. Arab countries all have their own diverse 
cultures, peoples, and histories, and we should respect these. It is inappropriate to say 
that they are hujin’guk as they are different from our perspective. 
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In his framework, South Korea’s identity becomes quite negative. Above all, it 
is hard to be regarded as sŏnjin’guk since it has disregarded the traditional value of 
agriculture in its rapid modernization process, resulting in the low level of food self-
support. He argues that the uncertainty of agricultural situation weakens the 
sustainability of economic growth. He also disputes the assumption that South Korea 
has moved toward the status of sŏnjin’guk in a linear way from hujin’guk. For him, the 
direction of social change is undetermined, and the notion of temporal progress from 
hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk is a myth. In this regard, he maintains that “countries like North 
Korea and the Philippines can be our future instead of the past.” Considering South 
Korea’s weak sustainability, he adds that “the idea that we are heading toward 
sŏnjin’guk is quite dangerous.” 
The respondent from chŏnnong shows a sort of deconstructive perspective, 
paying attention to the diversity of the world. A big problem of the categorization of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk, for her, is that it tends to evaluate a country by measuring the 
very limited aspect of it, e.g., economic one, with a single-dimensional yardstick. She 
argues that this is likely to lose, rather than catch, the true character of country. In this 
respect, she sees no usefulness in categorizing various countries into the dualistic 
scheme of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. She says that:  
 
I don’t understand classifying sŏnjin’guk, chungjin’guk, and hujin’guk according to 
merely economic indices, ignoring various traits unique to each country. There are 
aspects that are not consented [regarding the classification], and I doubt if it is 
necessary to make categories like that. 
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She adds that: 
 
I think it is quite problematic to move the world with the unilateral model. In this way, 
one cannot learn from each other. For a materially affluent country, spiritually affluent 
countries can bring about cultural richness. There are differences, and it is problematic 
to homogenize those aspects into one.  
 
The concept of sŏnjin’guk is also criticized as idealizing the social systems of 
certain countries categorized as such. In this regard, she points out that the term 
sŏnjin’guk tends to be used as a blanket term masking various problems virtually 
appearing in countries designated as sŏnjin’guk. Being designated as such, a country is 
idealized and assumed as a role model to other countries. As for this, she mentions that 
“on becoming sŏnjin’guk, it is regarded as a model and a correct answer. Thus, even if 
the U.S. has a lot of racism and human right abuses, they are masked under the name of 
sŏnjin’guk.” 
The perspective of the respondent from ch‘amyŏ yŏndae is somewhat similar to 
that of the respondent from chŏnnong in the sense that both show a sort of 
deconstructive attitude towards the concept of sŏnjin’guk. Considering the diversity of 
the world, she also refuses to see any usefulness in classifying countries into sŏnjin’guk 
or hujin’guk. She expresses strong resistance to the ways of creating a hierarchy among 
countries according to economic and military powers. Besides, the concept of 
sŏnjin’guk, for her, is too ambiguous and subjective to have significant usefulness as its 
definition becomes different from person to person. In regard to this, she insists that: 
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I don’t know with what criteria they distinguish sŏnjin’guk, chungjin’guk, and 
hujin’guk in general, but it seems that the government uses it frequently. I don’t agree 
to it because criteria are ambiguous and it tends to just refer to economically and 
militarily powerful countries in the West. It can be a discourse in some ways. There 
seem to be underlying implications that economically prosperous and militarily strong 
countries are to be referred to as sŏnjin’guk. 
 
Putting stress on the diversity of societies, she adds that: 
 
So, it is assumed that we are always a following country. [. . .] Each country may have 
its own merits to boast, so it may be inappropriate to refer virtually to the permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council as sŏnjin’guk, without considering diversity.  
 
It is interesting to see that this respondent thinks that the term sŏnjin’guk 
virtually means the U.N. Security Council members, which is quite an untypical way of 
perceiving sŏnjin’guk. In this perception, such high-income countries as Scandinavian 
countries and Japan, which are typically categorized as sŏnjin’guk, are not designated as 
such. For her, the term sŏnjin’guk virtually refers to powerful countries, which do not 
include small European countries. That is to say, sŏnjin’guk is an idealized term for 
powerful countries.   
In criticizing the concept of sŏnjin’guk, she emphasizes the importance of such 
values as peace, equality, solidarity, and justice at the national and international levels. 
In this respect, she doubts how much effort powerful countries make to devote to those 
important values around the world. Thus, for her, some powerful countries should not 
be designated with the beautified image of sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, she states that: 
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Western countries, which South Korea tries to resemble, are very hujin’guk in some 
aspects. As in the case of U.S. invasion of Iraq, for instance, they cannot control such a 
thing even though it is said that the so-called democracy is established institutionally 
and procedurally. [. . .] In those aspects, it is very hujin’guk in terms of the use of the 
military and the deployment of the military abroad. It is a very dangerous country in 
terms of doctrine, and is very backward in terms of healthcare and welfare sectors. 
 
The respondent from hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab also shows a deconstructive attitude 
towards the concept of sŏnjin’guk, valuing the sustainability of the earth. At the same 
time, she presents an alternative way of classifying countries. She basically considers 
that the categorization of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is a way of distinguishing between 
the good and the bad according to the degree of wealth. For her, the accumulation of 
wealth is deeply related to consumptive lifestyle, which is not free but requires cost 
from people as well as nature. She points out that the conventional ways of classifying 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is highly uni-dimensional in the sense that they do not take 
into account various important aspects in the relationship between people and nature, 
such as the exploitation of the earth and people, the environmental impact, and the 
sustainability of lifestyle. Furthermore, she argues, they imply that the rich is good and 
the poor is bad. As an environment activist, she emphasizes that the conventional ways 
of classifying countries into sŏnjin’guk or hujin’guk promote harmful effects on the 
world. Questioning the sustainability of rich countries’ ways of life, she argues that: 
 
[If sŏnjin’guk is regarded as a model,] it makes people consume like those in sŏnjin’guk 
and pursue that kind of society. I think this makes people have a desire of false image, 
and if so, the earth would collapse since the entire world has to live like that.  
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In this regard, she is concerned about that the environmentally unfriendly ways 
of life are romanticized as a universal vision of the world under the name of sŏnjin’guk. 
She points out that “as long as we use the term sŏnjin, that is, going ahead, it is seen as 
a goal for us to reach.” In relation to this, she criticizes that the concept of sŏnjin’guk 
puts focus merely on economic dimension, such as per capita income, ignoring diverse 
aspects of society. For her, the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk rather mask the 
diversity of society, and thus are not quite useful in understanding it. In this regard, she 
mentions that: 
 
As for indices, I don’t think we have to distinguish countries according to GDP. There 
can be diverse criteria, such as happiness index, the index for natural resources, or that 
for human resources. There can be diverse regional classifications according to those. 
Thus, I think the current way of classification is problematic because it distinguishes 
countries according to how much they are industrialized or how much their per capita 
incomes are.  
   
In those respects, she suggests an alternative classificatory way of countries, 
which takes into account the rich’s responsibility for environmental damages. 
According to this, she distinguishes between the responsible country (ch‘aegim kukga) 
and the victim country (p‘ihae kukga). These new concepts put focus on the 
responsibility of the rich country for the damages to people and nature. In this regard, 
she insists that rich countries have two main responsibilities: one is the responsibility of 
helping restore the damages of victimized people and the environment; and the other is 
the responsibility of reducing their consumption level and adjusting to a sustainable way 
of life. In this respect, her criticism of the concept of sŏnjin’guk does not remain a mere 
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criticism, but leads to an alternative model of evaluating societies or countries. In this 
regard, she states that: 
 
On the contrary, I would prefer to distinguish between the countries with much 
responsibility, which exploited more and used the earth more and thus have to pay more 
taxes, and the countries that need to be taken care of. 
 
In relation to this, she goes on to say that: 
 
As a certain model of overconsumption and enormous desire, which uses much and is 
quite speedy, is termed as sŏnjin’guk, people pursue it, rather than taking care of their 
environment. Then, I think the classification system should be changed. An alternative 
is the distinction between ANNEX 1 group and others in the Climatic Change 
Convention. I think this is useful because ANNEX 1 group means the countries that 
have to cut more as they are historically more responsible. This kind of distinction is 
necessary. I think it is appropriate to distinguish them in a way to give them 
responsibility for their destructions and exploitations as they started first.  
 
As for the characteristics of the responsible country, she mentions that: 
 
For example, there are three main types: the countries that caused wars; the countries 
that did a lot of imperial exploitations, creating many colonies; and, the countries that 
consumed lots of energy using a lot of natural resources.  
 
Her examples of the responsible country include the U.S., Japan, Germany, 
France, Spain, and Britain. It is interesting to see that these countries, which are likely 
to be idealized in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, are somewhat negatively represented in 
terms of their relationships with the environment and other countries. In particular, she 
harshly criticizes the U.S., the most responsible country, saying that: 
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The U.S. is not quite a model country in terms of such aspects as energy consumption. 
It seems that democracy is developed in terms of form but not in terms of contents. 
Welfare is not developed, and nor are the education system, human right situation, and 
energy consumption exploiting the earth. It doesn’t seem that any one thing [of the U.S.] 
can be a model.  
 
Confucian scholars show civilizational approaches to the concept of sŏnjin’guk. 
They tend to interpret it in terms of the limitation of modern civilization and to suggest 
alternative notions of it based upon Confucian thoughts. By defining it in different 
paradigms of civilization, they try to go beyond the conventional modern concept of 
sŏnjin’guk. In regard to this, a respondent argues that the current categorization of 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is useful only in terms of the paradigm of modern civilization 
led by the West. For him, modern civilization is characterized as developments of 
science, democracy, and capitalism. In this context, he argues that one can distinguish 
countries leading the characteristics of modern civilization, from those following or 
lagging behind them. In this regard, he says that: 
 
 [As for the distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk,] I agree, but just on the 
conditions of the so-called modern civilization. Modern civilization is discussed in 
terms of the developments of science, democracy, and capitalism, which are pursued by 
Western civilization. The development of capitalism or modern civilization is that of 
human-centered civilization. In the cultural atmosphere, in which nature is thought to be 
used for the benefit of human beings, the countries that faithfully pursue this trend of 
civilization are sŏnjin’guk, and those which are not faithful to that civilization are 
hujin’guk. Countries such as South Korea, which has been diligently catching up with 
that civilization as a model, are kaebal-dosang-guk.  
 
 However, he argues that the modern paradigm is coming to an end, witnessing 
its limitations mainly in terms of the environment and community. According to him, 
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modern civilization is a “human-centered and nature-destroying civilization.” Thus, the 
current classification system has come to be no longer useful. He emphasizes that it is 
time to consider a new version of sŏnjin’guk that is suitable to the upcoming 
postmodern world. In this sense, the status of sŏnjin’guk in the new paradigm is open to 
every country. As for the conditions for sŏnjin’guk in the new paradigm, he states that: 
 
Politically and socially, it is urgent to restore communalism from extreme individualism. 
Thus, it is important to establish a society based on moral social customs, instead of a 
legal society, in which people can trust one another.  
 
In relation to this, he goes on to say that: 
 
It is important that to what extent individual and communal values can be harmonized 
each other. For instance, it would raise a chance to become sŏnjin’guk to preoccupy 
things in terms of how much it is hybrid, and how much one can secure resources while 
protecting the environment, departing from the conventional notion that it is okay to 
drill oil and sell gasoline for cars.  
 
As for the urgent things that sŏnjin’guk of the modern paradigm should do for the new 
paradigm, he insists that: 
 
The most urgent problem for sŏnjin’guk is whether they can establish environment-
friendly and truly equal societies, recovering from the conditions they have made to 
become sŏnjin’guk so far, most important of which are the damages to the environment 
and the exploitative behaviors against hujin’guk. 
 
His criticism of modernity is reflected in his negative view on U.S. social 
systems, which are considered as a typical example of modern civilization. For him, the 
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contemporary status of the U.S. is far short of meeting the expectations of new 
postmodern civilization. Moreover, he thinks that it still sticks to the conventional 
notion of modernity, and does not quite realize its weaknesses in terms of new 
civilizational frameworks. In this respect, the U.S. is no longer sŏnjin’guk for him. As 
for this, he states that: 
 
Above all, the U.S. has a big problem in its social security system, and its problem of 
illegal immigrants, who occupy the bottom part of the country, is very serious. It shows 
an example of gesellschaft, which excessively pursues only individuals’ interests, 
without communal constraint and shared morality, as is seen in the recent problem in 
the financial system. It is also an example of making the world conflictive with its 
power, so the U.S. can no longer be sŏnjin’guk.    
 
The other Confucian respondent’s perspective is also based upon the criticism of 
the modern Eurocentric interpretive framework. This respondent shows a similarity 
with the above Confucian scholar in terms of envisioning a postmodern worldview. 
Regarding the modern worldview, he argues that: 
 
I’m continuously saying that the preexisting concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk 
should be changed. The previous concept of sŏnjin’guk is that which takes modernity as 
universal value, while what we are to present is the concept of sŏnjin based on the 
framework of postmodernity. Even if we can admit the value of such things as human 
right and equality, the general framework of modernity has reached the limit. [. . .] In its 
worldview, the mainstream is the mechanical worldview, or physical and value-free 
attitudes toward nature. Thus, it replaces god and nature with the absolutized human 
being. In order to absolutize the human being himself (or herself), they have had to 
create absolute reason, and have made the structure of utopia leading from alpha to 
omega. But, now, I think the concepts of sŏnjinhwa or sŏnjin munhwa (culture) based 
on those perceptions are coming to an end and being fragmented.  
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He also points out that the hierarchy between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, basically, 
reflects Eurocentric philosophy: 
 
The concept of sŏnjin itself is created by them [the West] and successfully inculcated to 
the people of the world. For example, such a person as Hegel employed that kind of 
dichotomous thought and it has been inherited from generation to generation in Western 
tradition. They have always distinguished us from others [. . .].   
 
For him, true sŏnjin’guk should promote the value of harmony among people, 
and between people and nature. In this regard, he suggests a need for “new frame-
making between [the human] and the universe.” He emphasizes that, in the new 
framework, one’s spirit should be restored to be harmonized with the spirit of the 
universe. He expects a great role of Confucianism in envisioning a postmodern world. 
In this sense, South Korea, which maintains lots of Confucian cultural heritages, is 
considered as having a big potential of contributing to the new world. In comparison, he 
thinks that the U.S. has many weaknesses in terms of the ability of maintaining spiritual 
harmony with the universe. In this sense, his perception of U.S. social systems is quite 
negative. He states that: 
 
The U.S. looks like a cut above us. It can be said that such aspects as established orders 
are a step above, but I don’t think it is the essence. I don’t think it is an appearance of 
true sŏnjin. This is because its civilization is established on the massacre of 80 million 
or 100 million Native Americans, and so are the thoughts and grounds upon which the 
civilization is to be established. When we think of the possibility of making great 
harmony, compensating for all of those aspects, they may naturally have to need 500 
times more efforts than us. I think it is a society maintained by gun and power, but not 
the one that guarantees human right, freedom, and equality that we anticipate. However, 
it looks like a high-level society on the surface because it has powerful laws and 
enforces them very strictly. On the contrary, law and compassion are mixed in our 
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society, which can be seen as a disorder by their perspective, but it may not be a 
disorder in reality. 
 
 
CHALLENGES TO THE CONCEPT OF HUJIN’GUK 
 
With regard to differentiation between the colonial and colonized worlds in the “age of 
empire,” Hobsbawm (1987:16) observes that we are dealing with “two sectors 
combined together into one global system: the developed and the lagging, the dominant 
and the dependent, the rich and the poor.” Even though this distinction explains some 
aspects of global political economic order, he points out its simplicity, saying that: 
 
Even this description is misleading. While the (smaller) first world, in spite of its 
considerable internal disparities, was united by history and as the common bearer of 
capitalist development, the (much larger) second world was united by nothing except its 
relations with, that is to say its potential or actual dependency on, the first. (Hobsbawm 
1987:16)  
 
In this statement, Hobsbawm raises a question of the representation of reality. As for the 
dichotomy of the first and second worlds, he points out that it tends to disregard the 
significant level of internal variation within each world, especially within the “much 
larger” second world.  
 In this regard, the concept of hujin’guk is a blanket term homogenizing various 
countries into a single category. In this sense, some respondents do not see much 
usefulness in such a concept as hujin’guk. Given the diversity of the world, they tend to 
argue that reality is too complicated to be contained in such a blanket term. In contrast, 
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some other respondents recognize the usefulness of a concept representing marginalized 
countries in the contemporary world order.   
 The respondents from minju noch‘ong tend to criticize the concept of hujin’guk 
with different dichotomous interpretive frameworks of the world, e.g., the First and the 
Third Worlds, or the imperial and colonized countries. They generally consider that the 
First World (or imperial country) has relatively more desirable conditions for human 
life, compared with the Third World (or colonized country). In this respect, they do not 
show much resistance to the ways of dichotomously representing the world. However, 
their understandings of the nature of the dichotomous world are different from the 
conventional ideas of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. In this regard, a respondent says that 
“anyway, it is a clear experiential reality that poverty and starvation are concentrated in 
[the Third World].” As for the Third World’s political situation, he mentions that 
“prolonged one-man rule, unstable domestic political situation, and the overthrow of 
formal democratic institutions are [the political characteristics of the Third World].” 
With regard to its social conditions, he insists that: 
 
It is also true in terms of phenomena that their consciousness is not awake. For example, 
education system is not established. It is clear that the education level is not high in 
terms of the infrastructure driving an industrial development, of which education is 
important for human infrastructure.  
 
The Third World’s undesirable situations, however, are interpreted in the 
context of unequal power relations within the world political economic order. As for the 
main causes of them, he pays attention to external and structural factors, rather than 
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internal ones. He blames the capitalist world’s systematic problem for the 
differentiation of the two worlds. With regard to the Third World’s conditions, he 
argues that: 
 
That may ultimately be because of the domination-subordination relationship within the 
world system. A certain country must have budget and capacity to invest in material or 
human infrastructures, but the domination-subordination relationship is making a 
difficult circumstance for it.  
 
Yet, this respondent does not see the Third World as helpless entity as is implied 
by the notion of hujin’guk. Rather, he considers that it has great potential to overcome 
the contradiction of the capitalist world system. In this regard, he states that: 
 
We are paying attention to the continuous movements occurring in the Third World to 
escape from the global domination-subordination relationship. For example, we are 
getting reports that the socialist governments in such Latin American countries as 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Cuba are employing policies for equality and social welfare, 
regardless of the changes of power. Thus, we are seeking for social and international 
alliance with them.  
 
The respondent from han’guk noch‘ong considers hujin’guk as countries in 
economically, socially, and politically undesirable conditions. As for the characteristics 
of hujin’guk, he states that “the food problem is serious, and the economic aspect and 
other aspects such as human right are not going along well.” As for an example of 
hujin’guk, he has picked up North Korea without hesitation. In this respect, his 
understanding of hujin’guk as undesirable countries is somewhat similar to mainstream 
ideas. However, he disputes conventional notions, which tend to consider hujin’guk as 
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responsible for its own misfortune. As for this, like other laborer respondents, he 
provides a relational perspective: that is, the conditions of hujin’guk are rather the 
results of historical colonial interventions. In this regard, he argues that: 
 
In fact, the influences of the so-called sŏnjin’guk such as Europe, which colonized and 
exploited the world first, have prevented the countries in Africa and the Third World 
from developing such things as education, economy, and people’s level. Without this 
structure, they might have been able to develop their own tribal or national cultures. 
Even if one sees them as hujin’guk and unenlightened from the globalized perspective, 
they might not have been like that from the beginning. They may look like hujin’guk 
and dictatorship because of the awkward graft of European capitalism on them. [. . .] In 
this respect, we cannot necessarily see them as the unenlightened or hujin’guk.  
 
On the other hand, he does not essentialize the classification of sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk either, but recognizes it as reflecting a certain group’s worldviews. In this 
respect, he shows a relative perspective on the categorization. As for this, he states that: 
 
For instance, let’s suppose there are a people that eat just two meals a day culturally and 
ecologically. From this people’s perspective, is the people eating three meals sŏnjin’guk, 
or rich people? No. They may be countries in need, because of starvation and the 
defenseless system to natural disaster. [. . .] But, I think what had those hujin aspects 
and systems grafted on them were European expansionism and colonialism.     
 
In relation to this, this respondent also insists that one can regard certain low-income 
countries as sŏnjin’guk insofar as they are enjoying their own social, political, economic, 
and cultural systems supporting people’s happiness and satisfaction of life. He gives an 
example of Costa Rica as a country being close to this case.  
The respondent from chŏnnong maintains a deconstructive position in regard to 
the concept of hujin’guk. For her, no country should be designated as hujin’guk, as the 
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term hujin’guk is used in a contemptuous manner regardless of reality. In relation to this, 
she attends to a discrepancy between the image and reality of countries that are referred 
to as hujin’guk. She points out that the designation of hujin’guk has an effect of 
blanketing certain countries with simple negative images. A serious consequence of it, 
she argues, is the unjust treatment of people in those countries, such as racial prejudice. 
In this respect, she holds a deconstructive attitude towards representations constructed 
by the concept of hujin’guk. In this regard, she mentions that: 
 
Being categorized into hujin’guk, a country is perceived as quite backward, 
underdeveloped, and dangerous. Because of this, a problem occurs when we go to that 
country, and even in Korea, we may ignore those who from that country, instead of 
treating them personally. I think, thus, that racial prejudice also derives, in some aspects, 
from the distinction between sŏnjin’guk, chungjin’guk, and hujin’guk.  
 
As for the discrepancy between the image and reality of certain countries typically 
referred to as hujin’guk, she argues that: 
 
I have been to Indonesia, which people tend to consider as a quite backward, 
underdeveloped country. However, even if they are different from us in terms of such 
things as sanitary thought, their national trait and their pride in their country are quite 
high. However, we seem to be caught in an idea that hujin’guk is lazy and so forth.    
 
The respondent from hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab also strongly rejects the concept of 
hujin’guk. Above all, for her, it is unjust to paint countries having suffered from 
colonialism with negative images of hujin’guk. In this respect, she prefers to use the 
concept of victimized countries, focusing on their historical sufferings from 
“responsible countries.” As for the definition of victimized country, she says that “they 
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are countries that were exploited much, and still being exploited, politically and 
economically.” The example of victimized country includes those typically considered 
as hujin’guk, such as countries in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern 
Europe. However, her perceptions of those countries are far different from those 
implied by the concept of hujin’guk.  
For her, it is the victimized country, rather than the responsible country, that 
shows much hope for the future of humanity. Therefore, she does not see such a 
hierarchy between the responsible and victimized countries as is suggested by the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Rather, she perceives the responsible country quite negative, 
while expecting much from the potentiality of the victimized country. She emphasizes 
that the victimized country appears somewhat weak in the surface but is not weak in 
reality and has a lot of potentiality. As such, she rejects the Eurocentric ways of 
envisioning the world. Furthermore, she argues that the victimized countries’ ways of 
life can be a reference point for the responsible country in terms of sustainability. With 
regard to this, she remarks that: 
 
[The victimized country] should not go toward the responsible country, the way of 
living dependent on so much consumption, so many roads, and so many cars. Rather, 
we have to train the responsible countries to reduce their consumptions to the half. 
Taking the responsibility means not only that they take care of others, but also that they 
reflect on themselves and reduce for themselves. [. . .] In those respects, many countries 
that should be taken care of can help the responsible countries.  
  
Confucian respondents tend to accept the concept of hujin’guk in a limited sense, 
that is, only meaningful in terms of the modern civilizational framework. Hence, they 
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argue that different definitions of hujin’guk are needed in emerging new postmodern 
paradigms. For a Confucian respondent, hujin’guk in new paradigm is a country that 
fails to adjust to newly emerging postmodern civilization, in which the values of 
community and the environment become very important. In other words, hujin’guk is a 
country that does not pay sufficient attention to the values of community and the 
environment. He argues that any country including those regarded as sŏnjin’guk in the 
modern paradigm can become hujin’guk in the new paradigm if they stick to old ideas 
and practices. He emphasizes that technology and development that are not harmonious 
with community and the environment have already reached their limits.  
The other Confucian respondent puts focus on the harmony of both material and 
spiritual aspects. In this respect, he argues that either the countries significantly lacking 
spiritual aspect or those significantly lacking material aspect can be hujin’guk. In this 
regard, China and the U.S. are the examples of hujin’guk, which he thinks are lacking 
the spirit of peace and harmony. As for this, he insists that: 
 
China is an example of hujin’guk. It has excessive pride and uselessly causes a feeling 
of uneasiness from its neighboring countries. I think the countries behaving like that are 
hujin’guk, and in this sense, the U.S. is quite a hujin’guk too.   
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN HUJIN’GUK AND 
SŎNJIN’GUK 
 
How wealth has become concentrated in some countries in the modern world has been a 
major question for development studies. There are generally two perspectives on this: 
one focuses on internal factors and the other on external factors. The representative 
school of the former is modernization theory, which tends to consider that the degree of 
wealth of society is mainly determined by the degree of modernization of its social, 
cultural, political, economic systems (Rostow 1960; Parsons 1971; Inkeles and Smith 
1974). In this perspective, the accumulation of wealth is closely related to 
modernization, which is indicated by society’s internal modern cultural values, such as 
affective neutrality, functional specificity, universalism, achievement, and 
individualism (Parsons 1971). As for this, Greig, Hulme, and Turner (2007:78) point 
out that “[m]odernization theory explained the prevalence of extreme poverty in poorer 
countries primarily as a consequence of endogenous forces.” An important political 
implication of the perspective focusing on “internal” factors is to blame the poor for 
their own “misfortune.” Upon this ground, modernization theory tends to set Western 
countries as a universal role model for poor countries to “catch up with” for their 
modernization and socio-economic development. 
A crucial weakness of this theoretical tendency lies in its disregard of power 
unbalances within and between societies and its underplay of historical contexts of 
global political economic inequalities (Webster 1984). In this respect, other perspectives 
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focus on external and structural factors in understanding unequal economic 
development among countries. For instance, dependency theory tends to argue that the 
“underdevelopment” of certain countries is the very cause for the “development” of 
some other countries within the structure of exploitative capitalist world economy 
(Frank 1989 [1966]). In this view, underdevelopment and development are the two sides 
of the same coin. Besides, theorists in this strand take into account colonial history as an 
important factor for the determination of the “developed” and “underdeveloped” 
(McMichael 2008). Thus, “underdeveloped” countries should not be blamed for their 
undesirable conditions, but the exploitative capitalist world economy that has 
historically been constructed through colonialism. 
Those ways of understanding global political economic inequality are reflected 
in the perceptions of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. The promoters of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk are more likely to focus on internal factors, while those who resist it tend to 
attend to external and structural factors in seeing political economic inequality among 
countries. The respondents from minju noch‘ong generally consider the appearance of 
global unbalance, either between the imperial and colonized countries or between the 
First and Third Worlds, as a result of the historical expansion of capitalism. Influenced 
by Marxist ideas, they assume that profit flows from the weak to the strong in the 
capitalist world, which enables the latter’s accumulation of wealth at the expense of the 
former. As for the appearance of the First World, for instance, a respondent states that: 
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I think it is structuralized through the appearance and expansion of capitalism, which 
established the world economic order and structured world capitalism, and various 
political and military incidents, such as World War I and II, associated with them.   
 
In this relational and structural perspective, the problem of poor country is not 
merely its own problem, but should be considered within the structure of the world 
capitalist system. Thus, the political economic development of the poor country is a 
matter of the structure of world capitalism. In this respect, the primary interest of the 
respondents from minju noch‘ong does not lie in a country’s upward mobility, e.g., 
from hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk. Rather, they pursue the restructuring of the system in a 
way to guarantee global justice and equality. In this regard, a respondent argues that: 
 
The labor union does not have interest in getting into the First World or sŏnjin’guk. The 
First World means the structuralized domination-subordination relationship, and 
sŏnjin’guk is the term frequently used by the government. Thus, progressive parties and 
labor unions are more interested in the improvement of the quality of people’s life [. . .].   
 
As for the need for just global system, the other respondent states that: 
 
The system that can guarantee human freedom, peace, happiness, and equality is based 
on the curtailment of working hours at the global level. And, the system that can 
guarantee basic income for everyone is needed because our material affluence is created 
not by an individual’s effort but by the shared efforts of humankind.  
 
As for global inequality, the perspective of the respondent from han’guk 
noch‘ong shows a similarity to other laborer respondents. In regard to the problem of 
poor countries, he attends to the exploitative world political economic order. His 
understanding of the relationship between the supposed sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is, 
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thus, basically relational and structural rather than sequential. In this regard, he 
questions, “If we are not to go back to ancient communalism, can the exploitative 
structure, the gap between the powerful country and the weak country, disappear in the 
global village?” As for the colonial interventions of hujin’guk, he points out that: 
 
African countries may be good to peacefully enthrone their leaders as they did in the 
past, [. . .] and to live by themselves with their own resources even though they are poor. 
[. . .] The problem is whether the global structure allows it. The structure of 
expansionism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century still exists until now. 
Africa is still playing a role as a resource supplier.   
 
The respondent from kanong also traces the contemporary global inequality to 
historical exploitations committed by colonial powers. He disputes a mainstream 
perspective that it is a matter of rational thoughts and scientific attitudes, arguing that 
“it was the logic of power” and that “they dominated because they had guns and 
weapons, which were different from rationality.” On the ground of this, he emphasizes 
wealthy countries’ historical debts to poor countries. He thinks that poor countries may 
need rich countries’ help in order to escape from extreme poverty. As for this, he argues 
that: 
 
I think it is desirable that as Europeans anyway committed the historical crime of 
colonial domination, they should give much help to the countries suffering from 
extreme poverty for an apology at least. It may not be right for them to ignore those 
countries. Rich countries, such as Europe, killed a lot of people by causing two world-
scale wars and scrambling for colony, and accumulated a lot of wealth through colonial 
policies. Thus, I think they have to make efforts to give it back so that poor countries 
can escape from extreme poverty at least.   
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The respondent from hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab also considers that the current 
situations of victimized countries are related to the responsible countries’ colonial 
interventions in the past. In this respect, she argues for the responsible countries’ duties 
to support the victimized countries’ efforts to make their own sustainable social models. 
With regard to this, she says that: 
 
If they were not invaded, and their cultures, civilizations, or cultures were intact, I think 
different societies might have been constructed through their own development 
processes. But, they were invaded and changed by others, so their development 
processes have been slow and behind because the processes were not fitting to them.   
 
 However, as an environment activist, she rejects the idea that poor countries’ 
future is to be the appearances of contemporary rich countries. Negatively perceiving 
the ways of life of responsible countries, she does not see the transition resembling 
them as desirable. For her, the transition to excessively consumptive society is not what 
humankind should pursue. In this context, she emphasizes that it is the time for both 
responsible and victimized countries to think about sustainable ways of living reflecting 
each country’s own historical and cultural backgrounds. For this, she argues that any 
unjust intervention of a certain country should be prohibited. In relation to this, she 
presents a quite optimistic view on humanity. As for the people’s capacity of managing 
a good society, she states that: 
 
I think that all human beings would like to live happy and rationally, regardless of race 
and language. [. . .] I think any small society, which has more than thirty members, has 
the capacity of [making a good society for itself].  
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While envisioning emerging postmodern civilization, a Confucian respondent 
recognizes the achievements of modern civilization, such as democratic political system 
and material prosperity. In this respect, he positively evaluates the historical processes 
of modernization. He considers that the achievement of some crucial aspects of 
modernity is a virtual precondition for envisioning the new paradigm of civilization. 
Thus, his discussion of postmodern paradigm is rather relevant to those which have 
already achieved some important characteristics of modernity. In this respect, he 
perceives hujin’guk as a country that has first to make efforts to come up with a certain 
degree of modernity, instead of thinking about postmodern paradigm. In this regard, he 
argues that: 
 
[. . .] political democracy is the biggest problem for hujin’guk. I think the developments 
of science and the economy are associated with political democratization, so the 
developments of science and the economy are not possible without political 
democratization.   
 
He also thinks that the countries categorized as hujin’guk in the modern 
paradigm will go through some difficulty in adjusting to the new paradigm. For the 
development of society, he emphasizes the capacity of adjusting to historical 
circumstances. In this respect, hujin’guk is the country that has fallen behind the 
modern trend. Thus, for him, it is very hard for hujin’guk to envision the next 
postmodern civilizational phase. As for the causes of the historical lag of those 
countries, he mentions that: 
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For example, in the case of East Asia, [. . .] they could not develop a culture valuing not 
only ethics but also reason, as modern Westerners did. As they paid too much focus on 
ethics, and looked at the human from that perspective, [. . .] they oppressed for 
themselves the possibility of developing a modern mechanical scientific civilization. 
The reason for underdevelopment lay in the failure in self-transformation toward a new 
civilization based on rationalism discovered by the West.  
 
As for the secret of the “rise of the West,” he focuses on internal factors, such as 
the emancipation of human reason. In regard to this, he says that: 
 
It is due to civilizations after modern period, as they say, for example, the individual 
was freed from authoritarianism, human right and freedom were guaranteed leading to 
democracy, and, the new economic system of capitalism was developed based on the 
competition among individuals. And, they accumulated wealth by developing natural 
resources and technology. These are factors for becoming sŏnjin’guk.  
 
 
CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL SELF-IDENTITY AND RESISTANCES TO THE 
SŎNJINHWA PROJECT 
 
A way of interpreting the world is closely related to the construction of identities. In 
different discursive frameworks, one’s identity becomes differently defined. As for 
South Korea’s national identity, the interviewees suggest different identities from those 
promoted by the conventional ideas of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. Some of the 
respondents try to put South Korea’s national identity in different discursive 
frameworks. Others are reluctant to give a clear identity to Korea on the basis of their 
criticisms of any uni-dimensional classification of countries. 
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 Paying attention to the domination-subordination relationship of the capitalist 
world political economic order, a respondent from minju noch‘ong insists that Korea is 
a kaebal-dosang-guk (developing country) posited between the First and Third Worlds. 
For him, South Korea does not reach the First World in terms of “power to control the 
world economy.” The other respondent from this labor union says that Korea is panje-
pansikmin-guk (semi-imperial and semi-colonized country). For him, Korea has many 
characteristics of the imperial country given its exploitative behaviors against colony-
type countries on the global stage. Yet, he points out that the domestic systems of 
distributing wealth acquired from those behaviors are not like those of the imperial 
country. That is to say, while the accumulated profit is distributed to laborers in the 
imperial country, making them an accomplice in the exploitation of colony, much of it 
does not go to laborers in Korea. He adds that this creates conflictive social atmosphere 
in Korean society, which is not a characteristic of the imperial country either. 
 Yet, the majority of the respondents are somewhat reluctant to give a simple 
national identity to South Korea. For them, there can be various national identities in 
multiple forms according to a variety of criteria. Refusing to use a uni-dimensional 
criterion in identifying countries, they pay attention to different historical and cultural 
contexts, in which each country has maintained itself.   
As the attitudes towards the concept of sŏnjin’guk are different, so are the 
attitudes towards the concept of sŏnjinhwa (achieving advancement). Even though the 
phrase of sŏnjinhwa is popular in mainstream discourses, there is no general consensus 
on what the state of sŏnjinhwa is. In this situation, the interviewees present different 
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thoughts and views on it, reflecting their own social and political economic positions 
and interests. Many of them tend to consider it as a euphemism for various 
governmental policies promoted mainly for the ruling groups’ interests.  
The respondents from minju noch‘ong tend to see the term sŏnjinhwa as strongly 
reflecting capitalists’ interests. They argue that various policies of sŏnjinhwa are no 
more than the disguise of the oppressions of laborers. As for this, a respondent argues 
that: 
 
For example, all the policies called sŏnjinhwa in the labor area are just for oppressing 
labor unions. The sŏnjinhwa of the labor-capital relationship is all about deregulations 
reflecting capitalists’ positions.   
 
The respondents from this labor union argue that the phrase of sŏnjinhwa 
promoted by the contemporary Lee Myung-Bak administration is even short of 
following the practices of those typically referred to as sŏnjin’guk. Far from many good 
policies and systems adopted by those countries, a respondent argues, “What the Korean 
government calls sŏnjinhwa are mostly those selected policies matching its interests, 
wrapped up under the name of sŏnjinhwa.” They contend that people who get most of 
the government’s sŏnjinhwa policies are those in the ruling class. This kind of negative 
perceptions of sŏnjinhwa is shared by the respondents from other organizations. Many 
of them relate it to the global trend of neoliberal policies. A respondent from farmers’ 
organization argues that the sŏnjinhwa project promoted by the government “seems to 
consider the U.S. as the model,” which he considers as a main promoter of 
neoliberalism around the globe.     
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 Some point out the ambiguity of the concept of sŏnjinhwa. The respondent from 
hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab points out that sŏnjinhwa has no substantial thing but is just a 
phrase. She argues that “[the government] uses the term sŏnjinhwa without substantial 
things, and thus people think of it differently from one another.” In this respect, she 
argues that the substance of sŏnjinhwa should be discussed first. She mentions that: 
 
I think there have first to be discussion and consensus on which direction the society 
wants to go to. The substance of sŏnjinhwa should be discussed first: whether 
sŏnjinhwa is the per capita income of $20,000; whether it is free education; whether it is 
making all regular employees; whether it is making the pollution level of Seoul below a 
certain level; or whether it is certain level of green belt ratio.  
 
Based upon the criticism of the governmental notion of sŏnjinhwa, she suggests 
her own concept of true sŏnjinhwa. She argues that four basic elements closely related 
to people’s quality of life should be preconditions for sŏnjinhwa: human right, welfare, 
education, and the responsibility for the earth. As for true sŏnjinhwa, she states that: 
 
I think the basic thing is to resolve the problems of human right, welfare, and education. 
The education problem is to make free education: that is, letting anyone study, who 
would like to study. The human right problem is to guarantee all rights for residence, 
food, education, and voting and participation in politics regardless of sex, age, and 
nationality. The welfare problem is to give enough social support for someone’s care if 
he (or she) has a problem. [. . .] If one more thing is to be added, we have to feel a 
responsibility for the earth.   
 
The Confucian respondents present their visions of sŏnjinhwa based upon the 
perceptions of the limitations of the modern paradigm. They argue that Confucian 
values have much to contribute to true sŏnjinhwa. In this perspective, South Korea 
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should look more inside than outside in order for true sŏnjinhwa. As for true sŏnjinhwa, 
a respondent raises a need for assimilating to nature: 
 
Any administration has had the goal of building sŏnjin’guk. However, what is called as 
sŏnjin is, in fact, to resemble the order of nature. It is a true ideal society in terms of 
Asian thoughts to make all people and lives have their own natures. As humans have 
various types, it is ideal to guarantee their own colors matching their types and to make 
all things flourish in their styles. Then, it is clear what sŏnjin is in our society. It is to 
make a balance by bracing up those who are living very poor while distributing from 
those who have too much and elated. Current policies do not seem to match this.  
 
 
RESISTANCES TO EUROCENTRISM 
 
As Eurocentric ideas are implicit in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, resistances to it are 
related to the criticism of Eurocentrism. Many interviewees criticize the assumptions 
and characteristics of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in terms of the critiques of 
Eurocentrism. In the context of criticizing sŏnjinhwa as well as the classificatory system 
of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, a respondent from minju noch‘ong argues that sŏnjinhwa 
and sŏguhwa (Westernization) are virtually the same. By identifying the sŏnjinhwa 
project with Westernization, he undermines the authority of the concept of sŏnjinhwa 
and various policies promoted under its name. In particular, he criticizes the 
contemporary Lee Myung-Bak administration’s sŏnjinhwa slogan as the same thing as 
Westernization, especially Americanization.  
On the other hand, the other respondent from this labor union pays attention to 
that the contemporary sŏnjinhwa slogan does not even reflect the merits of Western 
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societies. Regarding European societies as advanced over Korean society in terms of 
labor conditions, this respondent considers that Westernization or sŏguhwa in the literal 
sense can bring some merits to Korean society. However, for him, contemporary 
sŏnjinhwa policies are merely the biased selections of various Western labor policies, 
which mainly serve the capitalists’ interests. With regard to this, he states that: 
 
[Sŏnjinhwa and sŏguhwa] are very different. [. . .] Europe is totally different [from 
Korea]. In terms of various policies against laborers and basic labor rights, there are 
numerous differences between the two. Even though our situation is different, they say 
globalization or global standard as if foreign countries have similar policies. Basic facts 
are wrong [. . .].   
 
While respecting Western societies’ labor conditions and quality of life, this 
respondent rejects Eurocentric conceptualization of the world. In regard to Eurocentric 
ideas implicit in the concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, he argues that: 
 
What we call the sŏnjin’guk model is Europe or the U.S., but there are no such 
barbarian countries as them, considering what they did in World War I and II. In this 
respect, how can they be sŏnjin’guk? The basis of that barbarism derives from their 
basic worldview, historical perspective, and epistemology. The roots are the philosophy 
and historical perspective of modern enlightenment thought. [. . .] Our historical view 
and philosophy have something to drive evil away, and in this perspective, we are not 
hujin’guk. Even though we were colonized, we did not kill people or something. We 
may not call it as hujin’guk. If following the Eurocentric historical view, we are 
necessarily to make those mistakes to humanity.    
 
The respondent from han’guk noch‘ong expresses similar opinions to those of 
the laborers above. He criticizes the classificatory system of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk as 
Eurocentric in the sense that it mainly reflects some limited indices of economic 
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performances, such as GDP. Resisting to this kind of Eurocentric criteria, he tries to 
suggest a different framework of interpreting the world. In this regard, he appreciates 
the value of pursuing happiness. As for some countries’ pursuits of happiness, such as 
the Bhutanese Gross National Happiness (GNH), he argues that: 
 
It is desirable. We don’t have this kind of concept at all. [. . .] As we have reached a 
certain level of living standard, it is the time to pay attention to it. [. . .] I had a good 
breakfast this morning, but was not happy to see homeless people in the subway. Then, 
even if I ate five thousand won-value breakfast this morning, I would be happier to eat 
four thousand won-value meal in order to provide one thousand won-value meal to 
them. In this way, we have to make a discourse that values a situation in which we feel 
happiness together.   
 
Other respondents show attitudes of appreciating Korean traditions and Asian 
values over the supposed Western values. On this ground, they strongly oppose to 
sŏguhwa and advocate a need for searching for Korea’s own identity rooted in good 
traditions and cultural heritages. The respondent from chŏnnong, for instance, states that: 
 
Sŏguhwa is quite much processed in terms of consciousness or culture. It has been 
considered as the correct answer. [. . .] As [the West is] regarded as the correct answer 
and something to follow in order not to be backward, Western dietary habits and 
cultures have been considerably adopted.  
 
While being cautious about blindly following Western social systems, she suggests a 
need for learning from various countries including those regarded as hujin’guk.  
The respondent from kanong considers that Western countries have good social 
and political economic systems. Reflecting farmers’ position, he argues that many of 
them value agriculture and try to nurture it as key national industry. For him, they 
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attend much to their traditional values. He argues that this situation is in contrast with 
Korean society that does not much appreciate its traditions and cultural heritages. In this 
regard, he raises a need for Koreans to recognize the value of agriculture that is rooted 
in Korean tradition. He considers that the mainstream way of classifying sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk does not respect each society’s unique traditions and cultures. With regard to 
this, he states that: 
 
It is undesirable to schematically distinguish between sŏnjin’guk, chungjin’guk, and 
hujin’guk. Every society has its own culture and tradition, and there are countries that 
maintain their own national communities. It is not desirable to schematically distinguish 
in a way that one is sŏnjin’guk and others are chungjin’guk or hujin’guk because they 
are economically and militarily weak.  
 
The respondent from hwan’gyŏng yŏnhab is very critical of Korea’s losing the 
merits of its own traditions and becoming “Westernized.” This reflects her perspective 
that the Western mass-consumption society is not the answer but a disaster for the world. 
She emphasizes that each society needs to develop its own sustainable model reflecting 
its own cultural values. In this respect, she highly appreciates various forms of life 
around the world, rather than a universal convergent model. In this regard, she argues 
that the Bhutanese concept of happiness can be usefully applied to Korean society. In 
her words, “It is applicable. It is not that much money necessarily means happiness. 
Sometimes people seem to know that, but some other times they don’t seem to know 
that.” She regards “cold-hearted” rationality as both merits and demerits of Western 
societies. For her, many aspects of Korean tradition, such as communalism deriving 
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from agricultural culture, are more useful for imagining the future of Korean society, 
than the “cold-hearted” Western values.  
Seeing the limitations of modern civilization led by the West, the Confucian 
scholars envision different postmodern civilizations. As for the limitations of modern 
Western civilization in comparison with Asian civilization, a respondent states that: 
 
They, Western civilization, don’t value the universality of humankind. Religiously, they 
have the same intolerance as Christianity has. Thus, even if they achieved 
democratization, they invaded Africa, Latin America, and Asia. This is the limit of 
Western civilization. That is, it is the limit of Western civilization to have such a 
gimcrack cause of spreading Christianity. Confucianism is not like that. In 
Confucianism, it is inconceivable to destroy other civilizations in order to spread 
Confucianism. If there was no invasion from Western civilization, Confucianism might 
have established a civilization of new paradigm by far more mild and peaceful methods 
in its way, although it might have been slow.  
 
In this respect, the attitude to regard Western societies as the ideal is criticized 
as being confined within the worldview of modern paradigm. The Confucians also 
argue that Asian ideas including Confucianism have much to contribute to building new 
paradigms. Thus, they argue that Koreans need to pay more attention to their cultural 
heritages. This is also a ground upon which Eurocentrism is criticized. A respondent 
argues that Koreans’ Eurocentrism has been promoted by intellectuals during the post-
colonial era, who failed to ground in the root of Korean traditions when adopting 
European ideas. He argues that this is a main reason why South Korea has been 
undergoing spiritual wandering regardless of its world-scale economy. With regard to 
this, he points out that: 
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In fact, spiritual wandering and conflict still remain for intellectual leaders as well as 
the general public. [. . .] Not having spiritual trunk, we are continuously wandering 
even with the 10th largest economic size in the world.   
 
As for Korea’s “Westernization” and the way of classifying countries according to 
material criteria, he mentions that: 
 
It [Korea] has become a society in which one puts priority on his (her) own interests. 
This is the ultimate goal of the Western society. Accomplishment is first, and for the 
accomplishment, one should survive as the fittest. As the survival of the fittest is 
considered as the law of nature, it does not need any sympathy for the people dying. 
Then, only the sharp, scary, and thorough accomplishment is valued in society, like a 
lion snatches a prey, while such things as mutual care, sympathy, and sharing are put 
behind.   
 
This respondent argues that the pursuit of ideal society should be rooted in each 
society’s cultural context. In this respect, Confucianism is not the idea of passé but of 
the present and the future. He emphasizes that Confucianism has many aspects to 
contribute to overcoming modernity. In this regard, he argues that: 
 
It has many alternative structures to overcome modernity. For example, it sees the 
universe as an organic relationship, not a conflictive one. It has a framework in which 
the universe as the big universe and I as the small universe can be harmonized to create 
something great.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined that the basic assumptions and ideas of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk are far differently understood and contested by people in counter-hegemonic 
groups. As for the dualistic classification of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, all of the 
respondents refuse to accept it as is suggested by the conventional ideas of the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk. People from labor unions tend to criticize the classificatory system for 
reflecting the exploiters’ values and interests in the capitalist world order. Influenced by 
Marxist ideas, they suggest different categories for understanding the world, which 
reflect power relations in the world political economic order. In these perceptual 
frameworks, the countries typically referred to as sŏnjin’guk are rather represented as 
imperial countries or First World countries, implying their exploitative characters in the 
capitalist world order.  
Some respondents disapprove of the classification on the grounds that it does not 
reflect the diversity of the world. These people argue that we should not make a 
hierarchy among societies or countries according to uni-dimensional criteria. They point 
out that a society has various cultural and historical aspects that are not appropriately 
taken into account by the simple dualistic categorization. In their frameworks, there is 
no such a country that is to be constantly referred to as sŏnjin’guk or hujin’guk. Rather, 
the distinction between the two becomes highly blurred, and a certain country can 
become sŏnjin’guk in some aspects and hujin’guk in other aspects, if one should use 
such terms. Some of the respondents resist to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk by suggesting 
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alternative ways of classification, such as responsible countries and victimized countries. 
Others show inclinations to deconstruct the hierarchical world represented by the 
sŏnjin’guk - hujin’guk system. 
Confucian scholars tend to present other interpretive frameworks of the world, 
which can make up for the limitations of the modern paradigm. Envisioning new 
postmodern paradigms, they criticize the basic assumptions of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk as mainly reflecting the values of the modern paradigm, which tends to 
appropriate nature and humans. On this ground, they suggest that true sŏnjin’guk in new 
paradigms should reflect values of harmony between nature and humans, and argue that 
Confucianism and Asian values can contribute much to the building of a new world that 
is based upon postmodern values and worldviews.  
 Different understandings of the sŏnjin’guk - hujin’guk classification leads to 
different national self identity and different national vision. As for national identity, 
those who suggest alternative classificatory systems give South Korea certain national 
identities, such as “in between the First World (or imperial country) and the Third 
World (or colonized country).” However, many respondents are reluctant to give South 
Korea one stable identity as their perceptual frameworks are far more complicated than 
the dualistic classification. The respondents also challenge the project of sŏnjinhwa 
promoted mainly by ruling groups. Many point out that the contents of the project are 
somewhat unclear as the picture of sŏnjin’guk is not clearly presented by its promoters. 
In this situation, the policies promoted under the name of sŏnjinhwa are criticized as 
mainly reflecting the interests of ruling groups. Many of them also point out that the 
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sŏnjinhwa project is no more than the promotion of neoliberalism in Korea in the 
neoliberal globalization trend, which oppresses subordinated groups’ interests.   
 This chapter has also examined that the criticisms of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
reflect resistances to Eurocentric interpretive frameworks of the world. Many 
respondents pay attention to that the basic assumptions of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
reflect the values, worldviews, and interests of the West. They argue that as its 
classificatory system uses the criteria Western countries have strengths, these countries 
tend to be idealized and come to enjoy cultural hegemony. As a reaction to Western 
cultural hegemony, many respondents emphasize the importance of Korean traditions 
and cultural heritages. Rather than positing South Korea in the Eurocentric framework 
and envisioning its future according to it, they argue that the country should develop 
their own values and worldviews reflecting their traditions and cultures. Many 
respondents also point out that this would contribute to the building of a better world.  
 This chapter has shown that the basic assumptions and characteristics of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk are contested by various social groups. However, those 
contestations and resistances do not yet appear in a form of active movements of 
presenting alternative frameworks. In this situation, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk still 
enjoys a hegemonic status. The problems of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, however, are 
well acknowledged in the resistant voices expressed at the personal level. In that 
knowledge reflects power, the power of developmentalism in South Korea may not 
change unless the power of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk changes. In this respect, various 
ideas and thoughts on the discourse of sŏnjin’guk should be exposed to public 
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discussions so that the mainstream worldview can reflect more diverse values and 
interests within the country. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE WEST AND EAST ASIAN IDENTITIES: A COMPARISON OF THE 
DISCOURSES OF KOREAN SŎNJIN’GUK, JAPANESE NIHONJINRON, AND 
CHINESE NEW NATIONALISM 
 
Korea, China, and Japan share in common that their onsets of early modernization 
projects were motivated by the unexpected external shock, that is, Western countries’ 
expansions in the “age of empire” (Hobsbawm 1987). Encountering the threat from 
outside, they were desperate for strengthening their economic and military powers in 
order not to be taken over by the “barbarians.” They suddenly faced a paradoxical 
situation where they had to participate in the game set by the West in order to resist it 
(Sakai 1989). Thus, the radical transformations of society were attempted from above in 
the three East Asian countries. Among others, this type of modernizations can be 
conceptualized as that which is provoked by “a sudden external threat” (Therborn 1995).  
 Actual modernization processes in the three countries were, however, quite 
different from one another in their visions and practices (W. Kim 2005; Paek 2009). In 
the early period, Korean and Chinese self modernization efforts were constantly 
interrupted by the imperial powers’ intervention, whereas that of Japanese took 
advantage of the colonization of its neighboring countries. The divergence of the paths 
to modernity between three countries is also notable in the post-colonial era. While 
Korean and Japanese modernization processes can be characterized as capitalist ones, 
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the Chinese process is a socialist one. Therefore, the Chinese modernization process 
brought about very different forms of modernity from those of Korea and Japan.  
Closely intertwined with these different historical circumstances are the 
appearance of different national identities, worldviews, and subjectivities of modernity 
among them. With regard to this, I observe that there have appeared notably different 
discourses on national self identity, modernity, and perception of the West in Korea, 
Japan, and China. In particular, I pay attention to that the discourses of Korean 
sŏnjin’guk, Japanese nihonjinron, and Chinese new nationalism have respectively 
constructed dominant national identities and worldviews in recent decades. While the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk is developmental discourse and, thus, constructs national 
identity in developmental terms, nihonjinron demonstrates an ethnocentric discourse 
expressing a cultural type of national identity. In comparison, Chinese new nationalism 
shows a cultural and ideological type of discourse. Despite these differences, I consider 
that these discourses have represented one of the most dominant national identities and 
worldviews, especially vis-à-vis the West, in those countries in recent years.48 Given 
that these discourses have exerted significant influence on those countries’ 
                                                 
48 It is interesting to see that the terms sŏnjin’guk (先進國) and hujin’guk (後進國) are also used in China 
and Japan. The terms consisting of Chinese letters are differently read in Japan as senshinkoku and 
koushinkoku, and in China as xian jin guo and hou jin guo respectively. In this respect, the comparison of 
the use of the same terms 先進國 and 後進國 among the three countries would also be useful. It would 
show the commonalities and individualities in the construction of national identities and worldviews, 
reflected in the words commonly used by them. For instance, the Japanese use of 先進國 is somewhat 
different from that of Koreans in the sense that it represents their own national identity as “advanced” 
country vis-à-vis other backward countries, e.g., ASEAN countries. As such, the concept of 先進國 refers 
to the self for the Japanese, while it implies the advanced “other” for Koreans. There is also a difference 
in the frequency of the public use of the terms: among the three countries, for instance, the term 先進國 
seems to be the most popularly used in Korea. However, as this study’s focus is on the countries’ national 
identities vis-à-vis the West, I consider that the comparison of the discourses of sŏnjin’guk, nihonjinron, 
and new nationalism is more appropriate at this stage.   
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contemporary global and regional politics, it is useful to comparably examine those 
discourses in order to understand discursive backgrounds underlying the East Asian 
countries’ different collective responses to global and regional phenomena and trends.  
In those respects, this chapter aims to examine similarities and dissimilarities in 
the three East Asian countries’ subjectivities of modernities and their constructions of 
national identities vis-à-vis the West, reflected in the discourses of sŏnjin’guk, 
nihonjinron, and new nationalism. By investigating differences in interpretations and 
representations of national self and the world, this study intends to broaden a 
comparative understanding of notable collective sentiments appearing in the three 
neighboring Asian countries. Main research questions are: how do they construct their 
self national identities vis-à-vis the West; how is the West, the most significant other in 
their modernization processes, represented in the discourses; and how do the discourses 
reflect the countries’ awareness of modernities? 
This study consists of four main sections. The first section examines the 
historical backgrounds of the rise of the discourses of sŏnjin’guk, nihonjinron, and new 
nationalism, and their characteristics in general. The second section investigates the 
commonalities and differences in the perception of the West reflected in the three 
discourses. The third section focuses on the three discourses’ different constructions of 
self national identity. And the last section explores the discourses in terms of the 
subjectivities of modernities. 
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THE DISCOURSES OF SŎNJIN’GUK, NIHONJINRON, AND NEW NATIONALISM  
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
 
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a system of knowledge that is constructed around the 
concepts of sŏnjin’guk (advanced country) and hujin’guk (backward country). One of its 
notable characteristics is a hierarchical distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk, in 
which the former has the latter as its alienated other. Naturalizing the hierarchy between 
the two central concepts, it has given justification to Korea’s efforts to “catch up with” 
sŏnjin’guk. In this way, it has played a crucial role in supporting Korean developmental 
regime. It has also provided dominant interpretive frameworks of national identities and 
worldviews for South Koreans in their national developmental processes.  
The distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is akin to the Eurocentric 
developmental distinction between the “developed” and “developing” (or 
“underdeveloped”) (Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009). In fact, 
Western countries are virtually referred to as sŏnjin’guk. In this respect, the discourse 
strongly takes Eurocentric bearings. In the process of national development, South 
Koreans projected their positive and negative developmental values into the concepts of 
sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk respectively. In this sense, the discourse is Koreans’ own 
construction reflecting the specificity of their historical developmental experiences, 
rather than a faithful reflection of reality “out there.” As an ideal image, sŏnjin’guk has 
played a central role in guiding the transformation of the Korean society, e.g., as an 
urgent national goal and an important reference point.  
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The formation of the sŏnjin’guk discourse coincides with the launch of the Park 
Chung-Hee regime in the early 1960s. Seizing power through a military coup d’etat, the 
Park regime sought for its legitimacy from the achievement of “choguk kŭndaehwa” 
(the modernization of motherland). The Park regime’s pursuit of aggressive 
modernization and rapid economic growth was justified by the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, 
which supposed a somewhat linear universal path of development with sŏnjin’guk 
ahead and Korea (hujin’guk) behind. The global hegemonic discourse of 
developmentalism and modernization theory, which echoed U.S. hegemony, deeply 
influenced the discursive formation of sŏnjin’guk. As the modernization project tended 
to seek for the cause of the supposed backwardness of Korea from its traditional values 
and lifestyles, the efforts for radical transformation of Korean society were legitimated, 
such as the saemaŭl undong (New Village Movement) that aimed for the dramatic 
change in both material and spiritual conditions (Choe 1976). 
 In the discourse, the West as sŏnjin’guk plays as a major referent with which 
Korea should catch up in the near future.49 The discourse tends to assume various social, 
cultural, and political economic ideas and practices of the West as advanced and 
universal, and, thus, directly applicable to the Korean situation. Moreover, they are 
frequently considered as what Korea has to adopt to become sŏnjin’guk. For instance, 
                                                 
49 Korea’s attitudes towards the West have been quite friendly throughout the postwar period. This is in 
some ways related to its historical experience of the Cold War in the wake of the Korean War, in which 
Korean elites regarded the West, especially the U.S., as the supporter of their country. In its 
modernization process, Korean ruling elites have developed somewhat strong mental and material 
connections with foreign powers. As for this, Kim (2009:11) notes that “for the past 100 years, Korean 
society maintained its ruling structure of three party alliances, which combined political and economic 
ruling groups with foreign powers.”  
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Korea’s neoliberal reformation in various fields in recent years under such slogans as 
sŏnjinhwa (achieving advancement) and segyehwa (globalization) demonstrates its 
willingness to adopt the global neoliberal trend led by major Western countries.  
 Nihonjinron (theories of Japaneseness) is a historical concept reflecting the 
Japanese deep-rooted awareness of their “uniqueness” and “difference.” During the 
Tokugawa period, for instance, the kokugaku (national learning) school tried to 
differentiate Japanese culture from that of China by emphasizing the Japanese 
emperor’s place and indigenous Japanese cultural custom. While the kokugaku school 
promoted the “uniqueness” of Japan vis-à-vis China, then significant other, the 
contemporary discourse of nihonjinron appeared in a little different historical context, 
mainly as a response to Western cultural hegemony.  
For a while after World War II, Japan had to struggle with its identity problem 
associated with “symbolic vacuum” as formerly absolutized national symbols lost their 
legitimacy and authority after the defeat in the war. As Befu (2001:87) notes, “With 
defeat, Japan was no longer able to exploit effectively the most important symbols 
expressing national identity and nationalism,” such as “the imperial institution, the 
‘national’ flag, the ‘national’ anthem, the ‘national’ emblem, and national monuments 
and state rituals.” Japanese identity discourse has alternated between positive and 
negative ones according to geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. When such factors are 
considered as favorable to Japan, positive cultural nationalism prevails and vice-versa 
(Befu 2001). The nihonjinron discourse reflects Japanese self-identification in a 
positive light, shored up by their supposed economic success and the achievement of the 
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high level of consumer society in the 1960s and 1970s. With nihonjinron, the Japanese 
began to promote their self-confidence, and went further to argue that Japanese society 
and culture were not only unique and different from those of the West but even superior 
to them. 
 Nihonjinron promulgates the uniqueness of Japanese society and culture. The 
whole genre of nihonjinron deals with “Japan’s identity, attempting to establish Japan’s 
uniqueness and to differentiate Japan from other cultures” (Befu 2001:2). It is based 
upon some mythical notions claiming to the uniqueness and homogeneity of Japan. For 
instance, imagining an abstractly enclosed community within the national boundary, it 
asserts that “the Japanese people are a homogeneous ‘race’ and possess a homogeneous 
culture [. . .]” (ibid.:68). Japanese uniqueness is considered as deeply related to their 
homogeneity, and thus “Japaneseness” is assumed as inherent in people, culture, 
language as well as land (or geographical traits) in themselves. In this way, it tries to 
create an essentialistic link between the supposed national characteristics, and cultural 
and geographical conditions of Japan. It argues, for instance, that “the Japanese 
language is natively spoken only by Japanese in Japan” (ibid.:35). 
Regardless of its ultra-ethnocentric implication, nihonjinron has been one of the 
most prominent discourses on Japanese modern self-identity and worldviews. It has 
served for Japanese conservative ruling elites as a discourse for the management of 
country, society, and organizations by appropriating the values of collectivity, loyalty, 
and harmony. In this respect, nihonjinron has played a role as a “kind of ideology” 
associated with the “interests of the ruling social class or stratum” (Yoshino 1992:185). 
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In relation to this, Befu (2001:79) points out that nihonjinron plays a political role as a 
“model for behavior” for the Japanese. The building of nihonjinron as a hegemonic 
discourse was explicitly and implicitly supported by Japan studies-related institutions, 
such as Japan Foundation and the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 
one of whose main missions was known as disseminating and propagating nihonjinron 
(Befu 1993).  
 Unlike the capitalist development of the two neighboring countries, China chose 
a totally different path of socialist one. In Lin’s (2006) terms, China took “revolutionary 
modernity” that combined nationalism, socialism, and developmentalism. With regard 
to this, she notes that “[n]ationalism denotes national unity, sovereignty, and autonomy; 
socialism stands for equality and social justice; and developmentalism implies a 
determination to overcome backwardness” (Lin 2006:60). Chinese intellectuals suggest 
that this kind of Chinese modernity can be an alternative to the Eurocentric singular 
form of capitalist modernity that is inherently exploitative. Focusing on the difference 
in the concept of modernization between China and the West, Wang (1998:13) argues 
that “the modernization in Chinese discourse and the modernization in modernization 
theory are different.” According to Wang (1998:13-7), Chinese full-scale modernization 
has begun with Mao’s socialism as a modern anti-capitalist modernization theory (or 
anti-modern theory of modernization), and thus “inherent in China’s socialist 
modernization experience is a historical antimodernity.”   
Ever since China’s encounter with the imperial expansion of the West, one of 
the most important goals of China has been to establish a “strong nation,” as is 
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expressed in a Chinese term “qiangguomeng” (the dream of strong China) (Hunt 1993; 
Zhao 1997). Chinese intellectuals’ nationalistic “quest for national greatness” is based 
upon the “recollections of ancient grandeur combined with outrage at China’s 
humiliation” (Zhao 1997:725). Remembering the glory of the Central Kingdom in the 
past, the Chinese tended to consider that modern Chinese history was studded with 
humiliation mainly caused by Western powers. Despite Chinese nationalists’ common 
aspiration for a strong nation, there was a discrepancy among them in the ways of 
achieving it. A notable trend among Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s was anti-
traditionalism, which was popularized with the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and 
opening policies. Reflected in the term “Western learning fever” (xixue re), the anti-
traditional trend regarded the West as an ideal, and argued for the reformation of the 
society modeling after it.   
This epochal trend, however, changed in the 1990s under different domestic and 
international circumstances, with the appearance of the new strand of nationalism. In 
response to “Chinese problems,” the new nationalism argued that the Western-oriented 
modernization promoted by anti-traditional reformers brought about various crises in 
China, such as “the decline of national identity, the decline in traditional values and in 
Marxist or Maoist faith” (Zheng 1999:47). To redress them the new nationalism 
developed alternative arguments emphasizing the need for a strong centralized 
government and the promotion of “Chineseness”; the recognition of the importance of 
Chinese traditions and cultural heritages; as well as the reevaluation of Mao Zedong. 
The new nationalism denounced the liberal modernization process during the 1980s as a 
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kind of Westernization that would eventually endanger China. Witnessing the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the advocates of new nationalism argued that “a 
strong State is crucial for China to survive as a unified nation-state” and that 
modernization should be based upon nationalism (Zheng 1999:44). Many of the 
advocates came from the so-called “New Left” (distinguished from Mao’s Old Left), 
who reemphasized the importance of Chinese socialist identity. In this context, the New 
Left promoted new conservatism and new authoritarianism, and became allied with 
anti-Western ideas to some extent.  
The rise of new nationalism accompanied the Chinese disenchantment with the 
West in the general public, and they recognized that “the West was not perfect, [. . .] 
and that its practices were unfair towards China’s national interests” (Zheng 1999:51-2). 
Anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese were provoked by some controversial 
incidents in the 1990s, such as China’s failure in its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, 
the U.S. bombardment of Chinese embassy in Serbia, and the delay of China’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization. Along with anti-Western discourses, those incidents 
intrigued many Chinese to realize that the West was not the supporter of their building 
of a strong nation. The “China threat” theories raised by Western (especially American) 
scholars in the international relations field fueled Chinese anti-Western and anti-
American sentiments.  
 The Chinese new nationalism is based upon the mistrust to the West, which 
some criticize as a negative essentialization of the West, Occidentalism (Chen 1995). 
The previously believed anti-traditional modernization was disputed as a way to 
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dismantle the Chinese nation in the face of Western hegemony. Anti-traditionalists 
tended to criticize the Chinese conventional patriotic spirit for “denying China’s 
backwardness” (Zhao 1997). They tended to regard the Western path as a way to 
effectively modernize China, which is impossible without the recognition of the 
weaknesses of China. However, with the rise of the new nationalism, the West was 
mainly perceived as the invader of Chinese nation and identity, and the Chinese started 
to (re)focus on Chinese values, vis-à-vis the West. This resulted in the rise of cultural 
conservatism in which “Confucianism struck back” (Yan 2008). In this regard, Yan 
(2008:135) argues that the cultural conservatism unfolded mainly in two ways: “a 
popular movement to study the classics and an elite movement to construct China’s soft 
power.” 
 The rise of the Chinese new nationalism reflects the change of international 
settings around China. As Zhao (1997:738) notes, it “coincided with the end of the Cold 
War and China’s rapid economic growth [in the 1990s].” This is related to a view that 
the Soviet Union did not achieve a strong nation by adopting the Western model but 
collapsed just because of it. The Chinese mistrust to the West is interlinked with their 
gaining of confidence in the nation’s rapid economic growth, which is putatively in 
contrast with the fate of their rival country in the socialist race.  
The Chinese confidence is well reflected in a statement of Guan Shijie, a 
Chinese high-profile intellectual: “the time has come for the West to learn from the East. 
The West should switch positions and the teacher should become a student. The 
Confucian concept of universal harmony will be dominant during the next century, 
247 
 
which will be one of peace and development” (cited in Zhao 1997:736). As such, 
“‘Western learning fever’ (xixue re) common in the 1980s was taken over by 
‘Chinese/Confucius learning fever’ (guoxue re) among intellectuals [. . .]” (ibid.). In 
those respects, the new nationalism reflects the Chinese awareness of their country’s 
changing status and the change of global historical circumstances, which are 
characterized by some theorists as the “(re)emergence of Asia” (Frank 1998; Arrighi 
and Silver 1999; Arrighi 2007) or “global rebalancing” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010).   
  
 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE WEST 
 
As some theorists note, the assumption of the Western monopoly of modernity is based 
upon a “disconnected” Eurocentric “tunnel” historiography (Blaut 1993; 
Subrahmanyam 1997; Washbrook 1997). Regardless of the conceptualization of 
modernity, which might have begun from the West, it would be more appropriate to say 
that “modern phenomena” had existed scattered around the world more evenly than is 
generally assumed by the Eurocentric tunnel historiography. In this perspective, what 
we recognize as modernity is the result of a broad range of historical and spatial 
interactions. This does not mean, yet, that many non-Western societies’ modernization 
projects were free from the impact from the West. In many ways, Korea, China, and 
Japan launched their early modernization projects to cope with the threat from the West. 
For this, they paradoxically had to accept the West in order to resist it, which created “a 
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dilemma between modernization and westernization” (Zheng 1999:53). In this context, 
the West has appeared as the most significant other to the three Asian countries from 
their early modernization processes. It played an important role in providing reference 
points in their modernization processes. However, the ways the West is represented 
differ across countries and contingent upon historical circumstances. As Dittmer and 
Kim (1993) note, the West has played a positive referent for some while negative one 
for others in relation to their constructions of national identity in the processes of 
modernization. 
 The discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a kind of convergence theory premised upon a 
belief in the linear universal path of development. On this development path, sŏnjin’guk 
is represented as the foregoer while hujin’guk as the follower. In this perception, the 
diversity of societal forms associated with different historical, cultural contexts does not 
draw much attention. The Western capitalist forms of society are generally represented 
as prototypes that other societies are to follow. As such, the West is represented as 
having desirable social, political, economic, and cultural forms, out of which a cultural 
hierarchy between the “West and the Rest” appears (Hall 1996). In regard to the 
historical background of the hierarchy, the rise of the West is mainly understood in 
terms of endogenous factors, such as the development of reason, while its historical 
expansions accompanied by the unprecedented level of physical and mental violence is 
generally overlooked.  
 In the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, the concept of sŏnjin’guk frequently refers to the 
U.S. and Western European countries (and Japan). Combined with the image of 
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sŏnjin’guk, those countries tend to be idealized regardless of reality. As for the nature of 
Korea’s relationship with the West, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk assumes it basically as a 
reciprocal one. As is assumed by modernization theory in which the West is portrayed 
as a benevolent helper of the development of the underdeveloped, the West in the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk tends to be regarded as a cooperator of the development of 
Korea. The social, cultural, and political economic characteristics of the West are 
generally conceived of as universal, and thus directly comparable and applicable to 
Korean society. In a similar vein, many aspects of Korean society, which are supposed 
as different from those of the West, are often regarded as the remnants of the past, and 
thus as the signs of Korea’s status of not being a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk yet.  
As such, the discourse gives justification to the West-oriented transformation of 
Korean society. In regard to this, the concept of sŏnjin’guk plays diverse roles in Korea 
in suggesting a point of direction, a standard of comparison, a desirable model, a 
reference case, a trend to follow, a preceding subject, a criterion of normality, a 
reference for national identity, and a competitor. As Western countries are frequently 
represented as sŏnjin’guk, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk serves as a ground for 
maintaining Western hegemony in Korea. Thus, some Korean scholars argue that the 
developmental distinction between chŏgaebal-guk (underdeveloped country), kaebal-
dosang-guk (developing country), and sŏnjin’guk is nothing but an indication of the 
degree of Westernization (Park 2003).  
In the discourse of nihonjinron, in contrast, the image of the West becomes less 
attractive. In this discourse, the West is portrayed as lacking many of what Japan 
250 
 
uniquely has. A basic idea underlying the discourse of nihonjinron in terms of the 
comparison of Japan and the West is that the latter has achieved economic prosperity 
but not social harmony, while Japan has both of them. Japanese uniqueness supposedly 
inherent in diverse aspects of Japanese culture and society is suggested as the secret for 
the Japanese successful achievement of both economic prosperity and social harmony. 
This perception of nihonjinron is the basis of its argument that the Japanese society is, 
in many aspects, better than Western ones.  
However, the assumption of Japanese superiority does not necessarily mean that 
the West is ignored in nihonjinron. Rather, the Japanese have been very aware of the 
West as the most significant other throughout their modern history. In fact, the 
discourse of nihonjinron has appeared as a response to Western hegemony, and 
therefore, many aspects of Japanese uniqueness proposed by nihonjinron are virtually 
meaningful only in relation to the West (Befu 2001). What is assumed to be unique in 
Japan is actually what the West is not assumed to have. As Befu (2001:7) notes, “It is 
only because Japan and the West happen to share a similar kinship system (including 
monogamy), share a materialistic orientation, and lack a caste system that these 
phenomena are not at issue in the modern Nihonjinron.” In a similar vein, he adds that 
“Nihonjinron would probably concern itself with Japan’s monogamous marriage system 
[. . .]” if the Islamic world or India, instead of the West, happened to be Japan’s 
contrastive referent (ibid.). 
The Japanese have continuously contrasted their society with the West 
throughout their modern history. Their perceptions of the West have been closely 
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related to how they perceive the status of their country. The degree of Japanese self-
confidence vis-à-vis the West has been reflected on the degree of positive attitude 
towards their national self. When they had confidence, they saw their national self in a 
positive way and vice versa (Befu 1993). In this respect, nihonjinron’s degree of 
assurance in the self reflects the Japanese recovery of self-confidence from the identity 
problem of the postwar period. On the basis of excessive level of self-assurance, 
nihonjinron issued a serious challenge to the assumption of universal history and 
Western cultural hegemony.   
In the Chinese new nationalistic discourse, the West appears primarily as a 
hostile competitor. Historically, it was Western imperial powers that forced the Chinese 
to get out of the imagined castle of the Central Kingdom. In this respect, the Chinese 
imagination of their national self and the world has also been deeply related to the West. 
In this regard, Wang (1998:11) notes that modernization has been conventionally 
understood by Chinese intellectuals as a “process of reevaluating their society and 
tradition against the yardstick of Western society and its cultures and values.” And he 
adds that this is one of the reasons why the contemporary Chinese discourses on 
modernity are “located within the ‘China /West’ and ‘tradition / modernity’ binaries” 
(ibid.).  
Chinese early modern history afflicted by imperialism and colonialism remained 
as a humiliating memory for the Chinese. In this context, the early Chinese modernizers’ 
aspiration for national greatness at the turn of the twentieth century continued through 
the early period of People’s Republic of China (Zhao 1997). A primary goal of Mao 
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Zedong’s socialist project was to build a strong socialist nation. With regard to the West, 
Mao stressed the need for narrowing the economic gap with the West, as was well 
expressed in his call in 1949 for “catching up to Great Britain and the United States” 
(Zhao 1997:726). The Chinese in the Mao era believed that they could build a better 
stronger country than Western capitalist ones through a different route, i.e., socialist 
development.  
The image of the West for the Chinese has varied according to different 
domestic and global circumstances. In the 1980s, when China launched economic 
reform and opening policies, the West tended to be idealized especially by anti-
traditional liberal intellectuals. Being critical of Chinese socialism for the nation’s 
economic backwardness, those intellectuals asked for the political economic reforms by 
modeling after the West. The Western-learning mood was high in this context as was 
expressed in such phrases as “cultural fever” (wenhua re) and the “new enlightenment 
movement” during the 1980s (Zhao 1997; Wang 1998). This intellectual trend tended to 
regard the Western-style capitalist society as an important reference for Chinese 
modernity in terms of such aspects as “the establishment of autonomy and freedom in 
the economic, political, legal, and cultural spheres” (Wang 1998:19). In this vein, they 
were generally critical of state authoritarianism and Chinese tradition.  
The new nationalistic discourse arose from a sense of crisis about Chinese 
identity caused by the anti-traditional atmosphere. Criticizing the previous intellectual 
trend for romanticizing the West without much empirical knowledge about it, the new 
discourse promoted the “de-romanticization of the West” (Zhao 1997). The degree of 
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discrepancy in the interpretation of the West between the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and the general public was far reduced when it came to the new nationalistic 
discourse in the 1990s. The West in the new discourse was portrayed basically as a 
hostile entity that had an intention of tackling China’s bid for a strong country. As it 
attributed, to some degree, the collapse of the Soviet Union to Western conspiracy led 
by the U.S., the new nationalism strongly supported the centralized power structure of 
the CCP in order to “maintain social stability and economic development” (Zhao 
1997:732). New nationalistic discourse argued that the Chinese should realize the true 
nature of the West. The nationalistic publications charged with anti-Western or anti-
American sentiments, such as Zhongguo keri shuo bu (The China That Can Say No), 
made bestsellers. This intellectual mood went in tandem with the state-led patriotic 
education campaign launched in 1993, which “laid out patriotism as a guiding principle 
for China’s educational reform” (Zhao 2004:218). Asian values, which were 
disregarded by the “cultural fever” intellectuals, were reevaluated in this period in terms 
of China’s socio-economic development. 
In the new nationalistic discourse, the West tends to be portrayed as having 
affluent economy, yet, with poor culture. It is suspected as hiding imperial intentions 
somewhat similar to those of the colonial era, and as creating unfair game rules to China 
by using its economic and military powers. Global conflicts are often attributed to 
Western conflictive and binary worldviews. Upon this, new nationalist discourses raise 
a need for enhancing harmonious Chinese cultural heritages and emphasize China’s role 
in building a better world. In this context, as Zheng (1999:80) notes, new nationalists 
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promote the argument that “it is time to change the rule of game-playing produced by 
the Western civilization.”  
  
 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF SELF NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
In the hierarchical framework of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, Korea’s self-identity is 
based upon a sense of advancement over hujin’guk and a feeling of lacking over 
sŏnjin’guk. On the supposedly universal path of development, Korea is considered as 
having moved from the status of hujin’guk towards that of sŏnjin’guk. Korea is now 
frequently considered as almost sŏnjin’guk, or “on the threshold of sŏnjin’guk” 
(sŏnjin’guk munt‘ŏk). Under the influence of modernization theory in the Cold War 
context, Korea’s early developmental regime did not hesitate to define their nation as 
hujin’guk and sought for their legitimacy from the vigorous efforts for escaping from it. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Korea’s self identity degraded to hujin’guk in 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk from munmyŏng-guk (civilized country) in the discourse of 
munmyŏng (civilization) prevalent in the pre-developmental era. It is during the 1970s 
that Korean developmental elites started to perceive their country as having escaped 
from the status of hujin’guk, and when it came to the late 1970s, they began to designate 
it as in top-tier of chungjin’guk (developing country between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk) 
or being close to the rank of sŏnjin’guk.   
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 Korea’s prominent national identity has been constructed in relation to 
sŏnjin’guk in the developmental context. Since their incorporation into the Eurocentric 
world order, Koreans have evaluated various aspects of their society in the light of the 
West. Korea is now represented as almost sŏnjin’guk but somewhat short of full-fledged 
sŏnjin’guk. This self perception provides Koreans with a source of both pride and 
shame. On the one hand, Koreans feel a great sense of pride in their achievement of the 
status of “almost sŏnjin’guk” in such a short period, which is assumed as having taken 
hundreds of years by the West. Developmental elites tend to argue that this is due to the 
previous generations’ blood, sweat, and tears, and that it is our generations’ 
responsibility to make the nation a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk. They argue that Korea 
should not fall back into the status of hujin’guk in today’s competitive global political 
economic circumstances. On the other hand, Koreans’ national identity also gives a 
sense that Korea is, yet, short of sŏnjin’guk, which creates a ground for their tendency 
of self-orientalization. In this framework, Koreans perceive many aspects of their 
society as somewhat irrational, immature, and abnormal vis-à-vis the rational, mature, 
normal aspects of sŏnjin’guk. By continuously comparing their country with sŏnjin’guk, 
Koreans show a certain degree of “inferiority complex” and “double consciousness,” 
which are typical among colonized people (Fanon 1967; Du Bois 1994). In this 
perception, Korean society tends to remain merely as the lacking unauthentic copy of 
the sufficient authentic sŏnjin’guk.    
In the discourse of nihonjinron, the Japanese national self appears noticeably as 
different, unique, and superior vis-à-vis the West. The national self is also represented 
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as homogeneous, harmonious, and inherent in Japan’s geographic conditions, which 
takes on excessive ethnocentric implications. As noted above, the sense of uniqueness 
reflected in nihonjinron is based upon a certain degree of confidence that they have 
already achieved what the West has. Recognizing the weaknesses of Western countries 
especially in social and cultural aspects, such as social conflict, high crime rate, extreme 
individualism, etc., nihonjinron theorists tend to emphasize Japanese strengths vis-à-vis 
the West. In this perception, what is considered as “different” is in no way regarded as 
an obstacle to Japan’s development. Rather, as Befu (2001:68) points out, it is argued 
that “Japan became an economic giant because of what Japan is.”  
As noted above, the Japanese sense of superiority reflected in nihonjinron is an 
intellectual attitude conscious of the West. Since their encounter with the West in the 
mid-nineteenth century, the Japanese have made significant efforts to transform their 
society to cope with the West. These are well shown in historical incidents such as their 
endeavors to renew unequal treaties with Western countries in the late nineteenth 
century; the promotion of war time slogan for “overcoming modernity” in the early and 
mid- twentieth century; and self-criticism related to the defeat of war after the mid-
twentieth century. As the West has been the Japanese most significant other throughout 
their modern history, nihonjinron can be understood as a self-conscious nationalistic 
discourse aimed to overcome Western hegemony. In a similar vein, it is an effort to 
overcome the modern Eurocentric cultural framework, in which Japan tends to be 
located outside of universal history. In this regard, it is a movement of resistance to 
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refuse to locate the Japanese national self and their history within the Eurocentric 
hierarchical framework. 
 The Chinese new nationalistic discourse puts their national self mainly in a 
position to compete with the West, which is suspected as an interrupter of the Chinese 
project for building a strong nation. The new nationalism is a counter movement to the 
previous anti-traditional pro-Western discursive movement that assumed China’s 
lacking position vis-à-vis an idealized West. The anti-traditional trend of “cultural fever” 
in the 1980s was based upon the “criticism of traditional Chinese culture and criticism 
of Chinese national character” (Zhao 1997). In contrast, the new nationalism asserts that 
China has been pursuing a different path of socialist development, incorporating 
Chinese tradition and culture into it. It is based upon an assumption that China can build 
a strong, wealthy country with socialist characteristics, which are more desirable than 
Western capitalist countries. Choosing socialist paths to development, the Chinese 
started a different game that was set not by the West but by themselves.  
Through the discourse of new nationalism, the Chinese express a good amount 
of confidence in their national identity. Recognizing that China in the past suffered from 
Western imperialism and was backward in national development, the new nationalism 
argues that this should be no longer the case in the future. It perceives that China’s 
recent economic growth has rendered it a different national status on the international 
stage. Furthermore, it argues that the West has already exposed its weakness in many 
aspects, manifest of which are its conflictive, exploitative, and unequal social, political 
economic relationships. Against these shortcomings, the new nationalism supposes their 
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national self as responsible for developing an alternative political socio-economic 
model globally as well as domestically, which is more harmonious, distributive, and 
equal. The Chinese slogan of “peaceful rise” can be understood in this context, which is 
a response to the “China threat” theories promoted by some realist political scholars in 
the U.S. With regard to this, Sheng Hong, a high-profile new nationalist scholar, argues 
that “China’s new nationalism should not aim at hegemonism, but the elimination of 
hegemonism” (Zheng 1999:85).  
Another ground for the confidence of new nationalism in China’s contribution to 
a better world is its rich cultural heritage. The Chinese pride in their cultural legacy has, 
in some aspects, become a basis for their “cultural nationalism,” which argues that “the 
dominance of Western culture in international cultural exchanges was threatening the 
cultures of [. . .] China” (Zhao 1997:735). With the rise of cultural nationalism, 
“Western learning fever” in the 1980s was replaced by “Chinese / Confucius learning 
fever” (guoxue re) in their search for “Chineseness” (ibid.). The “Mao fever” of the 
1990s also reflected this intellectual atmosphere, as the New Left tried to reevaluate him 
by saying, for instance, that “Maoism’s contribution to China’s economic growth lies in 
its collectivism” (Zheng 1999:62).   
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THE SUBJECTIVITIES OF MODERNITIES AND POSTMODERNITIES 
 
As a highly contested and subjective concept, modernity is understood differently 
across time and space. Rather than universally given, modernity is constructed 
reflecting not only society’s material conditions but also its collective values, 
worldviews, and identities. It can be argued that dominant features of modernity in a 
society reflect its dominant collective subjectivity, which is subject to continuous 
contestations among society members. In this respect, the three East Asian countries’ 
subjectivities of their modernities reflect their perceptions of self identities and the 
world, and their imaginations of national future. On this ground, this section pays 
attention to how each country differently or similarly defines its self and the world in 
terms of its perception of modernity.    
Even though modernization theory lost its authority in the academia of 
development studies, its influence is still strong in the public in many aspects. For 
instance, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk still echoes the theory’s basic assumption of a 
universal linear development path. It is interesting to note that the Korean discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk has not changed its basic conceptual framework characterized by the binary 
distinction since its formation in the 1960s, in spite of the historical changes of 
domestic and global circumstances. In this framework, various aspects of Western 
societies tend to be presented as the universally applicable archetype. Diverse social 
systems are not much appreciated and even considered somewhat aberrant from the 
putative normal path to modernity. As hujin’guk is represented as the backward, 
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undesirable past of the advanced status of sŏnjin’guk, the distinction entails an 
epistemic hierarchy between the two. In the discourse, sŏnjin’guk monopolizes the 
romanticized notion of modernity. Thus, the modernity of sŏnjin’guk is considered as 
what is yet to be achieved by non- sŏnjin’guk. In those respects, the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk rather maintains the conventional Eurocentric framework of modernity.  
The discourse of sŏnjin’guk has not, yet, been homogeneous across time. Before 
the 1990s, the concept of sŏnjin’guk was used in the context of the kŭndaehwa (literally 
modernization) project under the authoritarian developmental regime, which supposed 
industrialization as the primary aspect of modernization. Since the 1990s, the concept 
has been employed in relation to different discourses, such as segyehwa (globalization) 
and sŏnjinhwa (achieving advancement), which aim to make the nation a full-fledged 
sŏnjin’guk in the wake of its successful achievements of industrialization and 
democratization.50 In relation to this, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk tends to see that the 
Korean modernization process in the past was very rapid and, thus, not mature enough. 
It assumes that Korea has achieved in just a few decades what the West has experienced 
through hundreds of years, and that some aspects of Korean society do not deserve a 
full-fledged sŏnjin’guk yet.51  
                                                 
50 Park Seil (2006), a prominent proponent of sŏnjinhwa today, argues that having achieved two 
important goals of modernization, kŭndaehwa and minjuhwa (democratization), Korea has now to pursue 
sŏnjinhwa.  
51 In the perspective of “modernities,” the discourse’s Eurocentric assumption of linear path of 
development from hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk is disputed. From this point of view, Korean modernization 
process has its own characteristics reflecting its own distinctive historical circumstances, which is 
distinguished from those of the West, and thus should not be understood in such universal sequential 
notions. What Korea achieved in such a short period is, in fact, not so much a speedy tracking of what the 
West has undergone ahead, as the result of its own unique historical experiences.      
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Unlike the Korean case, Japanese discourses on modernity well recognize their 
“uniqueness.” With regard to this, two perspectives are prominent: one tends to 
understand Japanese modernity with the conceptual framework of “non-modernity” and 
the other with “postmodernity” (Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989; Clammer 1995; 
McCormack and Sugimoto 1988). In either perspective, it is assumed that Japanese 
society has achieved what is regarded by Westerners as modernity through different or 
unique social, cultural processes, resulting in a society hard to be understood with the 
conventional Eurocentric concepts of modernity and modernization. This kind of 
conceptualizations of Japanese experiences of modernity is an effort to place their 
society outside of Eurocentric historiography. With regard to this, Clammer (2001:39) 
notes that “not only was Japan a postmodern society, but that it was also the only one 
yet to emerge (and as such the pioneer, well ahead of the West [. . .]).” He goes on to 
say that “in some sense it always had been postmodern” (ibid.). In this way, the 
Eurocentric periodical distinction between the premodern, the modern, and the 
postmodern becomes blurred. In relation to this, Clammer (2001:50) argues that Japan 
is “the one society which has passed directly from pre-modernity to postmodernity 
without passing through modernity at all [. . .].” 
As noted above, many Japanese scholars refuse to locate their historical 
experience within the Eurocentric periodical framework. In this regard, Takeuchi 
Yoshimi, for instance, argues that “[m]odernity is the self-recognition of Europe, the 
recognition of Europe’s modern self as distinct from her feudal self [. . .]” (cited in 
Sakai 1989). To include Japan in history imagined by the West means to consign Japan 
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to be a “perpetually incomplete version of the West” (Tanaka 1993:45). Therefore, 
rather than trying to fit the Japanese case into the Western periodization, they choose to 
emphasize its “uniqueness” and “difference” vis-à-vis the West.  
It is interesting to note that postmodern discourses and nihonjinron gained 
popularity around the same time in the 1980s. In spite of the fundamental difference in 
nature between the decentralizing, heterogenizing postmodern discourses and the 
centralizing, homogenizing nihonjinron, the two shares in common their focus on the 
difference and uniqueness of Japanese society from the West. In this respect, Iida 
(2002:200) appropriately points out that “although nihonjinron discourse runs 
seemingly counter to these latter trends [of postmodernism], it also has ‘postmodern’ 
components.” While postmodern discourses interpret Japanese society as “postmodern” 
with an awareness of Western theorization, nihonjinron construes it with the 
ethnocentrically charged notion of “intrinsic uniqueness.” The latter can especially be 
understood as a kind of “nationalistic sentiments calling for the recovery of Japan’s 
‘true identity’ supposedly erased by the process of modernization / Westernization” 
(Iida 2002:205).    
The 1980s witnessed the discourses of Japanese uniqueness and postmodernity 
at the peak. As McCormack and Sugimoto (1988:13) notes, “Japan in the 1980s is 
embarking on the path toward a postmodern society.” According to them, there are two 
notable periods when Japan has declared the transcendence of modernity as an official 
state project in its modern era: “first under Premier Tōjō Hideki in 1942 and more 
recently under Premier Ōhira Masayoshi in 1979 [. . .]” (McCormack and Sugimoto 
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1988:13). The former appeared in the wartime context, and the latter in the context of 
the Japanese regaining of confidence from the identity crisis after the war. The state-
supported volumes entitled Beyond the Modern Age (Kindai o Koete) published in 1983, 
which was dedicated to the late Prime Minister Ohira, stated that “we have come to the 
age in which one must go beyond the modern, and we must shift from an economic-
centered to a culture-centered age” (cited in Iida 2002:166). According to this, Iida 
(2002:166) notes, “the problems of the modern age, such as the exploitation of nature, 
an excess of freedom, and the lack of spirituality, are essentially caused by the 
rationalism and materialism inherent in Western civilization.”  
That Ohira was a main political figure supportive of nihonjinron shows a link 
between postmodern discourses and the nationalistic discourse. Focusing on the 
“uniqueness” of Japan, nihonjinron is sympathetic to the interpretation of its society as 
postmodern. Many aspects of Japanese society, such as pastiche and eclecticism in 
cultural artifacts, “de-centered subject” in individual perception of self, and collectivism 
in social organizations, are considered as containing various elements of postmodernity 
(Clammer 1995, 2001). Furthermore, these unique or postmodern aspects of Japanese 
society are often regarded as superior to the decaying societal forms of the West. It is 
related to this context that Japanese society is idealized in nihonjinron as a harmonious, 
conflict-free, “relational” society. On this interpretive ground, a Japan-centered version 
of universalistic argument comes out that Japan has arrived first in a condition that the 
West has not reached yet (Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989; Clammer 1995).  
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Some nihonjinron theorists argue that Japan has always been postmodern as it 
did not follow the Western path of development. In this regard, the prefix “post” is 
rather understood as “beyond” than as “after.” As for this, Clammer (1995:15) notes 
that the “postmodern” is in some sense “the transcending (or undermining) of the whole 
notion of periodization” that characterizes the “‘Enlightenment project’ to control or 
even create reality by categorizing and defining it.” It is assumed that Japan has 
achieved what are thought of as major characteristics of modernity, such as 
industrialization, urbanization, and technologization, while maintaining their central 
cultural values. In this regard, some argue that the material conditions of Japanese 
society are at a similar level to those of the West, but the characteristics of its social 
system look more comparable to those of India (Clammer 1995, 2001). In this 
perspective, the conventional distinction between the traditional and the modern is 
highly blurred with Japanese society. It is also recognized that Japanese traditional 
values served well for Japan’s successful modernization by promoting national harmony 
and unity (Jansen 1965; Hall 1965). In this sense, Japanese society is a fine example 
challenging “the legitimacy of imposing on another society a periodization of history 
itself developed in the west” (Clammer 1995:15). 
The Chinese discourse of new nationalism reflects their notion of “alternative 
modernity.” In this notion, the Chinese have undergone an “alternative path” to 
Eurocentric modernity through “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In this way, 
the Chinese refuse to identify modernity with capitalism. Furthermore, they claim to 
build a better societal system upon the recognition of the limitations of Western 
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capitalist modernity. The Chinese new nationalism argues that the capitalist form of 
modernity contains conflictive, discriminative, and exploitative relationships among 
people as well as between people and nature. In this regard, Sheng Hong, a 
representative new nationalistic theorist, argues for the superiority of Chinese culture, 
saying that “[because] each religion in [Western civilization] worshipped only one god, 
war and competition were inevitable” (Zhao 1997:737-8). He goes further to argue that 
“[i]n the context of religious conflict and competition, social Darwinism was developed,” 
and thus “Western culture [would] lead humanity into catastrophe” (ibid.:738). In this 
respect, the new nationalism argues that the Chinese should pursue an alternative to this 
by combining efficient socialist reform with their traditional cultural values. According 
to the new nationalism, the Chinese modernization project aims to achieve an equal, 
distributive, and harmonious society. As for the importance of Chinese cultural heritage 
in this regard, Sheng Hong argues that “Confucian respect for universal harmony and 
collectivism in Chinese culture should be especially instrument for world peace and 
development” (ibid.). 
As such, the concept of modernity for the Chinese new nationalism does not just 
mean economic prosperity and high technology, but includes harmonious and 
egalitarian Chinese cultural values. It also believes that “traditional culture could play 
an important role in robust economic growth” (Zhao 1997:739). This is supported by 
the discussions of “Confucian capitalism,” which no longer sees Confucianism as an 
obstacle to economic development, but a vital factor for it. In those respects, the 
Chinese concept of modernity is in competition with the Eurocentric notion of 
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modernity. Ultimately, they aim to overcome the West by achieving their ideal of 
“alternative modernity.” As Wang (1998) notes, “new collectivism” and “the theory of 
rural enterprise-led modernization” are the specific examples of experiments for 
China’s different path to modernity. He argues that Chinese modernity should not put 
emphasis just on “efficiency,” which is the central theme of Western modernity, but 
should also focus on the values of political participation, economic equality, and the 
protection of the environment (Wang 1998).  
The new nationalist understanding of Chinese modernity reflects Chinese 
ambition to restore the “glory of the Chinese past.” It is assumed that achieving 
harmonious socialist society with national wealth and strength is an ultimate way to win 
the competition with Western capitalist modernity. As such, the new nationalist concept 
of modernity poses a serious challenge to the Eurocentric notion of modernity. In this 
regard, Tian (2005a:3) argues for the adoption of “market socialism” in which “the 
market is the means for developing a productive force, and the goal is to build 
socialism.” Reflecting his confidence and optimism in the Chinese path, Tian 
(2005b:298) also argues that there is a difference between Chinese alternative 
modernity and Western liberal modernity in the sense that “the former is more universal 
and more thoroughgoing than the latter.”   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has comparatively examined the perceptions of national self and the West, 
and the subjectivities of modernities reflected in the discourses of Korean sŏnjin’guk, 
Japanese nihonjinron, and Chinese new nationalism. It has shown that the three Asian 
countries’ dominant discourses on modern self and the world are based upon different 
perceptual frameworks despite their regional proximity. In terms of the perception of 
the West, the sŏnjin’guk discourse considers it mainly an advanced being, which Korea 
and other societies are to pursue. With the dualistic distinction between sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk, it gives a certain degree of respect to the West by designating it as sŏnjin’guk 
in general. On a presumed universal path of development from hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk, 
Korea is frequently posited on the threshold of the rank of sŏnjin’guk, which renders 
both positive and negative self-identity for Koreans. In terms of the perception of 
modernity, the Korean discourse remains, in general, within the conventional 
Eurocentric notion of modernity. 
 The Japanese discourse of nihonjinron, in contrast, shows strong self-confidence. 
In this discourse, the West is represented as having many weaknesses in their societies 
and lacking many positive aspects of Japanese society. Interpreting the superiority of 
Japanese society as deriving from Japanese intrinsic uniqueness, nihonjinron makes an 
effort to enhance a sort of ethnocentric Japanese national identity. In this context, it 
refuses to posit Japanese society within the Eurocentric conceptual framework of 
modernity. Rather, it tends to interpret Japanese society as non-modern or postmodern, 
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which has many merits over Western societies. In those respects, the Japanese 
nihonjinron discourse offers a serious challenge to European cultural hegemony.  
 The Chinese discourse of new nationalism arose out of the sense of identity 
crisis deriving from the liberal intellectual trend that tended to idealize the West. Thus, 
the new nationalism tries to reassure the nature of the West as a main competitor for 
China, denying its romanticization. Arguing that Chinese identity was eroded by the 
liberals’ blind pursuit of Western-style modernity, it aims to reemphasize Chinese 
socialist values as well as their cultural heritages. It recognizes the insufficiency of 
Chinese economy, which raises the need for the adoption of the market economy for 
productive forces, but is also aware of the merits of their cultural values in building a 
better society in competition with the West. Reflecting that the Chinese has long 
pursued “alternative modernity” through socialism with Chinese characteristics, the new 
nationalism asserts that the Chinese has been going on the right track of modernity. As 
for this, it argues that Chinese alternative modernity is closer to true universal values, 
such as equality and harmony, compared with exploitative Western capitalist modernity. 
In terms of self national identity vis-à-vis the West, it can be generally said that 
Koreans stick to the notion of “catch-up,” the Japanese to “uniqueness,” and the 
Chinese to “alternative.” In the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, Koreans express a strong 
willingness to accommodate the characteristics of Western societies by setting them as 
models of sŏnjin’guk. In contrast, the Chinese and the Japanese tend to maintain a 
distance from the West in their identity formation by setting it as a kind of lacking 
“other” to their self-identities. Unlike the Korean case, the Japanese nativist values have 
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successfully gone through the challenges from universalistic values within Japanese 
society, such as capitalist liberalism and socialism (Bellah 1974). In the case of China, 
traditional values were harshly oppressed under the universalistic value of socialism in 
its early revolutionary era, but have recently been reevaluated, as is reflected in the 
“Chinese / Confucius learning fever” of the new nationalism.       
From a global perspective, all of the three discourses expose crucial weaknesses. 
First of all, the Korean discourse does not pay much attention to the limitations of 
Western modernity, circumscribing Koreans within the Eurocentric imagination of the 
world. Within the framework of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, Koreans are hard to realize 
that the world is far more connected and interactive than they imagine. In this respect, 
the Korean discourse does not contribute much to challenging the Eurocentric epistemic 
hierarchy, and to building a more diverse and harmonious world. The Japanese 
nihonjinron discourse contains a different kind of problem. Even though it shows a 
strong resistance to Eurocentric notions, nihonjinron presents extremely ethnocentric 
versions of nationalism and worldviews. In this respect, some theorists criticize it as an 
“essentializing, totalizing, ethnocentric and possibly even racist discourse” (Clammer 
2001:66; Dale 1986; Befu 1993, 2001). The Chinese new nationalism also has various 
elements of excessive nationalism and ethnocentrism. Therefore, there is a need for 
more active cross-cultural dialogues in the light of the new nationalism. In this regard, 
Zhao (1997:744) insists that “Chinese intellectuals have yet to find their way to forms 
of cross-cultural dialogue in which the Chinese and Westerners may more critically 
understand themselves in the light of each other.”  
270 
 
This chapter has argued that the three neighboring countries in East Asia have 
different views of national self and the West, as well as different subjectivities of their 
modernity from one another. These different self identities and worldviews are deeply 
related to their imaginations of the future of their country and to their ways of 
interacting with the world. In terms of the trend of globalization, this suggests a cultural 
background of those countries’ different attitudes and responses to globalization. In the 
historical context of “global rebalancing” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010), those countries 
have far more room than before for contributing to the trends of globalization. In this 
respect, I would argue that they should more seriously engage in reestablishing their self 
identities and worldviews, reflecting those important historical global trends.  
Above all, people in those countries need to make continuous efforts to 
challenge and deconstruct Eurocentric worldviews. People should be able to resist 
unjust intentions of domination implicit in Eurocentric political, economic, social, and 
cultural ideas. However, they should also be cautious not to rely on another kind of 
particularistic ethnocentric notions for that purpose. I believe that East Asia has rich 
cultural traditions and heritages that are useful to enhancing truly universal values and 
constructing a better world.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has examined the basic assumptions, characteristics, formation and 
transformation, and historical backgrounds of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, which is a 
dominant way of constructing developmental national self and worldviews for South 
Koreans. It has argued that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is a historically constructed 
knowledge system based upon the relations constructed around the concepts of 
sŏnjin’guk (advanced country) and hujin’guk (backward country). With a hierarchical 
classificatory system in which sŏnjin’guk has hujin’guk as its alienated other, the 
discourse has provided dominant interpretive frameworks of national identities and 
worldviews in South Korea’s national developmental processes. As an ideal image, 
sŏnjin’guk has played important roles in guiding Koreans’ imaginations of national 
future and, thus, the transformation of their country, as an urgent national goal and an 
important reference point. By exploring the historicity of the discourse, this study has 
shown that the formation and transformation of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, whose 
assumptions are accepted somewhat universal, have reflected specific global and 
national historical circumstances in Korea’s modernization process. In this way, this 
study has problematized and historicized the universal bearings of the discourse and its 
taken-for-granted interpretive frameworks.  
For its historical root, chapter one has analyzed the formation and 
transformation of the discourses of kaehwa (enlightenment) and munmyŏng (civilization) 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the face of the Western imperial 
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expansion, Koreans felt a need for transforming their political economic, cultural, and 
social systems to maintain national sovereignty. Korean modern elites considered 
powerful Western societies as their models for reformation. In this situation, various 
aspects of Western societies tended to be idealized while many aspects of Korean 
tradition were stigmatized. The general image of the West abruptly changed from 
“barbarians” into “kaehwa-guk” (enlightened country) and “munmyŏng-guk” (civilized 
country), reflecting Eurocentric ideas of enlightenment and civilization. Thus, the 
discourses of kaehwa and munmyŏng reflected Korean modern intellectuals’ 
understandings of national self and the world in those times. 
It has shown that Korea’s modern self identity changed from munmyŏng-guk in 
the 1880s, pan-kaehwa-guk (half-enlightened country) in the 1890s and the 1900s, to 
munmyŏng-guk again in the 1920s with different connotation, reflecting different global 
and national historical circumstances. While the 1890s and 1900s witnessed the peak of 
the idealized West as reflected in the concept of munmyŏng, the 1920s and 1930s 
observed a steep downfall of the image of the West in the wake of World War I, which 
accompanied the crisis of the global discourse of civilization. In this period, the 
connotations of munmyŏng also changed dramatically, recognizing the spiritual 
goodness of Eastern civilization over material Western civilization. Under the colonial 
rule, the moral superiority of Korean civilization was also emphasized over the 
aggressiveness of Japanese civilization. Thus, the basic Eurocentric frameworks 
constructed in the previous discourses of kaehwa and munmyŏng were seriously 
challenged in the 1920s and 30s.  
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Amidst the crisis of the discourse of civilization, the global discursive focus 
changed from “civilization” to “development” in the mid-twentieth century, with the 
rise of U.S. hegemony. Reflecting this, Koreans’ dominant ways of representing 
national identity and the world began to be formed in developmental terms. In this 
process, the discourse of munmyŏng gave way to that of sŏnjin’guk. In the new 
framework, the West took its advanced position again as sŏnjin’guk, while Korean 
national identity degraded from munmyŏng-guk to hujin’guk.  
Chapter two has shown that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is premised upon a 
developmental distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. Various positive values, 
which are historically specific to Koreans, are associated with the former, while 
negative values with the latter. As such, those concepts are the constructions of Koreans 
themselves, rather than the faithful representations of reality. Despite the popularity of 
those concepts, this study has shown that they are used in loose terms, indicating 
different entities in different contexts. As an ideal representation, sŏnjin’guk plays 
important roles in guiding national development, as a point of direction, a standard of 
comparison, a desirable model, a reference point, etc. It tends to represent the desirable 
change and future of Korea. In contrast, hujin’guk plays roles as an undesirable being, 
which Korea should not resemble in its development process. Currently, South Korea 
generally identifies itself as very close to sŏnjin’guk, and tries to concentrate national 
energy on achieving the status of full-fledged sŏnjin’guk in the near future.  
In chapter three, this study has examined the historical variation of the discourse 
of sŏnjin’guk throughout the postwar period. The discourse has modified its connotation 
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and political implication according to the change of historical conditions since its rise as 
a dominant discursive system supporting the hegemony of South Korean developmental 
regime in the 1960s. As a developmental discourse, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
provided an interpretive system for South Korean national development, and gave 
legitimacy to the developmental regime’s pursuit of economic growth. By designating 
Korea as hujin’guk, the discourse made it a historical necessity to transform the country 
towards sŏnjin’guk. In this context, escaping the status of hujin’guk gained consensus in 
the general public as an urgent national goal in the 1960s and 70s. The discourse played 
an important role as a dominant interpretive framework in providing a motivation for 
South Korea’s rapid economic growth. In this way, it also gave support to the 
legitimacy of the South Korean developmental regime. 
From the late 1960s, there appeared a perception that Korea had escaped the 
status of hujin’guk, reflecting Koreans’ confidence in their rapid economic growth. In 
the 1970s, Koreans more frequently designated their country as chungjin’guk or kaebal-
dosang-guk (developing country), and began to identify it as an advanced kaebal-
dosang-guk or being close to sŏnjin’guk in the mid-1970s. In the 1980s, national 
identity as one of NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) was prevalent. Until the 
1970s, the concept of sŏnjin’guk was used in somewhat limited terms, e.g., advanced 
being in industrialization or capitalist development. It was not necessarily considered as 
advanced in other fields such as culture. South Koreans were aware of that their 
national interests, as developing country, were different from those of sŏnjin’guk. 
Furthermore, various negative side-effects accompanying industrialization were well 
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recognized. In this respect, a sense of wariness on becoming sŏnjin’guk was often 
expressed by intellectuals. 
It was the 1980s when the concept of sŏnjin’guk began to be rapidly idealized. 
In the process of adjusting to the international pressure to open national market, South 
Korean ruling elites began to promote the market opening as a precondition for 
achieving sŏnjin’guk. In a similar vein, a tendency of considering the transformation of 
Korean society in international terms became strong. This tendency came to be far 
manifest near the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, and accompanying this was the 
idealization of the concept of sŏnjin’guk. The discourse’s Eurocentric bearing further 
intensified in the 1990s when the South Korean developmental regime actively adopted 
the global discourse of neoliberal globalization. While the national identity of “near 
sŏnjin’guk” was prevalent, the Kim Young-Sam administration actively promoted the 
project of segyehwa (globalization) as a way to achieve the status of full sŏnjin’guk. 
The aspiration to become sŏnjin’guk is well expressed in the term sŏnjinhwa (achieving 
advancement) today. On this historical ground, it is interesting to note that Korea has 
been in the status of “just in front of sŏnjin’guk” for more than thirty years. 
In chapter four, this study has argued that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk has been 
challenged and contested by various counter-developmentalist socio-economic groups. 
There are apparent differences in attitude towards the basic assumptions and political 
implications of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk between the promoters of the discourse and 
the counter-developmentalist groups. There are also a considerable degree of resistances 
to the discourse’s ways of interpreting the world. All interviewees from those groups 
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refuse to accept the validity of the distinction between sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk in 
certain ways. The different understandings of the discursive system lead to different 
understandings of national identities and visions. In this respect, the slogan of 
sŏnjinhwa and its various policies are criticized as mainly reflecting the interests of 
ruling groups. However, those resistances to the discourse of sŏnjin’guk are not yet 
developed to the active movements of presenting alternative interpretive frameworks for 
development.   
 The last chapter has provided a comparative view on the discourse of sŏnjin’guk 
in transnational terms. Through the comparative analysis of dominant discourses in 
Korea, China, and Japan, it has demonstrated that each country has distinctive self 
national identities and perceptions of the West, despite their regional proximity. With 
regard to the perception of the West, Koreans tend to regard it as an advanced entity on 
a supposedly universal development path. In contrast, the Japanese and the Chinese tend 
to perceive it somewhat lacking and hostile respectively in relation to their national 
identities. In terms of national self vis-à-vis the West, Koreans consider themselves as 
somewhat insufficient, while the Japanese focus on their uniqueness and the Chinese on 
their potential alternativeness. And, in regard to the subjectivity of modernities, the 
Koreans show a typical Eurocentric paradigm of modernity. In contrast, the Japanese 
emphasize non-modernity and postmodernity, and the Chinese focus on alternative 
modernity with socialist characteristics. I consider that these differences in national 
identity vis-à-vis the West affect those countries’ basic attitudes in their international 
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politics. For instance, having the most humble self identity towards the West among the 
three, Korea shows relatively more accommodative stance to neoliberal globalization. 
Main contributions of the findings and arguments of this study can be 
considered in terms of global studies, cultural studies, development studies, and Korean 
studies. First, this study has demonstrated how global hegemonic transitions affected 
Korea’s national discursive formations and transformations. While previous research on 
the global discursive influence on national developmental situation is rare, this study 
has shown the significance of global discursive change in its impact on national 
discourses, with the case of Korea. In this regard, it has found that Korean discursive 
change from kaehwa and munmyŏng to sŏnjin’guk corresponds to that from 
“civilization” to “development” at the global level. This study has displayed a non-
Western country’s adjusting process to the Eurocentric world order, with a focus on 
discursive formation and transformation. 
Second, this study has examined South Korea’s modernization process from a 
cultural perspective, focusing on the formation and transformation of dominant 
discourses. Despite scholarly curiosity about South Korea’s economic “miracle,” 
research on background knowledge system underlying the “miracle” is rare. Previous 
cultural research on East Asian economic growth mainly remains around its relationship 
with the Confucian tradition. In this respect, a contribution of this study is to expand 
cultural research on Asian economic development to specific developmental discourse 
and ideology at the national level. It has argued that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk was a 
dominant discourse that provided legitimacy to the Korean developmental regime and 
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its active drive for national economic development and modernization. For this, it has 
employed various cultural theories and a methodology of discourse analysis to 
investigate the formation and transformation of Koreans’ collective mentality, reflected 
in major newspaper texts. 
Third, this study has analyzed the interactions between global and national 
development discourses. It has paid attention to the importance of developmental 
discourse supporting developmental regime, in understanding a country’s 
developmental transformation. Under the global hegemony of the West, South Korea’s 
national development projects were deeply influenced by global discourses with 
Eurocentric implications. This study has found that Eurocentric interpretive paradigms 
are still deeply ingrained in the South Korean public’s worldview. In many ways, they 
are taken for granted as universal common sense. In this respect, this study has shown a 
need for research on the cultural effect of developmentalism on the transformation of 
societies. Even though modernization theory, for instance, lost its appeal as a valid 
development theory in academia, its basic assumptions and ideas are still effective in 
mainstream public discourse of Korea. It has displayed that Korea’s national 
developmental slogans and projects such as kŭndaehwa (modernization), segyehwa 
(globalization), and currently sŏnjinhwa (achieving advancement) have been supported 
by developmental discourses such as that of sŏnjin’guk. This situation raises a need for 
researchers to engage more actively with the influence of Eurocentric developmental 
ideas on society.   
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 And last, this study is important in understanding the history of Korea’s 
adaptation to the Eurocentric world order. Facing “external shock” from the Western 
expansion, Korea felt a need for its transformation modeling the West in the late 
nineteenth century. Under the global discourse of civilization, Koreans constructed the 
discourses of kaehwa and munmyŏng as a way to interpret the newly emerging world 
order. A number of researches have pointed out Eurocentric elements embedded in 
those early modern discourses. However, strangely enough, research on Koreans’ 
Eurocentric discursive construction reflecting the new Eurocentric global order in the 
postwar era is very rare. In this respect, this study has filled the research gap in the post-
world war period, by demonstrating that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is an equivalent to 
the previous kaehwa and munmyŏng discourses in terms of Koreans’ construction of 
national identities and worldviews vis-à-vis the West. In relation to this, this study is 
also significant in terms of the research on Eurocentrism in Korea. In this regard, it has 
demonstrated the interconnectedness between developmentalism and Eurocentrism in 
Korea, through the analysis of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk as a dominant public 
Eurocentric developmental discourse.  
 In a practical sense, I hope this study could contribute to deconstructing the 
West for reconstruction (Chakrabarty 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 2001/2009). Nederveen 
Pieterse (2001), for instance, appropriately raises a need for deconstructing the West for 
a multipolar global circumstance. In this regard, he mentions that: 
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Developmentalism is not merely a policy of economic and social change, or a 
philosophy of history. It reflects the ethos of Western culture and is intimately 
intertwined with Western history and culture. Ultimately the problem of 
developmentalism cannot be settled in terms of political economy, nor in terms of social 
philosophy, the critique of ideas or unpacking discourse; it requires a profound 
historical and cultural review of the Western project. This task we might term the 
deconstruction of the West [. . .]. (Nederveen Pieterse 2001:32) 
  
For Nederveen Pieterse, the deconstruction of the West is an effort to return it to an 
equal part of world history, which has been so far obfuscated by Eurocentrism. For him, 
the total negation of certain discursive frameworks is neither possible nor desirable 
given the hybrid nature of global history. As the conventional concept of “development” 
reflects Western ethos, he argues for the need for deconstruction of “development,” and 
adds that it is the “prerequisite for its reconstruction.” For him, the need for 
reconstruction is raised as a pluralist project, which values the diverse processes of 
development reflecting each society’s cultural and historical contexts. This does not 
necessarily mean relativism, in which the judgment of desirable values tends to be 
withheld. In this respect, he notes that “[t]he middle way between universalism and 
relativism is pluralism” (Nederveen Pieterse 2001:33). 
 Based upon the findings of this study, I would like to think about the 
contribution of the sŏnjin’guk discourse to the transformation of Korea so far, and its 
implication in Korea’s future development. The discourse of sŏnjin’guk began to be 
discursively formed in the 1960s, accompanying the formation of the South Korean 
developmental regime led by Park Chung-Hee. Even though the terms sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk had been sometimes used before, it was not until this period when they were 
somewhat systematically arranged to form a knowledge system determining South 
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Korean national identities and worldviews. Amidst the rise of global developmental 
discourses, which made an issue of the “development of underdeveloped regions” in the 
Cold War context, the formation of the sŏnjin’guk discourse was deeply influenced by 
those global discourses, e.g., modernization theory. Reflecting the global discourses’ 
distinction between the “developed” and the “underdeveloped,” or the “modern” and the 
“traditional,” the South Korean discourse distinguished sŏnjin’guk from hujin’guk on a 
universal path of progress. Amidst the harsh anti-communist policies of the Park regime, 
there was not much room for critical development theories, e.g., dependency theory, to 
be reflected in the formation of the sŏnjin’guk discourse. In this way, the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk took on Eurocentric inclination from the beginning. 
 Despite its Eurocentric tendency, however, the sŏnjin’guk discourse did not 
necessarily idealize the West before the 1980s. In those times, the West represented by 
sŏnjin’guk was regarded as advanced only in terms of industrialization or capitalist 
development. As noted above, various negative side-effects accompanying industrial 
development were well recognized by South Koreans. In this respect, the use of 
sŏnjin’guk was quite limited to referring to the industrially advanced country. 
Furthermore, sŏnjin’guk was used in distinction from the concept of munmyŏng-guk 
(civilized country), which referred to either materially or spiritually rich country. That is 
to say, the concept of sŏnjin’guk implied the materially rich country but did not 
necessarily mean spiritual advancement. In this respect, the status of sŏnjin’guk was 
often compared with that of Korea as munmyŏng-guk, whose cultural richness was still 
appreciated despite its material poverty.  
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In those respects, it is hard to say that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk was entirely 
Eurocentric before the 1980s. In this context, sŏnjin’guk was set as the entity to “catch 
up” in terms of industrialization, but the South Korean developmental regime did not 
necessarily follow Westernization. Despite their pro-West tendency, South Korean 
developmentalists showed strong nationalistic attitudes, and approached the West 
somewhat carefully in many aspects. Considering that the West or sŏnjin’guk had 
different interests from Korea, they were wary of its political economic intentions on 
the international stage. For instance, the Park regime showed a cautious attitude toward 
foreign capital in this context (Koo and Kim 1992:127). Therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to say that the South Korean developmental regime under Park Chung-Hee 
was far more nationalistic than Eurocentric. This nationalistic attitude of the South 
Korean developmental regime began to get dim vis-à-vis Eurocentrism in the 1980s in 
different global and national circumstances.   
 In political economic terms, one of the most important roles of the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk for the Park regime lay in providing a general knowledge system justifying 
the regime’s aggressive pursuit of economic development. Within the discursive 
framework, the nation’s economic growth was naturalized as a historical necessity of 
progress from hujin’guk to sŏnjin’guk. As such, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk gave 
legitimacy to the Park regime’s drive for economic development as the most urgent 
national goal. The discourse provided an intellectual ground for the national motivation 
for economic development. Western countries represented by sŏnjin’guk were set as the 
actual models for South Korea to “catch up” in the near future in its pursuit of the 
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national goal. In this respect, it can be said that the discourse of sŏnjin’guk played an 
important historical role in South Korea’s rapid economic development. 
As a general knowledge system, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, however, did not 
guide the country’s specific development policies. Rather, South Korea’s state-led rapid 
economic growth was clearly distinguished from the development paths of Western 
countries. In this respect, even though it set Western countries as the entities to catch up, 
South Korea did not exactly follow their models in its specific development strategies. 
For instance, even though the U.S. was the most frequently referred sŏnjin’guk at the 
time, the South Korean regime, rather, envisioned an ideal model of welfare state in its 
drive for economic growth. In relation to this, an important material ground for the 
legitimacy of the Korean developmental regime was that the economic growth 
accompanied the improvement of ordinary people’s quality of life. At the time, the 
majority of the Korean population directly experienced the improvement of material life 
led by the national economic growth, with a perception that their country was 
“developing” and eventually approaching sŏnjin’guk. The developmental regime’s 
authoritative social policies were, in large part, tolerated and consented in this context.  
In this respect, it is important to note that the South Korean developmental 
regime was not just authoritarian, but capable of improving people’s material life.52 In 
relation to this, the ideal model of sŏnjin’guk was not the Anglo-Saxon liberal one, but 
that of sŏnjin pokji kukga (advanced welfare state). The issue of welfare was 
                                                 
52 This historical experience is still an important factor in today’s South Korean politics. The election of 
President Lee Myung-Bak in 2007, who has an image of one of the most successful CEOs during the 
rapid economic growth period, reflects people’s continuous desire for steeper national economic growth 
and the tangible improvement of their material life.    
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discursively highlighted in relation to economic development, and the developmental 
regime promoted that economic growth would lead the country to a welfare state. The 
imaginary of sŏnjin’guk with welfare characteristics in the 1970s and 80s made a clear 
distinction from its current image centered on global competitiveness with neoliberal 
inclination.  
Despite its contribution to Korea’s achievement of economic growth and 
modernization, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk exposes its limitations in various aspects in 
contemporary historical circumstances. From a practical point of view, it should be 
questioned whether the basic assumptions of the discourse, which provided legitimacy 
to the twentieth-century’s modernization process, are still useful in the contemporary 
and future contexts. Above all, the discourse basically assumes that South Korea is still 
chasing the West in a universal race of development. This shows that South Korea is 
still under a conventional notion of modernization project, when the limitations of the 
singular form of Western modernity and its developmental models have widely been 
recognized (Smith 1973; Webster 1984; Rist 1997; Nederveen Pieterse 1998, 2001; 
Mehmet 1999). A variety of movements are notable around the globe today to change 
our development foci from growth to more essential values such as sustainability, 
quality of life, subsidiarity, diversity, equity, etc. (International Forum on Globalization 
2004).  
In this respect, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk in its current form tends to 
circumscribe South Koreans’ imagination within a conventional modern paradigm, with 
a focus on GDP per capita. In a global sense, the Eurocentric hierarchical assumptions 
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of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk tend to disregard the diversity of human society. 
Eurocentric discourses tend to suppose something essentially singular, pure, and 
disconnected, while the reality is rather plural, hybrid, and connected. As Koreans’ own 
construction, the discourse of sŏnjin’guk rather relies on images than realities, and much 
information about sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk is, in fact, ungrounded. In this respect, the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk hinders South Koreans’ contextual and historical understanding 
of realities. This raises a need for developing a contextual way of looking at the world, 
rather than masking the complexity of reality by confining it within the blanket 
concepts of sŏnjin’guk and hujin’guk. For instance, the Bhutanese pursuit of “Gross 
National Happiness” (Ura and Galay 2004) should be approached in their social and 
cultural contexts, rather than distorting the reality by designating them hujin’guk and 
thus depriving them of their own identity. With regard to this, a future discourse should 
be able to open a possibility to South Koreans that they might have as many things to 
learn from, for instance, the Bhutanese as from the West.  
 In those respects, I would argue that it is the time for South Koreans to 
reconsider the concept of sŏnjin’guk to establish a more socially and culturally oriented 
model for the future, which reflects the complexity and hybridity of the world, and 
values various forms of living around the globe. An important implication of the 
historical understanding of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk is that it always recognizes the 
possibility of change. From a global perspective, a real paradox is that South Korea can 
never be a true sŏnjin’guk with the current form of the discourse of sŏnjin’guk. This is 
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because any country obsessed with Eurocentrism is not, and should not be, a true 
sŏnjin’guk in our future world.  
This dissertation intends to problematize a taken-for-granted South Koreans’ 
developmental episteme, which naturalizes development centered on economic growth. 
As is reflected in the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, South Koreans are still obsessed with the 
increase of GDP per capita, and this obsession is politically appropriated by 
conservative ruling groups to maintain their legitimacy. In the contemporary context, 
the discourse of sŏnjin’guk tends to be associated with the global neoliberal trend, and 
promotes an argument that neoliberal transformation of the country is the only way to 
win global competition and to eventually become a full-fledged sŏnjin’guk. A practical 
implication of this study is that it is the time for South Koreans to critically evaluate 
their GDP-centered development notions. By various international criteria, South Korea 
is already economically developed enough (World Bank 2010b). In this respect, the 
South Korean sense of lacking in economic aspects is not as much externally 
conditioned as is derived from their own perceptions. Moreover, it should be recognized 
that various problems in the contemporary South Korean society, such as deepening 
socio-economic polarization, intense educational competition, low sense of happiness, 
etc, are not derived from that the nation is not yet a fully developed country, but that, in 
large part, it is still sticking to the GDP-centered concept of development. In this regard, 
the current concept of sŏnjin’guk can be a growth-centered illusion. Furthermore, the 
current tendency of universalizing Western developmental perspectives in the process 
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of pursuing sŏnjin’guk can cause a risk for South Korean society, as imperialism always 
takes on an air of universalism.   
Therefore, I would suggest that South Koreans should seriously engage in 
reconstructing their notion of development and their vision of sŏnjin’guk in a way to 
reflect the merits and demerits of their own society. For this, it is the time for economic 
growth to go back to its proper position as a means rather than a goal. There are many 
priceless things on their own, such as communitarian and peace-loving traditions, which 
cannot be exchanged with economic growth. In this respect, the current form of the 
discourse of sŏnjin’guk tends to circumscribe their ability to imagine a different concept 
of development, by prioritizing economic growth indexed by GDP per capita. In order 
to overcome the limitation of imaginary, South Koreans need critical and historical 
ways of thinking about development. As for the discourse of sŏnjin’guk, the taken-for-
granted assumptions and visions of the discourse reflect their own particularistic, rather 
than universal, perceptions of the self and the world. In relation to this, they need to 
have more diverse and critical views on the distinction between sŏnjin’guk and 
hujin’guk. By different criteria, such as the crime rate or the sense of social solidarity, 
the South Korean society can be far more advanced than other societies that they refer 
to sŏnjin’guk. In a similar vein, many low-income countries can be regarded as 
sŏnjin’guk insofar as they have successfully established a peace-loving, happiness-
centered model of development, reflecting its own historical, cultural backgrounds. 
In regard to a new concept of development, economic growth is basically one of 
the conditions for national development. The importance of economic growth varies 
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according to societies’ material needs. If other important social, cultural values have to 
be sacrificed under the cause of economic growth, it is hardly a situation of 
development in a comprehensive sense. In this way, economic growth is not a sufficient 
condition for national development, not to mention that for sŏnjin’guk. In terms of 
modernity, South Korea has achieved a distinctive modernity distinguished from the 
modernities of Western societies, in which various traditional, Asian, and Western 
elements are intermingled. In this respect, they need to have confidence in their 
modernity, going beyond the self-orientalistic attitudes reflected in the discourse of 
sŏnjin’guk. The concept of modernities pays attention to the individuality of each 
society’s modernity as a result of its own historical experiences. In this respect, it is 
reluctant to make a hierarchy between modernities, not to mention to regard modernity 
as singular. In this sense, large part of hierarchy constructed between hujin’guk and 
sŏnjin’guk in the current discourse is logically and empirically ungrounded. In relation 
to this, Nederveen Pieterse (2001:157) notes that “the line between ‘developing’ and 
‘developed’ worlds has been blurring.” 
An important contribution of post-developmentalism in development studies is 
that it has provided ways to de-naturalize the concept of development and to recognize 
it as a discursive construction charged with Western political economic interests. From 
“non-developmental” perspectives, it has presented discursive frameworks to criticize 
“development” as a reflection of Western ways of looking at the world. In this way, it 
has played an important role in deconstructing the Eurocentric notion of development, 
which is obsessed with economic growth. A limitation of post-development 
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perspectives, however, is that they end up with an anti-development attitude by 
reducing it mainly to a Eurocentric discursive construction (Nederveen Pieterse 2009:ch. 
7). Thus, they are hard to be accepted as a practical option to industrial societies. Their 
usefulness mainly lies in recognizing the discursive nature of development and 
deconstructing the Eurocentric notions of development. Rather than the anti-
development position, I would argue for diversified and historically, culturally situated 
views on development. In this respect, the value of economic development should not 
be either disregarded or exaggerated. A preferable development process is to enhance 
various social, cultural, political, and economic values together, rather than to sacrifice 
others by prioritizing one of them.   
As for South Korea’s future development, I would suggest that South Koreans 
move beyond the conventional modern (or modernization) paradigm. As is argued by 
the current sŏnjinhwa project, it is the time to go towards a mature country, following 
the achievement of industrialization and democratization. However, a crucial problem 
of the current sŏnjinhwa project, mainly promoted by the government and ruling elites, 
is that its episteme is confined within the Eurocentric neoliberal modern paradigm. In 
fact, various neoliberal policies, such as financial liberalization and the privatization of 
public institutions, are promoted under the name of sŏnjinhwa. Considering the 
limitations of neoliberalism as a development strategy, I highly suspect if the current 
sŏnjinhwa project would lead the country to the “advanced” level.  
I think that desirable sŏnjinhwa should make efforts to go beyond the 
Eurocentric neoliberal notions of development. In relation to this, the new notion of 
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sŏnjinhwa should, paradoxically, be constructed upon the deconstruction of the 
conventional distinction between hujin’guk and sŏnjin’guk. This needs a perception that 
development is non-linear multiple processes, rather than a certain achieved condition. 
In this respect, Nederveen Pieterse (2001:159) points out that development is a 
“collective learning experience” and that “[l]earning is open-ended.” This conception of 
development involves resistance to any privileged one-dimensional perspective. At the 
same time, it means plural, open, and multi-dimensional approaches to development.  
For the past decade, South Korean society has been severely impacted by 
neoliberalism. Under the neoliberal transformation in various fields, which has been 
promoted by the government as the only way to survive in global competition, socio-
economic conditions for the working population have deteriorated in many aspects 
(Jang 2006). The causes of winning global competition and of eventually becoming 
sŏnjin’guk have played a major role in oppressing resistances to the neoliberal 
transformation. Meanwhile, as this study has shown, the publicly perceived condition of 
GDP per capita for sŏnjin’guk has increased from $20,000 to $30,000, both of which 
are far higher than internationally used criteria for high-income country.   
It is hard to say at this point where South Korea is heading towards now. Is it 
continuing the “miracle of the Han river”? It seems to me that South Koreans are now 
somewhat confusing about the direction of their country after the “miracle.” Lacking 
the ability to see beyond the conventional modern paradigm, they are still stuck in the 
Eurocentric notion of GDP-centered development. They are still trapped in the modern 
game when they need to create a far more sustainable and comprehensive model of 
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development. Given the nature of capital and the competitive global order, the Korean 
construction of new model should go in tandem with the global trend. In this respect, 
South Korea should not consider itself as in a passive position vis-à-vis the global trend. 
Rather, it is a time for Koreans to consider a way to contribute to the desirable change 
of the world. I believe that with abundant peaceful and communitarian cultural heritages, 
Koreans have much potential to construct a new developmental model, which is far 
more comprehensive and communitarian than the Eurocentric one and eventually 
contributive to a better world.  
A main limitation of this research is related to its attempt to cover quite a long 
historical period. As a pioneering work on the historical interactions between Korean 
and global Eurocentric discourses, this study has ambitiously tried to look over the long 
historical times. Thus, while providing a historical overview of discourses, it has not 
paid sufficient attention to detailed aspects of the historical flow. Besides, this research 
has mainly relied upon the analysis of some representative newspapers. In these 
respects, my future research will focus on elaborating details of the historical flow, 
based upon the analyses of a broader range of research materials.  
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